| Author | Message | | gchq | | Posted: Thu Oct 28, 2004 8:35 am Post subject: APPENDIX I |
| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX I
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following job description, taken from the U.S. Government Organization Manual, 1959-1960, page 143, is a typical government definition of the term, "special operations". It also defines the work I was in from 1955 through 1963, whether it was with the Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations).
"Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) is the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense in the functional fields of intelligence, counterintelligence (except as otherwise specifically assigned), communications security, Central Intelligence Agency relationship and special operations, and psychological warfare operations. He performs functions in his assigned fields of responsibility such as:
1.recommending policies and guidance governing Department of Defense planning and program development;
2. reviewing plans and programs of the military departments for carrying out approved policies and evaluating the administration and management of approved plans and programs as a basis on which to recommend to the Secretary of Defense necessary actions to provide for more effective, efficient, and economical administration and operations and the elimination of duplication;
3. reviewing the development and execution of plans and programs of the National Security Agency and related activities of the department of Defense; and
4. developing Department of Defense positions and providing for Department of Defense support in connection with special operations activities of the United States Government. In the performance of his functions, he coordinates actions, as appropriate, with the military departments and other Department of Defense agencies having collateral or related functions and maintains liaison with the Department of State, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Information Agency, and other United States and foreign government organizations on matters in his assigned fields of responsibility. In the course of exercising full staff functions, he is authorized to issue instructions appropriate to carrying out policies approved by the Secretary of Defense for his assigned fields of responsibility. He also exercises the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense relating to the direction and control of the National Security Agency and related activities of the Department of Defense. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) is appointed by the Secretary of Defense." | |  | | gchq | | Posted: Fri Oct 29, 2004 8:20 am Post subject: The Secret Team - Appendix II |
| The Secret Team - Appendix II
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX II
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Title 50 - War and National Defense, Chapter 15 - National Security contains, in one place, a collation of most of the law as it pertains to the Central Intelligence Agency. Most people who write about the CIA and who talk about the CIA - indeed, many who have served with the CIA - have never read this law. It is most significant that the legislation that pertains to war and national defense is the same legislation that includes all reference to the CIA. It is almost as if the bomb contained its own live fuse or the gun came with the trigger cocked for action. As we have seen, during the past twenty-five years the CIA has become the active agent that ignites the military establishment whenever that great mass becomes supercritical.
Fundamental to the whole concept and character of the CIA is the statement of the five powers and duties, which appears in Section 403 (d). This is a precise, clear, and unequivocal delineation of what Congress and the President wanted the Central Intelligence Agency to be. The language of the law has never been substantively altered; yet in practice the CIA and its Secret Team mentors have changed it beyond recognition. (This appendix includes all important material relevant to the CIA from the National Security Act.)
§401. Congressional declaration of purpose.
In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide a Department of Defense, including the three military Departments of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide that each military department shall be separately organized under its own Secretary and shall function under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide for their unified direction under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense, but not to merge these departments or services; to provide for the establishment of unified or specified combatant commands, and a clear and direct line of command to such commands; to eliminate unnecessary duplication in the Department of Defense, and particularly in the field of research and engineering by vesting its overall direction and control in the Secretary of Defense; to provide more effective, efficient, and economical administration in the Department of Defense; to provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces but not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces nor an overall armed forces general staff.
(July 6, 1947, ch. 343, § , 61 Stat. 496; Aug. 10, 1949, ch. 412, § 2, 63 Stat. 579; Aug 6, 1958, Pub. L. 85-599, § 2, 72 Stat. 514)
§ 402. National Security Council.
(a) Establishment, presiding officer; functions, composition.
There is established a council to be known as the National Security Council (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Council").
The President of the United States shall preside over meetings of the Council:
Provided, That in his absence he may designate a member of the Council to preside in his place.
The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.
The Council shall be composed of -
(1) the President;
(2) the Vice President;
(3) the Secretary of State;
(4) the Secretary of Defense;
(5) the Director for Mutual Security;
(6) The Chairman of the National Security Resources Board; and
(7) the Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive departments and of the military departments, the Chairman of the Munitions Board, and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board, when appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve at his pleasure.
(b) Additional functions.
In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security, it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council -
(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and
(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith.
(c) Executive secretary; appointment and compensation; staff employees.
The Council shall have a staff to be headed by a civilian executive secretary who shall be appointed by the President. The executive secretary, subject to the direction of the Council, is authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title %, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to perform such duties as may be prescribed by the Council in connection with the performance of its functions.
(d) Recommendations and reports.
The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and such other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require. (July 6, 1947, ch. 343, title I, § 101, 61 Stat. 497; Aug. 10, 1949, ch. 412, § 3, 63 Stat. 579; Oct. 28, 1949, ch. 782, title XI, § 1106 (a), 63 Stat. 972; Oct. 10, 1951, ch. 479, title V, § 501 (e) (1), 65 Stat. 378.)
1949 - Subsec. (a) Act Aug. 10, 1949, added the Vice President to the Council, removed the Secretaries of the military departments, to authorize the President to add, with the consent of the Senate, Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive departments, to authorize the President to add, with the consent of the Senate, Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive departments and of the military department, and the Chairmen of the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board.
The National Security Council, together with its functions, records, property, personnel, and unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, and other funds (available or to be made available) were transferred to the Executive Office of the President by 1949 Reorg. Plan No. 4, eff. Aug. 19, 1949, 14 F.R. 5227, 63 Stat. 1067, set out in the Appendix to Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.
§ 403. Central Intelligence Agency.
(a) Establishment; Director and Deputy Director; appointment.
There is established under the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence who shall be the head thereof, and with a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence who shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director during his absence or disability. The Director and the Deputy Director shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in an active or retired status, or from among individuals in civilian life: Provided, however, That at no time shall the two positions of the Director and Deputy Director be occupied simultaneously by commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in active or retired status.
(b) Commissioned officer as Director or Deputy Director; powers and limitations, effect on commissioned status.
(1) If a commissioned officer of the armed services is appointed as Director, or Deputy Director, then -
(A) in the performance of his duties as Director, or Deputy Director, he shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect to him if he were a civilian in no way connected with the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, or the armed services or any component thereof; and
(B) he shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control, powers, or functions (other than such as he possesses, or is authorized or directed to exercise, as Director, or Deputy Director) with respect to the armed services or any component thereof, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force, or any branch, bureau, unit, or division thereof, or with respect to any of the personnel (military or civilian) of any of the foregoing.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection, the appointment to the office of Director, or Deputy Director, of a commissioned officer of the armed services, and his acceptance of and service in such office, shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed services, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such commissioned officer shall, while serving in the office of Director, or Deputy Director, continue to hold rank and grade not lower than that in which serving at the time of his appointment and to receive the military pay and allowances (active or retired, as the case may be, including personal money allowance) payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and length of service for which the appropriate department shall be reimbursed from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Central Intelligence Agency. He also shall be paid by the Central Intelligence Agency from such funds an annual compensation at a rate equal to the amount by which the compensation established for such position exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and allowances.
(3) The rank or grade of any such commissioned officer shall, during the period in which such commissioned officer occupies the office of Director of Central Intelligence, or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, be in addition to the numbers and percentages otherwise authorized and appropriated for the armed service of which he is a member.
(c) Termination of employment of officers and employees; effect on right of subsequent employment.
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 652 of Title 5, or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, but such termination shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the Government if declared eligible for such employment by the United States Civil Service Commission.
(d) Powers and duties.
For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council -
(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;
(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: Provided further, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: And provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.
(e) Inspection of intelligence of other departments.
To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination: Provided, however, That upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national security.
(f) Termination of National Intelligence Authority; transfer of personnel, property, records, and unexpended funds.
Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) of this section has taken office -
(1) the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, February 5, 1946) shall cease to exist; and
(2) the personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group are transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, and such Group shall cease to exist. Any unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available or authorized to be made available for such Group shall be available and shall be authorized to be made available in like manner for expenditure by the Agency.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, § 102, 61 Stat. 498; Apr. 4, 1953, ch. 16, 67 Stat. 20.)
EX. ORD. NO. 11460. PRESIDENT’S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
Ex. Ord. No. 11460, Mar. 20, 1969, 34 F.R. 5535, provided:
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:
SECTION 1. There is hereby established the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, hereinafter referred to as "the Board". The Board shall:
(1) advise the President concerning the objectives, conduct, management and coordination of the various activities making up the overall national intelligence effort;
(2) conduct a continuing review and assessment of foreign intelligence and related activities in which the Central Intelligence Agency and other Government departments and agencies are engaged;
(3) receive, consider and take appropriate action with respect to matters identified to the Board, by the Central Intelligence Agency and other Government departments and agencies of the intelligence community, in which the support of the Board will further the effectiveness of the national intelligence effort; and
(4) report to the President concerning the Board’s findings and appraisals, and make appropriate recommendations for actions to achieve increased effectiveness of the Government’s foreign intelligence effort in meeting national intelligence needs.
SEC. 2. In order to facilitate performance of the Board’s functions, the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of all other departments and agencies shall make available to the Board all information with respect to foreign intelligence and related matters which the Board may require for the purpose of carrying out its responsibilities to the President in accordance with the terms of this Order. Such information made available to the Board shall be given all necessary security protection in accordance with the terms and provisions of applicable laws and regulations.
SEC. 3. Members of the Board shall be appointed by the President from among persons outside the Government, qualified on the basis of knowledge and experience in matters relating to the national defense and security, or possessing other knowledge and abilities which may be expected to contribute to the effective performance of the Board’s duties. The members of the Board shall receive such compensation and allowances, consonant with law, as may be prescribed hereafter.
SEC 4. The Board shall have a staff headed by an Executive Secretary, who shall be appointed by the President and shall receive such compensation and allowances, consonant with law, as may be prescribed by the Board. The Executive Secretary shall be authorized, subject to the approval of the Board and consonant with law, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary for performance of the Board’s duties.
SEC. 5.
Compensation and allowances of the Board, the Executive Secretary, and members of the staff, together with other expenses arising in connection with the work of the Board, shall be paid from the appropriation appearing under the heading "Special Projects" in the Executive Office Appropriation Act, 1969, Public Law 90-350, 82 Stat. 195, and, to the extent permitted by law, from any corresponding appropriation which may be made for subsequent years. Such payments shall be made without regard to the provisions of section 3681 of the Revised Statues and section 9 of the Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1027 (31 U.S.C. 672 and 673)
SEC. 6.
Executive Order No. 10938 of May 4, 1961, is hereby revoked.
RICHARD NIXON.
SHORT TITLE
Act June 20, 1949, § 10, formerly § 12, 63 Stat. 212, renumbered July 7, 1958, Pub. L. 85-507, § 21(b) (2), 7 Stat. 337, provided that Act June 20, 1949, which is classified to sections 403a-403j of this title, should be popularly known as the "Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949".
§ 403c. Same; procurement authority.
(a) In the performance of its functions the Central Intelligence Agency is authorized to exercise the authorities contained in sections 151 (c) (1)-(6), (10), (1), (15), (17), 155 and 159 of Title 41.
(b) In the exercise of the authorities granted in subsection (a) of this section, the term "Agency head" shall mean the Director, the Deputy Director, or the Executive of the Agency.
(c) The determinations and decisions provided in subsection (a) of this section to be made by the Agency head may be made with respect to individual purchases and contracts or with respect to classes of purchases or contracts, and shall be final. Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, the Agency head is authorized to delegate his powers provided in this section, including the making of such determinations and decisions, in his discretion and subject to his direction to any other officer or officers or officials of the Agency.
(d) The power of the Agency head to make the determinations or decisions specified in sections 151 (c) (1), (15), and 154 (a) of Title 41 shall not be delegable. Each determination or decision required by sections 151 (c) (12), (15), 153, or 154 (a) of Title 41, shall be based upon written findings made by the official making such determinations, which findings shall be final and shall be available within the Agency for a period of at least six years following the date of the determination. (June 20, 1949, ch. 227, § 3, 63 Stat. 208.)
§ 403f. Same; general authorities of Agency.
In the performance of its functions, the Central Intelligence Agency is authorized to -
(a) Transfer to and receive from other Government agencies such sums as may be approved by the Office of Management and Budget, for the performance of any of the functions or activities authorized under sections 403 and 405 of this title, and any other Government agency is authorized to transfer to or receive from the Agency such sums without regard to any provisions of law limiting or prohibiting transfers between appropriations. Sums transferred to the Agency in accordance with this paragraph may be expended for the purposes and under the authority of sections 403a to 403c, 403e to 403h, and 403j of this title without regard to limitations of appropriations from which transferred;
(b) Exchange funds without regard to section 543 of Title 31;
(c) Reimburse other Government agencies for services of personnel assigned to the Agency, and such other Government agencies are authorized, without regard to provisions of law to the contrary, so to assign or detail any officer or employee for duty with the Agency;
(d) Authorize couriers and guards designated by the Director to carry firearms when engaged in transportation of confidential documents and materials affecting the national defense and security;
(e) Make alterations, improvements, and repairs on premises rented by the Agency, and pay rent therefor without regard to limitations on expenditures contained in the Act of June 30, 1932, as amended: Provided, That in each case the Director shall certify that exception from such limitations is necessary to the successful performance of the Agency’s functions or to the security of its activities. (June 20, 1949, ch. 227, § 5, formerly § 6, 63 Stat. 211; June 26, 1951, ch. 151, 65 Stat. 89; renumbered July 7, 1958, Pub. L. 88-448, title IV, § 402(a) (28), 78 Stat. 494; 1970 Reorg. Plan No. 2, eff. July 1, 1970, 35 F.R. 7959, 84 Stat. -.)
REFERENCES IN TEXT
The act of June 30, 1932, as amended, referred to in subsec. (c), is the Legislative Branch Appropriation Act, 1933, act June 30, 1932, ch. 314, 47 Stat. 393, and is classified to section 303b of Title 40, Public Buildings, Property, and Works.
CODIFICATION
Section was not enacted as a part of the National Security Act of 1947 which comprises this chapter.
§ 403g. Same; protection of nature of Agency’s functions.
In the interests of the security of the foreign intelligence activities of the United States and in order further to implement the proviso of section 403 (d) (3) of this title that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, the Agency shall be exempted from the provisions of section 654 of Title 5, and the provisions of any other law which require the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency: Provided, That in furtherance of this section, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall make no reports to the Congress in connection with the Agency under section 947(b) of Title 5. (June 20, 1949, ch. 227, § 6, formerly § 7, 63 Stat. 211, renumbered July 7, 1958, Pub. L. 85-507, § 21 (b) (), 72 Stat. 337; 1970 Reorg. Plan No. , eff. July 1, 1970, 35 F.R. 7959, 84 Stat. -.)
§403h. Same; admission of essential aliens; limitation on number.
Whenever the Director, the Attorney General, and the Commissioner of Immigration shall determine that the entry of a particular alien into the United States for permanent residence is in the interest of national security or essential to the furtherance of the national intelligence mission, such alien and his immediate family shall be given entry into the United States for permanent residence without regard to their inadmissibility under the immigration or any other laws and regulations, or to the failure to comply with such laws and regulations pertaining to admissibility: Provided, That the number of aliens and members of their immediate families entering the United States under the authority of this section shall in no case exceed one hundred persons in any one fiscal year. (June 20, 1949, ch. 227, § 7, formerly § 8, 63 Stat. 212, renumbered July 7, 1958, Pub. L. 85-507, § 21 (b) (2), 72 Stat. 337.)
CODIFICATION
Section was not enacted as a part of the National Security Act of 1947 which comprises this chapter.
§ 403j. Central Intelligence Agency: appropriations; expenditures.
(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, sums made available to the Agency by appropriation or otherwise may be expended for purposes necessary to carry out its functions, including -
(1) personal services, including personal services without regard to limitations on types of persons to be employed, and rent at the seat of government and elsewhere; health-service program as authorized by section 150 of Title 5; rental of news-reporting services; purchase or rental and operation of photographic, reproduction, cryptographic, duplication and printing machines, equipment and devices, and radio-receiving and radio-sending equipment; purchase, maintenance, operation, repair, and hire of passenger motor vehicles, and aircraft, and vessels of all kinds; subject to policies established by the Director, transportation of officers and employees of the Agency in Government-owned automotive equipment between their domiciles and places of employment, where such personnel are engaged in work which makes such transportation necessary, and transportation in such equipment, to and from school of children of Agency personnel who have quarters for themselves and their families at isolated stations outside the continental United States where adequate public or private transportation is not available; printing and binding; purchase, maintenance, and cleaning of firearms, including purchase, storage, and maintenance of ammunition; subject to policies established by the Director, expenses of travel in connection with, and expenses incident to attendance at meetings of professional, technical, scientific, and other similar organizations when such attendance would be a benefit in the conduct of the work of the Agency; association and library dues; payment of premiums or costs of surety bonds for officers or employees without regard to the provisions of section 14 of Title 6; payment of claims pursuant to Title 8; acquisition of necessary land and the clearing of such land; construction of buildings and facilities without regard to sections 59 and 67 of Title 40; repair, rental, operation, and maintenance of buildings, utilities, facilities, and appurtenances; and
(2) supplies, equipment, and personnel and contractual services otherwise authorized by law and regulations, when approved by the Director.
(b) The sums made available to the Agency may be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds; and for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified. (June 0, 1949, ch. 227, § 8, formerly § 10, 63 Stat. 212, renumbered July 7, 1958, Pub. L. 85-507, § 21 (b) (), 72 Stat. 337)
REFERENCES IN TEXT
Sections 259 and 267 of Title 40, referred to in text, was repealed by Pub. L. 86-249, § 17 (12), Sept. 9, 1959, 73 Stat. 485. See chapter 12 of Title 40, Public Buildings, Property and Works.
CODIFICATION
Section was not enacted as a part of the National Security Act of 1947 which comprises this chapter.
§ 405 Advisory Committees; appointment; compensation of part-time personnel; applicability of other laws.
(a) The Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the National Security Council, acting through its Executive Secretary, are authorized to appoint such advisory committees and to employ, consistent with other provisions of this Act, such part-time advisory personnel as they may deem necessary in carrying out their respective functions and the functions of agencies under their control. Persons holding other offices or positions under the United States for which they receive compensation, while serving as members of such committees, shall receive no additional compensation for such service. Other members of such committees and other part-time advisory personnel so employed may serve without compensation or may receive compensation at a rate not to exceed $50 for each day of service, as determined by the appointing authority.
(b) Service of an individual as a member of any such advisory committee, or in any other part-time capacity for a department or agency hereunder, shall not be considered as service bringing such individual within the provisions of sections 281, 283, or 284 of Title 18, unless the act of such individual, which by such section is made unlawful when performed by an individual referred to in such section, is with respect to any particular matter which directly involves a department or agency which such person is advising or in which such department or agency is directly interested. (July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title III, § 303, 61 Stat. 507; Aug. 10, 1949, ch. 41, § 10(c), 63 Stat. 585; Sept. e, 1954, ch. 163, § 8, 68 Stat. 128.)
§ 407. Study or plan of surrender; use of appropriations.
No part of the funds appropriated in any act shall be used to pay (1) any person, firm, or corporation, or any combinations of persons, firms, or corporations, to conduct a study or to plan when and how or in what circumstances the Government of the United States should surrender this country and its people to any foreign power, (2) the salary or compensation of any employee or official of the Government of the united States who proposes or contracts or who has entered into contracts for the making of studies or plans for the surrender by the government of the United States of this country and its people to any foreign power in any event or under any circumstances. (Pub. L. 85-766, ch. XVI, § 1602, Aug. 27, 1958, 72 Stat. 884.)
Codification
Section was not enacted as part of the National Security Act of 1947, which comprises this chapter.
§ 409. Definitions of military departments.
(a) The term "Department of the Army" as used in this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Army at the seat of the government and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Army.
(b) The term "Department of the Navy" as used in this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Navy at the seat of the government; the headquarters, United States Marine Corps; the entire operating forces of the united States Navy, including naval aviation, and of the United States Marine Corps, including the reserve components of such forces; all field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Navy; and the United States Coast Guard when operating as a part of the Navy pursuant to law.
(c) The term "Department of the Air Force" as used in this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Air Force at the seat of the government and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Air Force. (July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title II, §§ 205(c), 206(a), 207(c), 61 Stat. 501, 502. | | | | gchq | | Posted: Sat Oct 30, 2004 8:42 am Post subject: APPENDIX III |
| The Secret Team
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX III
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The document that follows is one of the most influential documents of the past quarter-century. It was written and compiled from the work of many nameless and faceless authors within the government and from other sources close to these men in the academic world and the world of business. It was drafted by an Army General, Richard G. Stilwell, while he was serving as a member of a special Presidential committee. It includes much material written by Air Force General Edward G. Lansdale, among others. Its origins come from the depths of a special source reaching far back into the history of the man. Its twentieth-century manifestation occurs in the Russian Revolution of 1917 and in other revolutions since that time. These paramilitary ideas and methods know no ideology and no creed or code. They are the craft of those who would seek power and of those who would fight wars by technical means, and who would utilize the military organization of the state to gain that power by influencing the minds of the "elite", by engaging in social, political, economic, and almost incidentally, military activity.
As we have said this course of action begins with a high-sounding resolve to improve the lot of the poor "under-developed" nations, using the vehicle of the Military Assistance Program to take over the army of that country. This then is repeated in other countries, as we have seen, becoming evident in recent times in such countries as Greece and Brazil, among others.
If this were all that it meant we might be able to treat it lightly as another evidence of the inherent activity of the "do-gooder" instinct of Western man. However, it is only reasonable to see, in this action, the ominous fact that it is the American soldier who is the teacher of this doctrine; and it is the same American soldier who becomes his own student. Since this action was begun in 1959 tens of thousands - yes, hundreds of thousands - of American military men, a whole new generation, have grown up believing that this is not only the right thing for "those foreigners" but for Americans as well.
The following document begins mildly and almost reasonably. It gets to the heart of the matter smoothly and without alarm. However, as it builds and creates its own crescendo it begins to veer from its scholarly and well-tempered tone and approaches the type of delivery made famous by such men as Hitler, Mussolini, and Joseph Stalin. When highest officials of this Government assert that the majority of the nations of the uncommitted "Third World" would be better off under the control of their military elite, an elite to be selected by Americans, it is time for other Americans to read, to listen to, and to sound the warning on the possibility that this same American elite may not become persuaded of its own role in this country.
Note that this paper was drafted in May 1959. It was drafted during the Eisenhower Administration, and it was a forerunner of such catchwords, generally associated with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, as counterinsurgency, pacification, special forces, subversive insurgency, and the like. These terms had all been introduced before Kennedy's tenure and were simply awaiting their day in the world of the Secret Team.
In keeping with Secret Team practice, this so-called draft was unclassified so that it could be processed through all sections of the elite without control of transmittal or copies.
May 15, 1959
TRAINING UNDER THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM
(with emphasis on development of leaders)
CONTENTS
I Introduction
II Present Pattern
III New Horizons
IV Leadership Programs
Non-Military Sector
Military Sector
V Development of Indigenous Educational Systems
VI New Roles for the Military
VII Development of Values
U.S. Training Environment
Role of the Advisor
VIII Requirements and Recommendations
I INTRODUCTION
The Committee has thus far placed primary stress on defining the quantitative threshold and material guidelines of a continuing mutual security effort. Yet the Committee is mindful - and indeed so stated in transmitting its Interim Report - that an adequate United States contribution to the security and growth of our Free World associates, and particularly the less developed countries, involves much more than the provision of military hardware and economic capital, vital though these ingredients be. The indispensable complement, and a clear third dimension of United States programs, is the development of requisite institutional frameworks, managerial organizations and individual talents to effectively use the physical resource inputs. The Committee has had reports, from all quarters, that the severe shortage of trained executives, administrators, and other categories of decision makers is a major impediment to balanced economic growth in the less developed areas. It is conscious that arms alone do not an army make; that leadership, collective motivation, and identification with the aspirations of countrymen are equal determinants of a military establishment adequate to its tasks and compatible with its environment. It is impressed with the magnitude of the tasks which face the fledgling nations in the quest for symbols to replace those no longer valid; in the adaptation of cultural heritage to new settings; in the development of political, social and ideological foundations; and in meeting today's manpower deficiencies while laying the educational base for the future.
One is impelled to speak out on this subject because the record demonstrates that, far from receiving major attention, human resources development has been relegated to secondary importance.
II THE PRESENT PATTERN
Admittedly, there are impressive statistics as to the numbers of foreign personnel who have received training, under auspices of the Mutual Security Program, in the United States, in their own countries, or in third areas. But the concept and the approach have been largely mechanistic. While there has been a measurable shift in the past year, the bulk of ICA training programs are still "project-oriented": designed to meet the specific administrative, technical, and professional skill requirements generated by the concurrent ICA developmental activities. Likewise, the thrust of the massive training programs of the U.S. military departments has been determined by the materiel aspects of the MAP: production of specialists, technicians and junior tacticians to handle the equipment and systems furnished.
Certainly, these instructional efforts have been essential. Certainly also, such programs must continue, and probably at an expanded rate.
In the military area, new technical training dimensions are explicit in the second round of arms aid involving provision of advanced weapons systems for the NATO nations and an accelerated rate of modernization elsewhere. They are also explicit in the commendable new emphasis on improvement of indigenous logistic apparata and operating techniques. The Committee is confident that the minor obstacles to expansion will be surmounted and that the Defense agencies will press on to develop and implement programs of requisite scope in these categories.
In the civil sector, one need only contemplate the staggering estimates of skill deficiencies throughout Afro-Asia to appreciate the magnitude of the gap. Unlike the military, the ICA's ability to meet any measurable portion of this widening gap, at the technical level, is limited by the general inflexibility of its operational base - built of direct hire personnel and a system of contract which demand detailed governmental administration, planning and supervision. There is a need to change the nature of the base, to bring the tremendous strength and unparalleled competence of our non-governmental institutions to bear on this training problem and, concomitantly, to shift the government role to the more suitable tasks of broad planning, support, and arrangements vis-à-vis the foreign authorities concerned. The modalities of this shift have been explored in other committee papers.
The Committee's principal concern - and consequently the subject of this paper - is that training objectives have been so severely circumscribed, so inadequately related to the full sweep of our own national interest and of the recipient countries as well.
THE SHORTFALLS
Review of what is being done, and projected, in the training, educational and related fields by the combined efforts of the Department of Defense, the International Cooperation Administration and the International Educational Exchange Service reveals many shortfalls. The following are representative:
(1) the scale of orientation visits and hand tailored courses for key government or opinion leaders has been much below feasible norms; as indeed has exploitation thereof by the agencies concerned.
(2) all too few foreign military officers, of middle and upper rank, have been provided instruction in concepts or doctrine governing the employment of the military instrument, in peace and in war. Equally conspicuous is the absence of training in management above the unit level.
(3) procedures for the identification and grooming of future leaders are lacking.
(4) analyses of the trained manpower implications of country economic development goals are incomplete; comprehensive plans for meeting deficiencies are non-existent; and U.S. actions to stimulate either are half-hearted.
(5) higher educational opportunities available through the aggregate of ICA, IES and other non-military programs are below minimum thresholds, lack depth and present serious imbalances and gaps. The fields of under-graduate study is largely uncovered; trainees from the public services and the private profession sector are few; and the potential of ICA university contracts inadequately utilized.
(6) the substantial technical level and short term programs now in progress have not been paralleled by comparable efforts to accelerate the growth of basic educational systems within cooperating countries.
(7) effective coordination among the different programs has been wanting; and has resulted in loss of mutual support opportunities. ICA has yet to recognize the potential of the MAP training base for the furtherance of technical assistance objectives.
And of overriding moment has been the near universal failure to understand and accept concomitant responsibility for the political and psychological orientation and motivation of the trainee, the participant, the counterpart. There has been no guidance or concerted approach in the sensitive but vital area of inculcating, or testing for, compatible precepts of public morality, social responsibility and personal ethics. Notwithstanding the intensity of the struggle for the allegiance of the "middle billion", influence on the thought, habit and attitudes of these peoples, and on the institutions that bind them together, has been left to chance.
Confronted with these broad deficiencies, the Committee can only conclude that the Executive Branch has grasped neither the measure of the challenge nor the inestimable potential inherent in the human side of development.
In rendering what is tantamount to an indictment, two tempering considerations have been recognized. The first is a series of factors, cumulative in effect, which serve to place finite limits on the pace and scope of the corrective actions implied by the foregoing compendium of criticisms. The second involves several initiatives, independently pursued unfortunately, with the aim of improving the direction, the depth and the substantive payoff of activities in the human resources field. Neither was sufficiently weighted to invalidate the basic conclusion. Both, however, have had an impact on the proposals to be presented subsequently. They therefore merit treatment in general outline.
THE LIMITATIONS
The formidable obstacles to rapid expansion and improvement of these activities include such diverse factors as political sensibilities and attitudes, legal restrictions, availability and qualification of trainees and trainers, capacity of facilities, and financing problems. Moreover, they are so intermeshed that all must be attacked concurrently. Among the more significant:
(1) National educational systems and manpower problems involve such politically sensitive considerations that U.S. initiative and aid are not automatically accepted by local governments; nor does full cooperation necessarily follow acceptance. And in the first instance, the less developed nations simply do not have either statistics or plans and are therefore faced with major, time-consuming efforts to produce both.
(2) Under the provisions of Section 451c of the Mutual Security Act, a special Presidential determination is required before military training can be extended to any country with whom a bi-lateral agreement has not been negotiated.
(3) Important strictures surround the present selection base for overseas training for high-level personnel. One is the requirement for a working knowledge of English or third country language, coupled with the limited availability of such instruction. Another is divergence in criteria applied by the cooperating country and by the U.S. agencies in determining candidate qualifications. Still another is reluctance to release individuals for extended instruction abroad, given the competing demands for their services locally.
(4) Appropriately qualified U.S. personnel for staffing overseas educational, advisory or training projects are in short supply; language is again a problem. There are also finite limits on the absorptive capability of the U.S. educational institutions in terms of teachers and facilities.
(5) In certain specialty areas, the training establishments of the U.S. military departments are already taxed to capacity; funds and spaces are requirements for expansion; so also is relaxation of security policies with respect to the nationals of a number of countries.
(6) Patterns of cooperation by U.S. universities with the policy desires of the Government are far from uniform.
(7) Currently, there are no funds available for educational development of many low income countries.
ENCOURAGING SIGNS
There has been evidence, in recent months, of increased U.S. awareness of the import of the broader aspects of training. Constructive moves include the following:
(1) An exploratory project, High Level Human Resources for Economic Development, was initiated by the President, to survey the need of less developed countries in administrative, managerial and technical categories; and to determine the advisability and practicability of a special U.S. assistance program. Work has proceeded under supervision of an inter-agency Task Group (Secretary of Labor, Deputy Undersecretary of State, Directors of ICA and USIA). While the Task Group is unlikely to proceed with the surveys-in-depth originally contemplated, it has stimulated a new order of interest in manpower planning on the part of recipient countries, U.S. missions abroad, and Washington agencies.
(2) The Department of State has underway a detailed survey of international education and training activities conducted by agencies of the U.S. Government. Aside from the accumulation of important statistical information, the work will provide the basis for establishing an informational clearing house and a more effective coordinating mechanism.
(3) On 4-5 April, the Department of State convened the first of a series of periodic conferences to bring together the government agencies, the universities and the major private foundations with operative programs for education of foreign nationals. Properly prepared and peopled, such conferences could be of great value. It is worth noting that the university presidents were vocal about the need for clearer national policies and guidelines.
(4) The Deputy Secretary of Defense issued recently a directive to the military departments underscoring the contribution of training of foreign military personnel to the achievement of international security objectives; and directing, as feasible, a 5-15% program increase in training (or orientation) for senior officers.(5) The proposed FY-60 Military Assistance Training Program and the Technical Assistance Program reflect substantial increases over previous years. The latter includes a first entry into the undergraduate study field. Meanwhile, the geographic emphasis of the International Educational Exchange Service shifts away from Europe.
While commending these initiatives, the Committee has noted that follow-up has lacked vigor; and that even optimum execution would produce results far short of the minimum essential advance.
III - NEW HORIZONS
Policy formulation is not a pre-condition to a more comprehensive and responsive program to improve human knowledge, skills and attitudes in the less developed areas. The importance and compelling need therefor is amply underscored in official statements of basic United States security policy. The requirement is widespread recognition, in sectors public and private, of the essentially of properly trained and motivated manpower to the hoped-for evolution of the middle third of the world. This recognition can be stimulated. Education is, after all, among the most cherished elements of the American tradition; and expanded programs provide an opportunity for new initiatives in the conduct of our foreign policy.
The Committee appreciates the substantial nature and diversity of the educational, training and cultural programs - binational and international, public and private - now underway outside the purview of the Mutual Security Program and the International Educational Exchange Service; for example, upwards of 100 organizations have programs for Pakistani. Not having examined these programs, no comment is made thereon. In most cases, the United States can exercise only minimal control over the direction of these other activities; she has, however, the continuing information and influence to insure against duplication.
A look at the vastness of the requirements and at the current activities of the training and educational activities of the MAP, ICA and IEES have focused attention on four general areas. A vigorous approach to all four will provide the basis for the program our security interests demand. The areas, to be discussed in some detail, are:
(1) The formal training of leadership cadres, in all key sectors of national life.
(2) The support of educational systems in low-income countries, both allied and neutral.
(3) The exploitation of MAP supported military establishments in furtherance of political stability, economic growth and social change.
(4) The role of Americans in developing the professional and ethical code of foreign leaders.
IV - LEADERSHIP PROGRAMS
This, clearly, is the key challenge. All reports emanating from abroad conclude that a major, if not the principal, impediment to progress in the Afro-Asian countries is the severe shortage of individuals capable of filling responsible positions responsibly. Were this not reason enough to expand and improve our leadership programs, there is another - the traditional activities and growing capabilities of the Soviet Union for the development and control of elite groups. We may elect to stand aloof from competition with her in the supply of military and economic aid. In the leadership area, we cannot!
NON-MILITARY SECTOR
Ways and means of achieving better performance in the top level managerial field have been well explored in various U.S. agency studies. These suggest certain concurrent planning and implementation actions addressed directly to the shortfalls tabulated previously. It is to be noted that the efficacy of these actions will be largely a function of the initiative and competence of our Country Teams.
ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS
Development of Country Plans
There is a requirement to stimulate and, where national sensitivities permit, to offer technical and other assistance for the establishment of machinery and procedures for systematic surveys and analyses of the manpower situation. None of the less developed nations has yet evolved anything approaching a human resources annex in support of national developmental plans. They are not, therefore, capable of measuring the gap over and above the actual and predictable outputs of indigenous institutions and the several operative overseas programs, or of sharply identifying priority of needs in public administration, in industry, business and labor, or in education.
This is patently a long term project, to be attacked incrementally. Other actions should not depend thereon.
Shift in Emphasis of U.S. Programs
Valid suggestions encompass two main categories: the immediate and the longer range.
The first envisages expansion of IEES "leader grant" programs; ICA attention to the private entrepreneurial sector and to the decision-makers in other than the public economic sector; and greater participation by U.S. professional associations, major foundations, and private institutions.
The longer range problem dictates substantial entry into the field of undergraduate and graduate education in the U.S. to groom the future leadership, and in addition, the concept of "junior year abroad" for students studying in their home countries. It also involves, on a major scale, the collaboration of American universities, industry, and professional associations in conducting special "workshops", on-the-job training and specialized projects, for national or multi-national groups, in all pertinent fields.
The longer range program holds the most promise. For one thing, there will be fewer conflicts with the immediate operating needs of the governments. More important, the collegian or junior executive is in his formative years. He may ultimately embrace an alien philosophy but only if the suasion is of the highest caliber; the lasting influence of undergraduate associations and intellectual intake is not to be underestimated.
Implementing Steps
The foregoing steps will require some additional funds, for they are additive to the essential activities now underway. They also imply some changes in legislation to remove restrictions on utilization of available local currency and, perhaps, to countenance the new directions (as, for example, wholesale departure from the general one year limit on training duration). It also involves expansion of staff and closer coordination among participating U.S. agencies and institutions.
These concrete steps are manageable for they follow established patterns. But there are others - less tangible infinitely more difficult.
SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS
Selection of Personnel
It is evident that the success of the entire effort hinges on wisdom and foresight in the choice of trainees. And the burden thereof falls squarely on the U.S. field organizations. Effective performance pre-supposes that the Country team:
(1) Has adequate biographic registers, personal contacts and reliable informational sources to prepare unilateral lists of promising candidates in all sectors; and priorities within lists.
(2) Has sufficient rapport and stature vis-à-vis the cooperating government to influence the latter's priorities, selection processes and choices; and to be assured that the trainee is scheduled for employment in posts commensurate with anticipated training.
(3) Is as attentive to the training of leadership and managerial cadres among the non-communist opposition as to the representatives of the ruling party; and astute enough to devise plans which will provide for such training under other than direct U.S. governmental sponsorship and with minimum impact on official relationships.
(4) Has full data on all U.S. programs, official and private, affecting the country; is effective in the coordination thereof; is in a position to exploit fully the potential of ICA university contracts in the leadership field; and capable of influencing the direction of unofficial programs to cover priority gaps.
(5) Is fully aware of activities in adjacent countries and how these activities might be utilized for the good of the country to which accredited.
Training Framework
It is not enough that the training or orientation course itself be carefully designed and competently conducted. The preparation of the trainee and his handling as an individual are of equal import. There must be facilities for, and help in, refresher instruction in English and other Western languages, where indicated or feasible; in this connection, it is essential that the selection base not be limited to those possessing a knowledge of English. There is the matter of cushioning transition from native habitat to the American scene and educational methodology and the consequent requirement for painstaking orientation prior to and after the overseas voyage; and the inverse to help adapt the individual for the return home and subsequent communication to his compatriots. Beyond this - as discussed more fully in another section - is the matter of the comportment of the Americans with whom he is professionally and socially in contact: his acceptance as an equal; the understanding afforded his views; the intellectual and ethical challenges presented. The field, the Washington staff, and all others concerned share responsibility for the quality of the resultant
impact.
The Follow-Up
The importance of continuing contact with the key decision-maker, actual or potential, subsequent to his training is self-evident. Sober reflection, after the individual's return and in light of new responsibilities, may produce valuable ideas on how training may be altered for improved applicability. Up-to-date knowledge of the individual's professional progress, evolving philosophy and attitudes provides the basis for evaluation of impact; tightens the bonds of association; determines the need for or desirability of further training; and generally promotes the U.S. national interest. The follow-up activities involve arduous tasks for the field. But there is no other means of determining program results or of exploiting the success achieved.
It may be asked if the Country Teams are now equipped and oriented to handle the responsibilities thus enumerated. Our own reservations on this score have given impetus to the companion annex on the U.S. personnel implications of the Mutual Security Program.
MILITARY SECTOR
RATIONALE
For reasons both military and political, there are pressing requirements for new foci in leadership programs for the Officer Corps of the MAP supported forces - and, gain, principally of the less developed areas.
In the first instance, effective control and maneuver of armies (and to a lesser extent the naval and air arms) of growing modernity poses for the senior officers of the several military establishments, professional equipment requirements not dissimilar to the needs of the United States Services: an adequate mastery of military concepts and doctrine; and competence in tactics, logistics and management.
It is not enough, however, to restrict leadership inputs to U.S. norms. Except in specifically defined circumstances, our Armed Forces have no operative responsibilities within national frontiers; conforming generally to the precepts of Western democracies, they are not an integral part of the mechanism for maintenance of law and order. The prevailing concept is expeditionary - an instrument of latent power, unentangled domestically, ready for projection abroad should the exigency arise. Not so for the great bulk of the forces of the new nations. Their role has additional dimensions and their missions are actual as opposed to contingent. They are a key element in the maintenance of internal security and are largely determinant of whether stability or instability characterizes the routine of government. The Officer Corps is perforce deeply involved in domestic affairs. Those who lead, or are destined to lead, must therefore acquire qualifications and attributes beyond the criteria which identify the successful commander in combat.
Finally, the ranks of the Officer Corps in most less developed countries are a rich source of potential leaders of the national civil service, the professional class, and other non-military sectors. Here one finds a high degree of discipline, dedication and political moderation. Moreover, one must reckon with the possibility - indeed probability - that the Officer Cops, as a unit, may accede to the reins of government as the only alternative to domestic chaos and leftist takeover. Both considerations point to a program for selection and preparation of promising officers for eventual occupation of high level managerial posts in the civil sector, public and private.
GUIDELINES
It is recognized that practical limitations confront, over the short term, major augmentation of top level military leader programs - limitations which are identical with those described under the non-military sector. Notwithstanding, there is substantial scope for upgrading the military assistance training programs of the U.S. service departments in conformity with the foregoing.
Higher Level Military Education
Such programs merit first priority. Three avenues are open: development of regional facilities coupled with more extensive bi-national exchanges within regions; augmented local institutions; and accommodation of a larger senior officer load in the U.S.
(1) The long touted prospect for a Pacific Defense College should be brought to fruition and similar institutes planned for the Middle East, Latin America and Africa. Desirably, these should be school centers, providing not only strategy studies, but specialized courses for those charged with anti-subversion planning, for logisticians, civil affairs chiefs, and key management personnel. The advantages of a regional approach are self-evident.
(2) The U.S. might well encourage and support, in every country with substantial military forces, the organization of an institute on the concept of our own National War College; on the conversion of existing colleges to the all-service, military-civilian approach. MAAG personnel should be as active therein as the climate will permit - to insure, among other things, that the curricula grapples with concrete national problems.
(3) There are valid reasons for excluding foreign officers from the U.S. War Colleges and the Armed Forces Staff College. But, elsewhere - and with considerably less reason - the doors of our major school centers are not fully ajar (it is noted, for example, that only 123 foreign nationals are programmed through the Army Command and General Staff School in FY-60). Although considerable effort will be involved, all U.S. Services - and particularly the Army - can develop, conduct and administer additional, specially tailored instruction in doctrine, tactics, logistics and management. The school locales need not be limited to military facilities; the growing competence of American universities in military science is exploitable.
Civilian Schooling, Undergraduate and Graduate
This envisages team play as among MAP, ICA and IEES at the country level. ICA and IEES are in a position to finance the education, in the U.S. or third countries, of high caliber career officers in military-applicable fields such as psychology, political science, law, engineering and business administration. MAP can assist ICA in the identification of officers who should be trained for key responsibilities in the civil sector. IEES can assist in the establishment of middle level courses in local educational facilities for officer instruction in administration, finance, military justice and management.*
*This thought, and certain others, reflect ideas advanced by the "Study on MAP in the Underdeveloped Areas" prepared for the Committee by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, by Dr. George Liska; and by Dr. Buy Pauker.
Orientation and Observer Visits
The upper limits of the modest increase in Stateside trips for leaders prescribed (with qualifications) by the Department of Defense should be attained and exceeded. Strains on the military departments would be eased by shifting emphasis from the extreme top level of the military hierarchy to the potential successors a few years hence: the representational burden would be less, the communication problem more surmountable, and the benefits more lasting. Our officials have probably been overconcerned about representation, insufficiently attentive to the substantive impact sought. Where language capability exists, senior foreign officer itineraries should encompass (or even built around) participation in scheduled University or Association seminars and conferences, judged to be within the visitor's scope of interest by reason of functional or geographic coverage; dividends would accrue from his chance to contribute and by his viewing of civilian-military collaborations as practiced in this country. MAP should also support regional conferences to improve personal contacts and promote exchange of ideas and techniques among the military elite of adjacent countries. One possible result, of great value, might be the emergence of more uniform and viable concepts of civil-military relationships.
The Neutral Countries
The stakes for which we contend justify attention to every possibility to improve the competence and influence the orientation of the office corps of these nations. The attaché personnel should be so instructed; and the special efforts involved in securing Presidential determinations for training in the U.S. or third countries accepted.
The Advisory Role
The key influence in the development of military leaders of superior motivation and integrity may well be that exerted by the MAAG personnel. It is mentioned here because it is integral to this discussion. However, the cardinal importance of this function dictates separate treatment in subsequent pages.
Akin thereto, applicable to the military sector, and incorporated by reference, are what have been called the "Substantive Aspects": the responsibilities of U.S. personnel in the selection of trainees, in the establishment of the training environment, and in the follow-up and evaluation phases.
A collateral requirement, common to all training in the U.S. is expansion of English language instructional facilities in the cooperating countries. The U.S. Military Departments, the USIS, and the USOMs have all made some inroads on this problem in various ways.* But the demand, even at present level of activity, is far in excess of available capacity. Here, then, is a principal bottleneck. A coordinated effort, built around the relatively large USIS operators in most countries, is indicated.
*Electronic Teaching Laboratories; English courses in local educational systems; bi-national centers; text books; and refresher training facilities in this country, utilized by trainees upon arrival.
SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF AFRICA
It is appropriate, at this juncture, to point up the leadership implications of the African continent, and more especially those portions still in colonial status or newly emerged therefrom. The sovereign state of Ghana, for example, mans only a third of the essential posts in her embryonic civil service; for another - and the critical - third, she is quite dependent on alien employees without assurance of tenure; and the remainder are unfilled. In the non-British colonies, the situation is worse. The problem is staggering. On the other hand, Africa is the one area of the world where we have the leisure for forward planning, where we can lay the groundwork for the sort of comprehensive attack outlined by the Presidential Task Group, where we can begin to identify and groom the future national leaders. The overall approach should be multi-lateral, combining Western European efforts and our own, with broad African representation. We should, however, have a highly selective unilateral program. For any long term African project, looking to the development of high-level managerial talent, to be successful, an adequate planning-operational task force must be fielded, peopled largely by juniors and with their futures guaranteed so the continuity may obtain. Its members should embrace political, economic, military, sociological, anthropological and other competence so the approach will be comprehensive and balanced from the outset.
V - DEVELOPMENT OF INDIGENOUS EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS
THE SITUATION
Their importance notwithstanding, programs for the production of leaders, professionals and skilled technicians - the emphasis of the US. training effort - are designed only to provide an adequate superstructure. A parallel, even more pressing, need is the development of the base; for if progress is sensitive to the quality of leadership, it is also dependent upon effective response of those who follow to the leader's bidding. In the less developed areas, an adequate response of not forthcoming; nor can it be forthcoming so long as ignorance, illiteracy and lack of basic skills are characteristics of the great bulk of the citizenry. Education of the human beings which constitute the major resource of the poorer countries is a fundamental requirement.
The nations of Latin America, Asia and Africa are conscious of the weaknesses - in breadth, depth, diversity and quality - of their educational systems; of the urgency of remedial action, and of the magnitude of the gap, in capital and human terms. They are equally conscious that the responsibility is theirs and theirs alone; it could not be otherwise, for educational institutions are so linked to the national character and fabric that no sovereign state can readily accept collaboration in the design or direction thereof. On the other hand, significant expansion of facilities involves major outlays of capital which is just not available in most countries.
Financial assistance to indigenous educational institutions has not been a feature of U.S. aid programs, although minor amounts have been expended on schools directly linked with economic development. Other demands coupled with legal restrictions have precluded use of any significant amounts of U.S. foreign currency holdings for the support of cooperating country school systems.* Indeed, there have been complaints that U.S. aid programs have operated to the detriment of supported country investment in national schools: it is said, in Latin America, that the pattern of development aid has required such large scale use of local currency resources, as matching contributions to complete, and thereafter maintain, major construction works that the development of public infrastructure, and notably schools, has fallen well behind needs.
*Technical assistance is, of course, available for provision of instructors, U.S. university contracts, etc.
continued... | | | | gchq | | Posted: Sat Oct 30, 2004 8:43 am Post subject: |
| Appendix - III Continuation...
A PROGRAM BASIS
There is a rising clamor, within and without the U.S. government for a strong program of aid to the educational institutions of the low income countries. It is convincingly argued that only by broadening and improving the now narrow educational bases can there begin to be a solution to the long term trained manpower requirements generated by national economic development plans. Adequate systems of educational institutions are equally essential for political stability and social adjustment. They provide the best - perhaps the only effective - medium for acquainting and inculcating youth with national values and the ingredients of national esprit; and with traditions, culture, ideals and aspirations. They provide the forum for development of codes of public morality and personal ethics, for defining responsibility to one's fellow man. They provide ever expanding reservoirs of raw material for tomorrow's leadership; and the means of identifying this potential. Given wise guidance and competent administration, a vigorous and growing educational complex is the principal counter to Communist subversion. Beyond this, the United States would stand to gain additional benefits from an educational support program of some magnitude. It will be of enormous value to American prestige and goodwill to be identified with visible symbols of friendship and progress like schools, colleges, libraries and laboratories. There is no more meaningful way of breaking down the myth of imperialist exploitation, of indicating our interest in individual opportunity and social democracy.
FINANCING
A price tag attaches to any such concept - one must think in terms of several hundred million dollars over the next few years. However, it need not be primarily new money. The scheduled accumulations of soft currency in repayment of development loans promise a major source of financing. Congress has not indicated how such moneys will be employed; substantial portions could be earmarked for educational purposes. Moreover, legislative authorization could provide for such use of portions of foreign currencies generated by future PL-480 activities. Thus dollars would be required only for those countries where the U.S. did not own substantial quantities of local currency; and for teachers and equipment which could not be funded otherwise.
ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
There are numerous possibilities for administering an educational development program. A multi-lateral approach, through an independent mechanism or International Development Agency affiliate, has distinct psychological and economic advantages and might be more palatable to certain countries; it would, however, be more ponderous and slow, less exploitable from the vantage of U.S. interest. A new Human Resources or Cultural Cooperation Agency, co-equal to ICA; a Semi-public Foundation, linking the government and the universities; a government Fund with relations to State and ICA paralleling those of the Export-Import Bank; and a broadened ICA charter - all have advantages and disadvantages.. The key to any organizational choice is that educational assistance must be closely and continuously integrated with the total country development plans. This tends to suggest that ICA should have the responsibility.
MANAGEMENT
More important to the effectiveness of the envisaged program than Washington organizational arrangements is the work of the Country Team. The latter must be competent in garnering adequate information to be able to analyze the national educational problems; in stimulating country development of comprehensive and balanced plans for expansion of facilities, for production of teachers and for determination of student population; in encouraging devotion of maximum country resources to education; and of insuring that request for assistance relate to priority needs and are consistent with overall plans. Equally, the Country Team has the responsibility of coordinating educational activities of private U.S. agencies and of influencing them, as appropriate, to direct emphasis to better support the key requirements.
This stress on priorities, as the directrix of aid, is advised. The educational problem is of such vast proportions that U.S. input must be viewed as primarily catalytic. Our aim is to stimulate the greatest feasible local effort, deploying our limited resources to cover the critical needs which cannot be met through any other means. It will require sound judgment to determine the proper division of investment and energy between the education of personnel needed today and those required in the future. The bottlenecks may range from teachers colleges to equipment for vocational training centers to elementary textbooks. It may be that the greatest single contribution will be in the provision of training aids, adapted to the local scene. In any case, while recognizing that there are minimum thresholds of comfort and cheer for satisfactory student morale, our interest should be in the quality of instructional content rather than of physical plant.
In the field of general education, as in the development of national leadership, the military establishments can play a significant role. To this area, we now turn.
VI - NEW ROLES FOR THE MILITARY
In the past year, a number of informed and thoughtful observers have pointed out that the MAP supported military establishments throughout the less developed areas have a political and socio-economic potential which, if properly exploited, may far outweigh their contribution to the deterrence of direct military aggression. Part of the reasoning rests on the example of history, of which the role of the military under Kemal Ataturk is representative; part on the record of recent months which has witnessed military accession to dominant position in the national affairs of several Asian states; and part of the growing realization that armies are often the only cohesive and reliable non-communist instrument available to the fledgling nations.
The thesis can be defended that the armies - and their relatively small air and naval counterparts - are the principal cold war weapon from the shores of the East Mediterranean to the 38th parallel. By the way of substantiation, one can point to command structures which provide for the rapid and effective dissemination of orders, information and propaganda to the lowest echelons; to the patterns of unit deployments which cover the country from the capital to the most remote frontiers; to the identification of officer and soldier with the village in which he was spawned; and to the intangibles of the military mystique - of variable strength, it is true - built of pride in the tradition of arms, in contributions to the winning of national independence, in sense of duty to the State.
It is not enough to charge armed forces with responsibility for the military aspects of deterrence; they represent too great an investment in manpower and money to be restricted to such a limited mission. The real measure of their worthiness is found in the effectiveness of their contribution to the furtherance of national objectives, short of conflict. And the opportunities therefore are greatest in the less developed societies where the military occupy a pivotal position between government and populace. As one writer has phrased it, "... properly employed, the army can become an internal motor for economic growth and socio-political transformation."
EDUCATION AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING
Aside from constituting a principal reservoir for leadership material, one of the military's major contributions to national growth is in the spread of education and skills. Literacy and a level of formal schooling are among the basic criteria of a fully effective soldier; a military establishment adequate to its actual and contingent tasks must include a wide variety of technical and managerial competence. Both are relevant to economic development and social evolution. Given the narrowness of the national educational system, and the obstacles to expansion in the civilian sector, it is logical that training facilities and input, which are required, in any case, to meet military needs, should be exploited for the overall advantage of the country. The returns are proportionately greater when the armed forces are essentially peopled with conscripts as opposed to careerists.
The Three Rs
Practical literacy training for every soldier is a manageable goal, as the programs of the Turkish Armed Forces are demonstrating. It enhances the individual's usefulness in service; it qualifies him for further education; and it equips him to disseminate his knowledge to his home community. As one source has suggested, the ripple effect of military instruction in the official language may be the best method of assuring that language's pre-eminence over local dialects.
Secondary Schooling
There is scope and need for the institution of off-duty courses akin to those which have long been a feature of the U.S. armed forces. The military organization facilitates identification of men of requisite capability and the exigencies of service provide a captive student population.
Vocational Training Centers
This area holds great promise both in reducing the burden on the U.S. of training low level personnel in U.S. facilities, and in meeting the demands of the civil economy. It is the essence of the "dual purpose" concept which has been elaborated in a separate Committee monograph. To the extent conflicts with the primary military mission are avoided and the civilian requirements are not exceeded, there is every justification for programming a student input which exceeds the military needs for artisans, administrative personnel and other commerce-applicable skills.
English Language Instruction
Facilities are not available in most MAP supported countries for providing English instruction for the minor numbers scheduled to be trained in the U.S. There are, however, cogent reasons for expanding knowledge of the English tongue: to broaden the selection vase for overseas training; to help the military in subsequent civilian pursuits involving foreign business contacts; to promote closer orientation and communication between the United States and the recipient country.
One cannot generalize the relative importance of these avenues, the extent to which they should be followed, or the methods. This can only be determined by specific country analysis. In some countries, encouragement and perhaps minor technical assistance to recipient governments may suffice. In others, direct military assistance may be most appropriate while, elsewhere, the answer may lie in ICA programs under MAAG supervision. What is universally needed is a coordinated survey, planning and execution at the Country Team level.
STRENGTHENING OF INTERNAL SECURITY
The maintenance of internal security constitutes a major responsibility of these armed forces, whether assigned directly or not. Superior performance will provide the environment of confidence so necessary to national growth. But the dimensions of security are as much political and social as orthodox military and, in the former respect, understanding and positive action have been generally wanting.
Indoctrination
There must be comprehension of the complex nature of the subversive forces at plan and of the variegated methods of communist attack. Similarly, there must be full knowledge of the means of counterattack available to the nation and of the place of the military therein. Most of all, there must be invoked the motivation to combat these influences, whenever and wherever they surface. Much of this is dependent on wise and inspiring leadership but a well planned and conducted program of Troop Information is an essential corollary. It should be a permanent feature of military life, worked and re-worked to insure it deals with vital national problems, and in terms meaningful to the average soldier. Its importance can hardly be exaggerated for it fills a void which has no parallel in the radio-periodical replete West.
Action
If the military is properly led, indoctrinated and motivated, the activities open to it are numerous. In certain instances, a key requirement may be direct military action against armed dissidents; consequently, appropriate elements of the army should be equipped and trained for unorthodox warfare. The main emphasis, however, will be in non-violent fields. An informed soldiery, widely based, is in an ideal position to transmit to the populace the thrust of its own indoctrination. By the example of its own discipline, confidence and deportment, the army provides assurance of physical protection and the identity of interest between protector and protected. Where direct military assistance to community projects is feasible - on the model of noteworthy "civic actions" in the Philippines, Vietnam and Laos - the army can demonstrably advance economic and social objectives.
PROMOTION OF NATIONAL UNITY
Here is the ultimate test of the armed forces. Their role, in the countries under discussion, is unique. They are at once the guardians of the government and the guarantors that the government keeps faith with the aspirations of the nation. It is in their power to insure that the conduct of government is responsive to the people and that the people are responsive to the obligations of citizenship. In the discharge of these responsibilities, they must be prepared to assume the reins of government themselves. In either capacity - pillar or ruling faction - the Officer Corps, at least, must possess knowledge and aptitudes far beyond the military sphere.
Successful discharge of this role depends on something more, however. It becomes the rallying point for energies and allegiance only to the extent that it personifies the spirit of the nation. Thus, to power and organization must be added adaptation to and visible reflection of national symbols, culture and values; and unwavering integrity. Stimulation, through military assistance, of these qualities is perhaps more important than successive increments of combat effectiveness.
VII - DEVELOPMENT OF VALUES
Up to this point, we have concentrated on defining the quantitative measurements of future programs in the human resources field. We have done this only to establish a framework within which expanded activities may be planned - not from any mistaken belief that the exposure of increased numbers of individuals to formal instruction will, per se, lead to accelerated national pogress along paths desired by the United States. As manifested by earlier references, we are acutely conscious that the indispensable complements to learning are viable concepts to guide the application of that learning; that a nation cannot progress without ethical codes to regulate the conduct of its citizens and institutions. We recognize that the test of leadership is less its competence in the organization of men than its fashioning and exemplication of the principles which inspire and drive the organization.
The special pertinency of these matters to the Afro-Asian area is evident. There the political and social revolution has uprooted most of the symbols, beliefs and concepts to which men previously clung. The gap must and will be filled. The U.S. has a vital interest in the nature of the new symbols and concepts for they are critical to the attainment of our foreign policy objectives.
It is one thing to subscribe to the fundamental importance or proper standards; it is quite another to materially influence their formulation and their acceptance. Ths component of our programs for the training of foreign nationals has been indifferently pursued and has met with scant success. The reasons are readily identifiable. While we have embraced "the struggle for the minds of men" as a slogan, we have been inept at translating it into personalized terms and meaningful courses of political action. We have been ineffective in codifying and communicating the principles by which we live; and we have entertained the misconception that our approval or our widely heralded social traits signified absorption of the political and moral precepts we are incapable of articulating. We are essentially non-political and empathy is not our forte. Most of all, we have invoked the myth of non-interference to cloak timidity, lack of assurance, sometimes want of moral courage when confronting issues which, admittedly, run close to national nerve centers and traditions. Yet nothing covert or insidious is involved. The tasks call for sophisticated handling but they are above board: to inculcate standards consistent with, and designed to support, the aspirations of the newer nations of the East. Alternate, incompatible standards are already being proffered.
There is no programming guidance which spells out the chapter and verse of this area of activity; nor, in fact, can there ever be set rules to govern the development of motivation, integrity and moral principles. A few points are, of course, clear. The complexity and delicacy of the problem dictates a highly selective approach; our aim is to build the current and future leadership that it may coalesce and build the nation. The intangible inputs to leadership can only be supplied by individuals, and particularly the membership of the Country Team, who have direct contact with the foreign elites. As we see it, the categories of contact are two. The first, transitory as to time but not impact, involves the American associates to form part of the environment of the leader's training in this country. The second, and more significant, is the advisor-advised relationship.
U.S. Training Environment
We have already alluded to the requirment for raising our sights with respect to the objectives of leadership training in the United States. Extra-curricular activities should be as carefully planned as the formal course of instruction, and the keynote should be something more than traditional American hopitality. Here is the opportunity for indoctrination in the dynamics of our society and for give-and-take discussions on the elements thereof adaptable and tranferable to the trainee's native land. There should be conscious efforts to demonstrate the identity among Constitution, government and governed; our theorems of public service; the responsibilities of the citizen to State and community; the role and importance of our national symbols; and the other major factors which contribute to balance, stability, confidence and progress within the American society. Conversely, attention should focus on the pressing deficiencies and needs in the trainee's own society and understanding but forthright comment on what remedial actions are feasible. Exchanges of this nature cannot be haphazard; their efficacy depends on thorough knowledge of the individual's background and passable skill in political dialetics. It will require real work and real imagination; and adequate arrangements with, and full support by the military installaitons, universities, commercial establishments where the basic instruction takes place. Most important is the selection of the personnel to whom the indoctrination, conditioning and grooming activities are entrusted; their interest, comprehension, knowledge of the trainee's country and preferably its language, tact, ability to reduce arguments to meaningful terms, and the example they set, are the final determinants of success or failure. Here is where the real costs of this training lie. The dollar expenditure in a year's course at the Army's Ft. Leavenworth or the Harvard Business School for eight Indonesian General Staff Colonels is no more than that required for pilot training of an Indonesian lieutenant. But the input of effort, imagination and motivaiton demanded of the hand picked Americans acting as these colonels' counselors cannot be priced.
It should be noted in passing that the Defense Department has an infinitely better mechanism - should it be willing to employ it - for the handling of these activities than do State or ICA.
ROLE OF THE ADVISOR
In the last analysis, inculcation of the values which distinguish responsive and responsible leadership rests with the members of the Country Team. It is only at this level that effective communication between nations can take place; that compatibility of United States and recipient country aims and objectives can be ascertained; and that progress towards mutual objectives can be measured and assured.
The starting point, as this paper has repeatedly underscored, is knowledge: knowledge of the attitudes, aspirations and pulse of a selective cross-section of the populace, and of their national institutions; knowedge of the background, views and factors which motivate the leadership elite; knowledge of the extent to which community of interest among government, armed forces and people is lacking, and why; and knowledge of the temper of the oposition and the nature of the weaknesses it exploits. There must, of course, be knowledge of the basic characteristics of local traditions, culture and religion; of the well springs of national pride and superstitions; and of prevailing social customs and practices. Extensive personal contacts with all strata of society can alone provide such knowledge. This is the first, and key, collective responsibility of the Country Team; the routine of reports, inspections and administration must be subordinated thereto. Through understanding of the local scene and the identification of the major vulnerabilities inherent therein are essential bases for the reorientation and improvement of the national leadership. The others, and all-important, are the careful choice of the instrument - the relationship between the U.S. representative and the native leaders with whom he is associated - and the equally careful determination of the media to be utilized. We stress the necessity of meticulous attention to the selection process. As one uniquely successful military advisor has phrased it, we are dealing with "one of mankind's
most sophisticated activities" and consummate wisdom and skill are required.
An honest answer to the question, "how can an advisor strengthen the national leadership, and through that leadership the stability and growth of the nation must be that the potential is limited only by the individual's ingenuity and dedication, on the one hand, and the effectiveness of this rapport with key indigenous figures on the other. However, one can establish certain directional signs. Since we have pondered the military more deeply, models can be constructed in that area.* But the approach to the non-military leadership problem is generally similar.
*Much of what follows has been taken from a Confidential memorandum prepared by Colonel E. G. Lansdale, Office of Special Operations, Department of Defense.
Force of Example
It is basic that the advisor demonstrate, in his own conduct, the very ideals and traits he seeks to inculcate in others. Integrity and devotion to duty must be respected in his every action. While conforming to local customs, he must meticulously observe the same rules and spirit of military courtesy, vis-à-vis the local forces, as practiced in his own service. He must display, on all inspections and visits, the same concern for the health, welfare and comfort of the troops and for objective standards of military justice as accords with the best traditions of the U.S. forces. These things rub off. There is evidence that the example of MAAG officers has often resulted in the adoption of practices which have strengthened local military esprit and cohesion. The corollary to example is suggestion in matters which are vital to the morale and vigor of a military establishment. Practices which have a debilitating effect thereon, which reflect on the integrity of leaders, merit the attention of advisors. These may include the diversion of portions of troop pay and rations; command acceptance of unsatisfactory living conditions; partiality in bestowal of promotions and other rewards; inequities in the system of military justice; in short, any action which reflects abuse of prerogative or disregard for the paternalistic responsibilities of the Commander. The advisor must know the facts; comprehend the background thereof; be forthright in discussions; and, above all, have effective solutions. In certain areas, the answer may be straightforward. No special problems exist in encouraging counterparts to correct omissions as, for example, in frequency and thoroughness of inspections; or display greater interest and energy in troop welfare programs; greater energy in welfare activities. More imagination is required where reversal of precedent is involved. Convincing the Commander that the establishment of troop messes is, on its own merits, an excellent course of action may be the optimum - and only - answer to "squeeze" of subsistence allowances. Suggestion that the leader conduct a troop information program on the fundamentals of military justice may focus his attention of deficiencies which had previously gone unnoticed.
Development of Symbols
The traditions which sustain and uplift military forces are generally lacking in the newly emerged nations. They can, however, be found in the cultural heritage, refurbished and made meaningful. The U.S. Army helped build José Rizal into the Philippine national hero; and did the same with respect to the legendary figures who today furnish inspiration for the armed forces of Vietnam. The U.S. MAAGs have the research facilities, the contacts and the troop information know-how to encourage and assist the Ministers of Defense in the development of symbols which reflect the highest ideals of the nation.
Formulation of a Military Creed
We have pointed out the unique responsibilities of the military forces - one might almost say armies - in the development of political stability and national unity. How well these responsibilities will be discharged depends upon the evolution of proper standards of service to guide the leaders; and upon the latter's effectiveness in securing acceptance thereof by all ranks. To the extent that the advisor is attuned to the local environment, perceptive of the significant undercurrents, able to communicate his understanding and motives, and discreet in his approach, he can exercise appreciable influence on the formulation and expression of enduring principles. The latter include the relationship of the military instrument to the State and to the civil power; professional and personal codes for military men; the deeper meaning behind the observance of the forms of military courtesy; and the constraints on the military in the emergency discharge of the functions of government. His influence in the dissemination of these creeds and concepts may be no less important. Forethought and imagination can assist in effective design and direction of the troop information and education programs to be conducted by commanders for the troops.
Increased Unity of Army and Populace
The achievement of internal security involves more than adequate physical protection. The populace must be confident of the motives of the protectors; assured that the price of protection is not the deprivation of individual rights and privileges, that the military is indeed the servant of the State. The advisor must be able to suggest ways and means of promoting mutuality of objective and interest between the civil community and the military. Joint consultative committees are an excellent mechanism for the quick resolution of points of friction in Local community relations. If there are unit farms there should be no occasion for the commandeering of provisions. Military equipment and labor, temporarily idle, can expedite completion of village communal projects. Army medical facilities have the capacity to handle emergency cases, to help control the spread of disease or to eliminate critical sanitation problems.
The membership of the Country Team must be no less imaginative and persuasive in the non-military leadership sectors, where the search continues for meaningful forms and concepts of government, tuned to domestic and external realities. The increasing tendency, throughout Afro-Asia, to relinquish national responsibility to the military instrument is evidence of the non-viability of the Western forms and concepts which were originally embraced, deficiencies in local political leadership, or both. While the military deserves our full support in their discharge of their trusteeship responsibilities, it is in our best interest that the reins of government be returned to the civil authority as soon as one adequate to its tasks can be created. It is the duty of American field representatives to ascertain what has gone wrong and to proffer guidance and advice in the development of governmental and institutional structures and concepts of service, which will restore the confidence of the populace. Only thus can an enduring relationship be established among the governments, the military and the people themselves. The record is witness to the tremendous influence exerted by a few dedicated Americans over the policies and points of view of key decision-makers; the value of their efforts, both to the country concerned and the United States, has been inestimable. It is regrettable, however, that these initiatives have been so limited in number and that they have sprung from the individual rather than governmental direction and impetus. Yet this is the real test of our ability to develop national leaders of integrity, objectivity and devotion to standards compatible with our own; and, through these leaders, to insure the kind of stability and growth that constitutes the basis of our aid. Our selection, preparation and guidance of our field representatives must henceforth reflect this basic fact.
VIII - REQUIREMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The foregoing discussion constitutes the arguments for and describes the broad objectives of efforts commensurate with the importance of the human side of development to the total mutual security program. Full attainment of these objectives may well be infeasible. Long term and complex undertakings are involved. Progress will be slow and not susceptible to precise measurement. The most difficult obstacles involve intangibles: it will be easier to surmount fiscal and legislative problems than to condition and motivate American trainees for a series of responsibilities without precedent. We are convinced, however, that we cannot set our sights on any lower targets. For, we repeat, the achievement of political stability and economic growth throughout the less developed areas depends upon the competence of the national leadership, today and henceforward.
Our proposals have dealt mainly with new emphasis, with the strengthening of the training framework and with qualitative improvements as to substance. These requirements do not translate into concrete recommendations. What follows, therefore, is a mixture of the general and specific.
RE-ENUNCIATION OF POLICY
The first requirement is an attitudinal shift: widespread recognition and acceptance of the essentially of greater efforts in the development of human resources; and the gearing for such cohorts. While it must permeate both government and private sectors, the initiative lies with the Executive Branch. Existing policy must be reviewed and updated: and there must be teeth. The sympathy and support of the Congress must be secured. Similarly, mechanisms must be found for eliciting the understanding of and greater cooperation from the American educational apparatus, the private foundations and the industrial and business world.
We recommend that the National Security Council be seized with this matter and that it:
(1) enunciate the need for greater efforts to identify, train and groom the foreign leadership cadres in all key sectors and provide the authorization for the MAP, ICA and IES actions to meet this need;
(2) underscore the policy of the United States to provide substantial assistance for the development of national educational systems;
(3) provide guidelines for closer relationships with and support from the private sector;
(4) stress the importance of the advisory function of American representatives in contact with foreign nationals;
(5) issue the requisite instructions to give force to the above and charge the OCB with the responsibility for follow-up and evaluation.
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
The conduct of leadership programs of the nature and size we have envisaged will require a considerably strengthened U.S. organizational framework and an increased capability to manage and coordinate the activities at the country level, in Washington and at the locales where training or orientation takes place. Country Teams must assume a new order of responsibility as regards selection and programming of trainees, both with and independent of the local government. It has heavy coordination tasks in several arena. It needs comprehensive and up-to-date biographic registers and other data. All Teams will require a full time individual as central control point; most will need some personnel augmentation.
Department of Defense's present training management arrangements are inadequate; however, that organization has the capability to effect the necessary readjustments. Within ISA, the training element must be reinforced and moved from its present backwater to the status of a major division under the Director of the Military Assistance Program elsewhere proposed. The several Departments will need to create separate mechanisms for planning and monitoring the training and orientation visits of an expanded group of military leaders.
The training staffs of the International Cooperation Administration will likewise need to be augmented. These are already overtaxed in handling current programs.
Department of State's responsibilities will likewise increase. Aside from expanded and more carefully tailored International Educational Exchange Service activities, it has a primary interest in the totality of programs designed to build the national leadership of foreign countries. It must therefore assume an active coordinating role not only with respect to the activities of MAP and ICA in this field, but also as regards those of the international agencies and private foundations and institutions. These requirements are clear; their measure and the extent to which they are met will be proportional to the vigor of the new national approach. Recommendations in the premises would be redundant.
LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Part of the "gearing up" involves both revisions of existing law, and further enactments. The underlying objectives of leadership programs apply with full force to all nations of the Free World. This aspect of military assistance is of such importance to the United States that it should proceed even where the country concerned is not eligible under the provisions of Section 142(a) of the Mutual Security Act; likewise, it should not require the special Presidential determinations prescribed by Sections 105 and 141 of the same legislation.
Accordingly, we recommend that the Executive Branch seek Congressional action to divorce training assistance from Section 142(a), if not earlier repealed, as well as Sections 105 and 141 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954.
The bulk of the expenditures involved in the massive support of indigenous educational institutions would be in the currency of the recipient country. U.S. holdings of such currencies will increase markedly over the next two decades as a result of Development Loan Fund operations and expanded PL-480 activities; and will far exceed predictable needs for support of U.S. missions.
We recommend that the Executive Branch seek Congressional action to:
(1) Specify support of local educational systems in the less developed countries as a principal purpose in the utilization of the foreign currencies accruing from development loan repayments.
(2) Modify or extend other pertinent legislation to provide greater authorization for use of U.S. own foreign currencies for training and educational purposes.
Congress does not now get a full picture of the training and educational activities programmed annually in the non-military sector. The International Education Exchange Service programs are presented as an element of the overall Department of State operations. Moreover, the IEES must compete for funds within the context of what is essentially an administrative budget. We believe that the prospect of securing the additional resources required for expanded leadership programs, and coordination as well, would be enhanced by combining IEES and ICA proposals for the purposes of Congressional presentation. Such action would further emphasize the new accent on human resources development.
We recommenced that title III of the Mutual Security Act be broadened to include all non-military U.S. programs for training and education.
BASIC PLANNING
As underscored in this paper, the nerve center of an expanded program is the Country Team. The needs, problems and exploitable opportunities vary widely from nation to nation; and they can only be ascertained on the ground. The Washington agencies must activate new efforts by the revision of instructions, guidance, authorities and latitude. Detailed planning and preparations are the tasks of the field.
It would be presumptuous to suggest the content of the planning directives to the Country Team. It would appear, however, that four separate areas should be covered and that there should be parallel instructions through State, ICA and DOD channels:
As to High-Level Manpower Development:
(1) Collaboration with, and offer of technical and other assistance to, the host government in establishment of machinery and procedures to survey and analyze priority needs.
(2)Cooperation with host country in developing a training plan to meet critical known needs for decision-making, managerial and professional personnel: and active participation in the selection process.
(3) Development of unilateral U.S. plans, as necessary, to insure balanced coverage particularly with respect to the private sector and the non-communist opposition.
(4) Determination of ways and means for fuller exploitation of ICA University Contract program, operating in the host country, for support of leadership activities through scholarship competitions, grants for faculty
development and student overseas study.
(5) Attention to long range, as well as short term, leadership requirements.
As to Support of Indigenous Educational Systems:
(1) Encouragement to host country in latter's development of sound long range plans for expansion of educational systems; and in devotion of maximum resources thereto.
(2) Willingness of U.S. to consider requests for Financial assistance where such is justified in meeting priority needs.
(3) Independent survey to determine priority needs and optimum nature of U.S. support.
As to Exploiting Potential of Military Structure,
(1) Field investigation of feasibility of promoting education through the local military establishments and primarily in the fields of universal practical literacy training; of vocational training centers with capacity beyond military requirements; and of night or off-duty schools at the secondary level. As a corollary, development of country team plans for coordinated exploitation of these possibilities.
(2) MAAG cooperation in the identification of promising military personnel For IEES or ICA grants and scholarships to prepare them for responsible posts in the non-military sector.
(3) Support for development of higher level military schools in host country with curricula to include national political and economic matters; and for senior officer attendance at civilian graduate schools.
(4) MAAG encouragement to host Ministry of Defense in development of improved troop indoctrination programs; and provision of technical assistance in the preparation and conduct thereof.
As to the Advisory Role;
(1) Enunciation of principle that a primary function of the members of the Country Team is to improve the competence and sense of responsibility of their foreign opposites; and that effectiveness in the discharge of this role shall constitute a fundamental basis of future performance evaluations.
(2) Re-emphasis of the essentiality of comprehensive knowledge of the local traditions, attitudes, culture, customs and significant undercurrents; of the identification of the major vulnerabilities in the local structure; and of extensive personal contacts in all strata of society as the underpinning of substantive advisory efforts to develop leadership adequate to its tasks and responsive to the aspirations of the populace.
(3) Forceful suppression of the American tendency to do the task himself and the substitution of the tolerance and forbearance of the true teacher.
(4) The overriding importance of demonstrating the highest standards of integrity and ethics in professional and personal conduct; of exhibiting moral courage to point out deficiencies in the attitudes and performance of local officials; and of devising and proposing remedies in keeping with native mores.
SUBSIDIARY PLANNING
Of the numerous supporting actions to be undertaken at the Washington level, those designed to improve the handling of the trainee are the most vital. They include:
(1) Development by the Office, Secretary of Defense and the Military Department of definitive guidance to the training establishments for the meticulous programming of off-duty activities for earmarked leaders; such guidance should provide information of techniques demonstrated to have been successful.
(2) The most careful selection and preparation of interpreter-escorts, official or private, for high level personnel who lack knowledge of the English language.
(3) Efforts to secure greater cooperation from the universities and business sector with respect to the desired extracurricular inputs; to this end. the collaboration initiated by the recent State Department Annapolis conference should be intensified and extended to the working level.
(4) Development of methods to elicit greater attention on the part of private institutions operative in the foreign field to the development of indigenous managerial competence and Leadership ability.
(5) Development of facilities and procedures to insure that the content of training and education, pursued either in major institutions or under special tutorial arrangements, are adapted and tailored to the specific requirements of the individual's background and probable future utilization.
(6) Organization of a permanent interdepartmental task force, peopled with young careerists, to tackle the problem of identifying and grooming a highly selective group of political national leaders for those portions of Africa still in colonial status, or newly emerged there from; the principal criteria of such a group to be continuity and breadth of collective competence.
THE ULTIMATE REQUIREMENT
The basic determinant of our performance will necessarily be the quality of the American personnel who provide the training and counsel. Improvement of that quality must engage our major efforts, now and over the long term. There is much that can be done to orient our representatives more fully.
The Executive Branch agencies need to maintain continuing contact with the research institutions evaluating the performance of our representatives abroad and reflect the constructive suggestions emanating therefrom in selection and preparation processes. But our basic deficiencies in linguistics, in political awareness, empathy and cross-cultural comprehension can only be restricted through a measurable reorientation of the American educational system. Contribution to the development of guidelines for such reorientation is an important responsibility of State, Defense and Health, Education and Welfare in close collaboration.
To be expanded.
Among the most noteworthy are the several papers produced by the staff of the Presidential Task Group on High Level Human Resources for Economic Development, mentioned earlier; and a thoughtful study by Mr. James Howe of ICA.
ICA has recently initiated a week long Communications Seminar for selected trainees following completion of their course of instruction. The emphasis is on professional conduct at home and the communication of ideas. | | | | gchq | | Posted: Sun Oct 31, 2004 10:07 am Post subject: ALLEN DULLES: A LEGEND IN HIS TIME. |
| ALLEN DULLES: A LEGEND IN HIS TIME.
While visiting an old friend from our "Fun and Games" days, I noticed on a coffee table a copy of "Gentleman Spy, The Life of ALLEN DULLES" by Peter Grose. Who was the real Allen Dulles, this Gentleman Spy? Is this really the man? I thumbed through the book and stumbled across a line that called to mind one of the most bizarre incidents of the CIA, the U-2 "Spy Plane" and the Cold War. It was an Air Force version of the "Pueblo Affair". It was an event that revealed the true characteristics of the real Allen Dulles and his brother, John Foster.
Grose was relating the story of Allen Dulles' "adventurous foreign tour", in 1956, to CIA stations not yet well known to him, where he might broaden his own perspective. Early in August, with a flight plan of over thirty thousand miles, Allen and his wife Clover set off to go around the world in fifty-seven days. "A good friend of mine was a member of the air-crew". To that bit of narrative, Grose added:
"The Air Force gave Allen its most luxurious aircraft, a four-engine, VIP-configured cargo DC-6,the Cadillac of the pre-jet era."
For the next several pages, he relates the high points of that long tour. I turned the pages eagerly hoping to get to the real story of what had really happened to that "luxurious, VIP configured DC-6". First of all, the DC-6 had not been "given to Allen" nor to the CIA. Under the provisions of the National Security Council Directive 5212, a basic document, which defines "Covert Operations", that Grose never cites, there is a process by which military hardware can be transferred to the CIA on an "Economy Act" plus "out of pocket" expense basis. You may be sure that this DC-6 had not been an out-right gift.
Furthermore, as I looked into the book for additional information about that historic DC-6, I discovered that the author had completely omitted it's demise from this account of the Gentleman Spy even though this "missing incident" in real life had created one of the most difficult and searing moments of their public service careers for Allen, for his brother the Secretary of State, as well as for President Eisenhower. All that was simply overlooked.
That incident had involved me in one of the busiest weekends of my military career by requiring that I work with both Allen Dulles and his brother John Foster close-up, in their own homes, and at a time when they were "at a loss for words". That's rare. During June 1958, Allen Dulles had ordered his long-time and most capable deputy, General Charles P. Cabell, to Europe for a series of meetings relative to the employment of the new reconnaissance aircraft, the Lockheed-built U-2. For this trip, General Cabell used the CIA's VIP DC-6. After landing in Weisbaden, the CIA's operational air base in Europe, he planned to travel to London with other CIA officials in their aircraft, and permitted the U-2 officers in Weisbaden to use the DC-6 for a quick, official visit to the U-2 base in Peshawar, Pakistan via Adana, Turkey and Teheran, Iran.
(Note: It is a characteristic fault of this book that major events and major principals are frequently either omitted or are distorted from true life. In this case, it is important to note that Grose mentions Gen. Cabell only twice in the entire book, of 641 pages, and even then rather disparagingly although Cabell had served as Deputy Director, Central Intelligence, as long as Dulles had served as the Director: 8 years and 9 months. He certainly was worth more than a few words... and certainly not disparagingly.)
After departing Adana and en route to Teheran, the CIA crew planned to travel the civil airway that would take them over Lake Van and then turn southeasterly in the vicinity of the Caspian Sea. The crew chief was taking pictures of Mt. Ararat out of the right side of the plane when he saw two jet fighters standing off the rear quarter. The fighters slid effortlessly in close to the right wing of the DC-6. They were so close that the plain red stars on the characteristically high rudders of the Russian MIGs were undeniable.
The co-pilot saw those MIGs at about the same time. One MIG pilot motioned to him to descend. The second MIG dropped behind and slightly below the unarmed transport aircraft, ready for action. There was no time to check location, no time to radio for help. The international signal for "I surrender" is to lower the plane's landing gear. The pilot slowed the plane and gave the crew chief the signal to drop the gear. Instinctively, the pilot went into a turn to look below for a place to land. That little maneuver cost him Dulles' VIP DC-6. As the left wing dropped he felt the plane shudder. He saw chunks of metal fly out of the left inboard engine nacelle. That second MIG, under the belly of the DC-6, had fired a short burst. That engine was in flames. He slowed the plane more, felt out the controls cautiously to make sure everything worked. The engineer and co-pilot killed the engine, cut off the fuel supply, and pulled the emergency fire control to suppress the flames. Then they waited. The MIGs floated beside them.
All nine men aboard were on CIA business. They were transporting highly classified materials, among them a briefcase and equipment for the then "super-secret" U-2 spy plane program. That material was stowed in the rear of the plane and they knew there was no chance to do anything about it. The wing would burst into flames the moment the fire ate through to the main fuel tank.
As the pilot held the plane on as steady a course as possible, others in the crew went to the rear and pulled out the jump door. This very special aircraft was loaded with sophisticated spy gadgetry, and it had a "jump" door for clandestine para-drop missions. That is why this crew had parachutes - Air Force transport crews do not usually carry them. It operated under cover as a U. S. Air Force transport aircraft.
These facts were not lost on the Russians when, later, they began to put all the pieces of this incident together and judge what kind of prize they had captured.
Five men bailed out immediately, trusting their fate to nylon shroud lines and the winds. Two of these men were badly burned by molten metal droplets as they jumped behind the burning engine. The pilot, the crew chief, and two others chose to stay with the plane as long as possible.
As the craft settled slowly, herded by the MIG's, the pilot saw a huge body of water (the Caspian Sea) off to his right front. Looming to his left front was a towering range of mountains (the Caucasus). Below him were lush fields of spring grain - the breadbasket of Armenia. He realized then that he had flown far north of his intended course. He spotted what looked like a small unfinished airstrip, no larger than a cleared section of a farm, about two-thirds black-top; the rest gravel. He nursed the burning plane down and towards the strip. All too late, he noticed that the long green grass was leaning with him and that he was landing hot - downwind. The short, rough runway responded as he hit the brakes the moment he touched the ground. The gear held and after the first thousand feet the plane slipped sideways and stopped. Dust and smoke engulfed the cockpit area instantly. Automatically, the crew cut all the switches and ran for the rear door. One of the men freed the escape rope and they dropped to the ground.
As they watched the forward section of the big plane melt, the MIGs circled overhead. Those MIGs and the smoke guided the Russian rural police through the fields to the four crewmen who had come down with the plane. The five who had parachuted were collected by farmers.
As they rode off in a police van to an unknown destination, they could see the charred hulk of the DC-6 standing high on its landing gear with only the floor and the high tail section still intact. They knew that the "TOP SECRET" bundle of U-2 papers protected in that thick leather briefcase and in the tail section of the plane that did not burn had not been destroyed. The complete story of the U-2 program, its operations, crews, and locations would certainly be uncovered by the Russians. That was June 27, 1958. Almost two years later, May 1, 1960, a U-2 with pilot Francis Gary Powers made a forced landing near Sverdlovsk, in the heart of the Soviet Union.
Because of that incident of June, 1958, the Soviets had gained advanced knowledge of the U-2 and of its operations. This helped them spot the Powers' plane, among others, and gave them information relative to the operation of the U-2s worldwide.
The author's failure to include this episode of the shoot-down of Allen Dulles' DC-6 with the CIA's U-2 officials and their full briefcases of information weakens many of the major sections of the book. For example, he writes: "Though most of the United States government, and all of the public, was in the dark about the U-2, the Russians knew about it from the start." And, in another area he writes, "Early in the program only three men in the White House, other than the President, even knew that something called the U-2 was flying. "In a further discussion of that so-called "Missile Gap" era of 1960, he writes, "Senator Symington had remarked in astonishment of the things Allen Dulles did not seem to know,"while the author accounts for that with the statement: "... the impression of ignorance had really been Allen's forbearance about discussing the reassuring intelligence received from the still secret U-2." That was 1960.
In still another section of the book there is a discussion of the "Open Skies" proposal made by President Eisenhower in 1955, and the author inserts: "Allen, alone among the participants (in a seminar to design a new foreign policy), knew that the United States already had a project under way for aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union, his own U-2 program."
By the total omission of the June, 1958, DC-6 "shoot-down" event, countless important items in the "Gentleman Spy" era of Allen Dulles' life have had to be fabricated. To give a few examples:
a) Did others really know about the U-2 program, or not? As a function of my own briefing on being assigned to the Headquarters, U.S. Air Force in July, 1955, I was given the full story of the origin of the U-2 and told of its initial flight that took place on almost that same day. The officers who briefed me had been with the program since 1954. Gen. Kenneth Bergquist, Director of Operations, USAF at that time, was the first man to discuss the potential of the new design that Clarence "Kelly" Johnson had been invited to the Pentagon to present. Bergquist was an old friend of mine from our joint assignment to the Continental Air Command and the Air Defense Command in the later 1940's, early 1950's period. He is the man who called Gen. Cabell at CIA Headquarters to set up an appointment for the Lockheed representatives to meet with him to discuss the future of the U-2 and a major reconnaissance program.
b) Selected officers from General Curtis LeMay's Strategic Air Command were qualified in the U-2 by Lockheed pilots, and began to check out others by 1957. The top men in Richard Bissell's U-2 CIA staff were from the Strategic Air Command, and worked in a special office the CIA created on "H" Street NW between 17th and 18th in Washington, D.C. At the same time, the entire logistical support program for the U-2 operations was a function of the U. S. Air Force. The men who ran that program worked in an office across the hall from mine in the Pentagon. We all knew about the plane.
c) As for Grose's statement that most of the Government and all of the U.S. public did not know about the U-2 until the Power's flight in May 1, 1960, I have two copies of the Thursday, September 10, 1959 Honolulu Star Bulletin with a large photo of the U-2 on its front page along with the headline: "Pilots Indicate Strange Plane Here Spies on Russia, China Land Areas" The story opens with the line, "Are the U.S. Air Force's mystery U-2 jet planes now at Hickam Air Force Base used for reconnaissance at unreachable altitudes over Soviet Russia?" (As a matter of interest the second edition of the same paper of the same date does not carry the U-2 photo on its front page. Who ordered it cancelled?)
Quite obviously other newspapers and magazines picked up the story. It was a poorly kept "secret" since the Soviets knew all about it, at least by July, 1958, and the public had been made aware of it for some time before Powers' eventful mission.
Meanwhile, the reason I had been called to Allen Dulles' home on the evening of June 28, 1958, was because early that morning after they had picked up that nine-man CIA crew, the Kremlin had held a news conference for members of the world press to report that an American "spy plane" had violated their borders near the Caspian Sea, and that the plane had been forced to land and all of its crew had been captured. Pictures of the downed aircraft were shown in the Soviet Press. Quite obviously, the Russians were right and the Cabinet members were wrong. Eisenhower was angry. McElroy and the Dulles brothers were embarrassed. The Soviets did not misinterpret this strange American behavior. When a plane is lost and a live crew is in Russian hands while the administration vehemently denies any knowledge, it becomes evident to any intelligence analyst that they must indeed have captured something special. This was not a border-flying ELINT aircraft on a spy mission that "blew off course" and was brought down. This was Allen Dulles' own VIP plane that had been shot down and the CIA director did not even know that it was being used, let alone on a highly classified mission.
Because so little has been made public about this most unusual incident, it has gone unnoticed. The press and public generally believed that the aircraft was no more than what it was reported to have been, "an Air Force transport on a routine mission". However, few incidents have had a greater impact upon the intelligence operations of this country than this unfortunate flight. Within hours the Russians discovered that the men on the plane were working for the CIA and that they were on an Air Force TOP SECRET mission.
The Russians had recovered, intact, all the TOP SECRET U-2 information. It had not been damaged in the fire. With this they soon broke the entire U-2 cover apparatus. CIA operations in Germany, Norway, Cyprus, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan - to name the obvious ones - were exposed. And, most importantly, from that time on, the Russians could prove that the CIA used the United States armed forces for operational TOP SECRET cover. All efforts by the United States to disclaim the plausibility of such a connection were now made ludicrous. This made all American military aircraft, transport and combat types, on any mission throughout the world suspect as a CIA covert operation. Allen Dulles right-hand man told me shortly after that event that "this DC-6 incident was one of the most crucial events of the era".
You can see now why I was surprised to find that not a word was written about this event in the "Gentleman Spy" book. How can any history book be credible at all, when some of the most important events of the period are omitted, intentionally or by the failure of the author to research his subject thoroughly?
(Note: As a function of my Pentagon duties, I was the officer directed to set up an Air Force aircraft and crew to fly to the release point, Astara, on the shore of the Caspian Sea at the border of the Soviet Union and Iran. I set up a complete debriefing of these nine crew members as soon as they returned to Washington. Allen Dulles personally assigned James McCord as the CIA representative of this de-briefing team. Following this thorough process, I retained a file cabinet full of tape-recorded testimony given under oath and the countless pages of transcript that resulted from this work.)
The plane had been lost on Friday the 27th. Early Saturday, the 28th, Washington time, a strange series of events took place. The Secretary of Defense had asked the Air Force to check out a report from Moscow of an aircraft that had been forced to land in the Soviet Union after crossing its border. General Thomas D. White, then Air Force Chief of Staff, replied that no Air Force aircraft were missing. The Navy gave the same reply and all possibilities were double-checked to determine if some odd-ball operation might have lost a plane. Commercial airlines and other operators were carefully screened to no avail. Finally, State and Defense reported to the White House that the Russians must have either made an error or they were playing some new kind of international game, because - they emphasized - no American aircraft was missing. Allen Dulles' office knew that the DC-6 in which Cabell had flown to Europe had landed in Weisbaden. These denials continued for more than eighteen hours on June 28, 1958.
At about 9 P.M. on that Saturday, I received a call from General White. He informed me that there was a problem about a missing aircraft and asked that I go immediately to Allen Dulles' home in Georgetown. When I arrived, Dulles was waiting with Dick Bissell, the Deputy Director, Plans, the man in charge of the U-2 program. After a quick briefing, they asked me for ideas. I knew where most of their aircraft were, and I knew also where to check if any planes were on special missions. I suggested that I should go to the Pentagon to check things.
I drove immediately to the Pentagon's Air Force Command Center where one of the best world-wide communications systems existed. Playing some hunches, I made a few calls. One was to the home of an agency officer in Germany. In response to my questions, he confirmed that the "Old Man's" DC-6 with nine crewmen aboard was indeed on a trip. I told him to get to his office and call me back immediately on the secure scrambler telephone.
About twenty minutes later we were able to put most of the pieces together. He confirmed that the CIA's Air Operations chief and eight others had left for Teheran in the VIP DC-6. I returned to Dulles' home. It was then about 2 A.M. on Sunday the 29th. I related to him that we had cleared things up pretty well, that the plane involved was his VIP DC-6. At that point Mr. Dulles' knees all but collapsed. He believed Gen. Cabell would have been aboard.
I quickly confirmed that Cabell was not aboard; but that nine CIA men from the Wiesbaden U-2 operation made up the crew. With that, it was Bissell's turn to collapse. I gave them the details, such as the registry number the plane was using that day, so that he could put something on the wire to the Embassy in Moscow. As a matter of practice, CIA aircraft carreedifferent serial numbers on different flights... "Air Force" or other.
After listening to this new information at about 2 A.M., Allen Dulles asked me to meet with him, his brother, Secretary of Defense McElroy, and Gen. Thomas D. White at nine that morning. At about 8:30 A.M. I drove up to Allen's house. He came out and got in my car and we drove the short distance to his brother's house. McElroy was already there and Gen. White arrived shortly. The immediate concern was to come up with a plan to get the crew back, what to tell the press, and what to tell the President. The first order of business was to find out from Gen. White how a plane like that on a "transport mission" could have been lost for eighteen hours without anyone knowing about it except the Russians; and what kind of a plausible cover story could be invented to cover that problem with the press and the President.
Gen. White explained that all Air Force planes are monitored from the time they take off until the time they land, and if one is late a search is initiated no later than one hour after the time of its expected arrival. But, on this CIA flight, the flight plan had been retained by the CIA personnel involved for security purposes; and Teheran, their base of destination was not aware of their arrival time or mission.
This plane, however, flew under Air Force cover and now that it had been captured, the Air Force had no alternative but to claim it as its own, along with the crew, and to accept the blame. After the fact, it could not be identified in any other way. So here we were, having denied the loss of the plane for eighteen hours, and suddenly we were forced to admit to error and lying.
In effect, this mission contravened a basic National Security Council Directive, number 5412 requiring that any clandestine operation must be carried out in such a manner that in the event of exposure for any reason the participation of the U.S. Government can be "plausibly disclaimed".
This operation had been a staggering goof. All that could be done there in John Foster Dulles' study was to make plans to "lie like hell", to stick with it, and hope for the best. Of course, those of us there that morning had no way to know that the U-2 material was in a briefcase in the rear of the plane and had not burned... all was lost! We hoped that the cover story would go over better here in the United States than in the Soviet Union, where they had the facts in their hands.
And that is exactly what happened. Only a few media people realized something unusual had happened. The story we had worked out and released to the press made these points: A DC-6 transport plane was a military air transport service plane on a routine cargo flight. The crew consisted of Air Force men. There were no passengers. The plane had departed Frankfurt, Germany, and was bound for Teheran via Adana, Turkey. En route, in the vicinity of Lake Van, it had run into bad weather and high winds and was blown off course. Soviet MIG's had intercepted the unarmed transport while it was still over Turkish territory and forced it to land in Armenia near Yerevan.
Then the most interesting scene of that troubled day took place. John Foster Dulles picked up a plain white telephone. Without any need to dial, he said quite simply, "Get me Mr. (a Russian name) in Moscow". After a brief wait, and a few words to introduce the subject to his Russian associate, he turned to me and asked, "Can you have a plane in Teheran quickly to pick up this crew at Astara ten days from now?" I said, "Yes." A few more bits of personal conversation with this Russian who was clearly not a member of the Soviet government, and the deal was made. That was the way the Dulles brothers carried out their business as lawyers or in public service. When the chips were down, there were no big conferences, no "Press Briefings", no ceremonial meetings with the Chiefs of State. At the Dulles level the real things were done personally, quietly and quickly... and for their "clients", there were no "Diplomatic" delays.
Shortly after that call to Moscow, he picked up the same white phone and said, "Get me the Boss." In a few moments President Eisenhower answered. "Good morning, Boss. How did your game go today? Just fine. How's Mamie? Fine. Boss, Allen and Neil are here with me along with Tommy White and we have been talking about the plane that the Russians forced down yesterday. Yes, we have found out all about it. It was one of Allen's. A special plane. The crew is all right. We have made arrangements for their return in ten days. A release has been prepared for the press around the world. We'll keep you informed." That is how the Dulles lawyers handled their client, the President.
To demonstrate how effective this cover story prepared that morning became, the following is extracted from the "1959: Britannica, Book of the Year," for the date June 29, 1958:
"U.S. Government demanded the immediate return of 9 U.S. airmen aboard an unarmed transport plane forced down by Soviet jet fighters near Yerevan in Southern Armenia."
Ten days later the crewmen were picked up and returned to Weisbaden. After a brief stop for physical examinations and personal matters, they were flown to Andrews Air Force Base, near to Washington D.C. During the next few weeks they efuuly debriefed, individually and under oath and, except for the damage done to the U-2 program and to other delicate aircraft operations, that was the end of one of the tensest episodes in the public service of Allen Dulles. It should not be over-looked because it is essential to an understanding of other covert activities.
While on the subject of the U-2, it is important to note that nowhere in the book does the statement made by Allen Dulles, relative to the Powers' U-2 of May 1, 1960, before the Executive Session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 31, 1960, appear. As a part of his prepared testimony on that U-2 episode, Dulles stated:
"Our best judgement is that it did not happen as claimed by the Soviets; that is, we believe that it was not shot down at its operating altitude of around 70.000 feet by the Russians. We believe that it was initially forced down to a much lower altitude by some as yet undetermined mechanical malfunction. As to what happened at the lower altitude, we are not sure. The pilot may have bailed out at any time or he may have crash landed. "And further... "It is obvious to us that the plane was not hit. If the plane had been hit by a ground-to-air missile, in our belief, it would have disintegrated."
Those of us who were close to that business knew that this statement was correct and that Krushchev statement that "The U-2 was shot down" was absolutely incorrect. It is surprising to find that a book published in 1994; and, for that matter, all media throughout the country today still persist in saying that the Powers' U-2 "was shot down". Allen Dulles' statement has been on the record since May 31, 1960. His testimony was accurate. Even Eisenhower wrote a similar account in his autobiography.
While we are on the subject of major CIA covert operations during the period of Allen Dulles' term as DCI, it must be noted that this book includes many pages of discussion of the Bay of Pigs operation, the failure of which led to his removal from the office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
For decades, countless reporters and writers, among others, have blamed President Kennedy for the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation because... they say... he had refused "to provide U. S. Navy active duty air-cover" for the Cuban exile Brigade on the beach. As we shall see, on the record of the Cuban Study Group that included Allen Dulles, the "Air Cover" issue has been contrived. Let's look at the record. This book fails totally in presenting material from the public record, that includes Allen Dulles' own conclusion relative to the "most serious" cause of failure of Operation Zapata. Such an omission of major significance is inexcusable. Immediately following the failure of Operation Zapata, President Kennedy, on April 22, 1961, appointed a Cuban Study Group:
"...to study our governmental practices and programs in the areas of military and paramilitary, guerrilla and anti-guerrilla activity which fell short of outright war with a view to strengthening our work in this area... and... directed special attention to the lessons which can be learned from the recent events in Cuba."
The members of the Cuban Study Group could not have been more varied personally and more diversified professionally than those assigned. They were: General Maxwell D. Taylor, formerly Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; the Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy; Admiral Arligh Burke, Chief of Navel Operations; and Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence. As a result, it is important to note that General Taylor wrote the following in his "Letter to the President, dated 13 June 1961":
"As we have found no difficulty in reaching a unanimous view on all essential points under consideration, we are submitting this view as a jointly agreed study."
Because that statement to John Kennedy included the agreed opinion of his brother Robert in conjunction with the others, it is hard to see how these group findings could be anything other than accurate and truthful.
(The Group's meetings took place in Pentagon Room 2E980, in the Joint Chiefs of Staff area only a few doors from my own office at that time. As a result we knew that each day after the meetings, Bobby Kennedy would go directly to the White House for a discussion with his brother.)
A few of that Group's findings that belong in this book and that are regularly found in official accounts of the Bay of Pigs operations, need to be considered here:
1) As early as August 18, 1960, during the Eisenhower administration, it was specified that for this Cuban Exile Program, "No United States military personnel were to be used in a combat status." This decision was in compliance with National Security Council directive 5412, March 1954, that defined and regulated covert operations. This was made known to all the planners of the operation, and is fundamentally the reason why the Kennedy administration held to that directive concerning the later "Air Cover" question.
2) On January 4,1961, a CIA Policy Decision paper warned Cuban air force and naval vessels capable of opposing our landing must be knocked out before our amphibious shipping makes its final run into the beach."
3) A Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluation of late February 1961 stated that, "one Castro aircraft, i.e. T-33 jet, armed with 50 caliber machine guns could sink all or most of Ð Ð Ð Ð the invasion force."
4) By April 6, 1961, the plan stated, "that main reliance for the destruction of the Castro Air Force must be placed on the D-Day air strikes."
It is amazing that so many books by "authorities" omit the above official stipulations that were on the record at the time, in their desire to write that the pre-dawn air strikes against Castro's jets were not important, and that the various senior officials had no idea of how important, tactically, that Pre-dawn strike was. President Kennedy knew. He had heard the above data, and much more. That is why he ordered those crucial air strikes at dawn on D-Day.
After a thorough review of the entire program the Cuban Study Group issued its findings:
1) Listed under the heading "Immediate Causes of Failure of Operation ZAPATA"... the code word for the "Bay of Pigs" the Study Group reported:
a) page 8. "...the cancellation of the strikes planned at dawn on D-Day. This last
mentioned was probably the most serious as it eliminated the last favorable
opportunity to destroy the Castro Air Force, on the ground."
2) As noted in par. 43 of the "Narrative of the Anti-Castro Cuban Operation ZAPATA":
a) page 17. "At about 9:30 P.M. on 16 April, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special
Assistant to the President, telephoned General C. P. Cabell of CIA to inform
him that the dawn air strikes the following morning should not be launched..."
3) Also from the "Causes of Failure":
"The effectiveness of the Castro Air Force over the beach resulted from a failure
to destroy the airplanes on the ground (particularly the T-33's whose importance
was not fully appreciated in advance) before or concurrently with the landing."
These excerpts from the official record, to include Allen Dulles, are perhaps the most important omissions in this book. This operational failure led to the firing of Allen W. Dulles and to the creation of President Kennedy's plan, as stated in National Security Action Memorandum 855, that he was going to remove the CIA from Covert Operations; or as stated in the press, "break the CIA into 1,000 pieces." (Again, it is important to note that this White House statement of policy, NSAM #55, came, almost verbatim, from the same Report of the Cuban Study Group.)
All of the above demands a thorough study of Allen Dulles the man, and how his experience and his personal objectives shaped his years of public service. Here the author, Peter Grose, makes some of his strongest statements. These were made relative to Allen's work as a partner in the New York law firm Sullivan & Cromwell, where both he and John Foster were partners. During that period, Allen had assured his partners that they could "let it be known quietly that I am a lawyer and not a diplomat"... always available if his services might be useful. This statement describes Allen Dulles as well as any I have ever seen. For the most part he saw his duty to be carrying out the plans of others.
For a Dulles, this was no casual comment. His grandfather, John Watson Foster, had served as Secretary of State during the Harrison administration [1892-1893], and an uncle, Robert M. Lansing, was President Wilson's Secretary of State [1915-1920].
Allen Dulles entered Princeton with the Class of 1914, won academic distinction with election to Phi Beta Kappa in each of his four years and graduated with high honors in philosophy. Two years after graduating from Princeton, Allen Dulles entered the Diplomatic Service and arrived at his first diplomatic post in Vienna in 1916. The United States broke off diplomatic relations with Imperial Germany in 1917. Congress declared war on Germany on April 6th of that year, and the State Department assigned him to the legation staff in Bern, Switzerland. With the end of the war, he was posted to Paris to join the American Commission to Negotiate Peace.
In 1920, Allen married Martha C. (Clover) Todd, and one day before their marriage, he informed her that they would be moving to the ancient city of Constantinople with the American High Commission. His new diplomatic colleague there was Ferdinand Lammot Belin. This was the start of a most interesting relationship, Ferdinand Belin was the brother of Alice Belin DuPont, the wife of Pierre S. DuPont. The book makes no mention of this relationship other than the normal official and social duties. However, it may be interesting to note that the DuPont family and the Belin family of Scranton, PA. are interwoven in several marriages.
What is of special interest here is the fact that Allen began his diplomatic career with a member of the Belin family, and more than forty years later he served on the Warren Commission that had been created to investigate the death of President John F. Kennedy and in that capacity he served with a young Assistant Counsel, David W. Belin. This coincidence is nowhere mentioned in this book, Gentleman Spy, or in any other source as far as this writer knows. It might be pointed out that the Bissell family is also related through marriage with the DuPont family. You will recall that Dick Bissell was Allen's Deputy Director, Plans in the CIA and the head of the U-2 program.
During the next ten years of the twenties, he completed his law degree at George Washington University and worked for the Foreign Service. He resigned from the Foreign Service in 1926 when his brother Foster offered him a job with the largest and most famous Wall Street law firm in the world, Sullivan & Cromwell. This move shaped the future course of his career more than anything else.
Unquestionably, historians and others interested in the insider's account of the Cold War years have been looking forward to a factual account of America's greatest and most famous "Spymaster" and underground legendary figure. This new book by the former foreign and diplomatic correspondent for the New York TIMES, Peter Grose, offers the reader three choices. First, it provides a most interesting account of the illustrious Dulles family and their national rnaaion`l roles, socially and diplomatically, during the past century. Secondly, Grose opens the door to some of the little-known workings and intrigue of the international lawyer and banker organizations of the world. Third, and certainly the most anticipated, a look at the Great Game of the world of the international spy, the Director of Central Intelligence.
As the author says, "Sullivan & Cromwell constituted a strategic nexus of international finance, the operating core of a web of relationships that constituted power, carefully crafted to accrue and endure across sovereign borders. These mammoth trusts and cartels found their way to profits with more than a little help from their friends, the lawyers. The men at Sullivan & Cromwell were such influential persons. The firm the Dulles brothers served, as partners, sought nothing less than to shape the affairs of all the world for the benefit and well-being of the select, the ultra select, their clients. This arrangement was mutual. Sullivan & Cromwell never seemed to mind having its own men in high government circles." Allen remained dedicated to the profession of law during his more than eight years as the Director of Central Intelligence.
Dulles slipped from the role of a partner with Sullivan & Cromwell into the newly created Office of Strategic Services in September, 1942, and soon was on his way to its new office in Bern, Switzerland. Quite obviously his long relationship with Sullivan & Cromwell had prepared him ideally for this new task. He had last been in Germany in 1938, but by 1942 he had the resources to assemble a research staff with biographical files from a German diplomat who had defected, plus the long-term business contacts of his law firm.
One period of this OSS assignment in Bern is rarely, if ever, mentioned and does not appear directly in this book. By the latter part of 1944, as the German armies were being pushed back from the Ukraine and the experienced heads on both sides began to see the beginning of the end for Hitler's imperialistic aims, the OSS under Dulles in Bern and his old friend Frank Wisner, who was stationed in Bucharest, had begun to make strong inroads into the German intelligence systems throughout Eastern Europe to include the Ukraine, and even in the heartland of Germany.
In Bucharest, Wisner ran an operation, during September, 1944, that secretly assembled and transported more than 700 American POW's via Turkey to a point in Syria - just north of Aleppo - in a long freight train. These POW's were mostly air crewmen who had attacked the major oil fields in the vicinity of Ploesti, and who had been shot down and captured in the Balkans. Concealed among these American air crewmen, the OSS spirited out many Nazi intelligence experts with their Soviet and East German files and many more of their Romanian pro-Nazi associates.
Upon their arrival in Syria, they were met by a fleet of Air Force aircraft and transported to Cairo. The American POW's were returned to their units in Italy, and the Nazis were spirited away quickly by the OSS. They had left Romania just ahead of the on-coming Soviet army that had crossed that border on Sept 1, 1944, in pursuit of the retreating Germans.
This first major pro-German operation, by the OSS, may well have been the first positive action of the oncoming "Cold War" when our war-time enemies became our friends, and our Soviet ally became the enemy. Immediately after this operation, Frank Wisner was slipped out of Bucharest. This was a most important milestone, that involved Allen Dulles, at the start of the Cold War era that this book fails to mention. The book simply states, "... a former Wall Street lawyer named Frank Wisner, whose OSS team had been booted out of Romania by the occupying Soviets". It adds no reason why the Soviet army would boot its "loyal" American allies out of the country. And, it seems strange that the book contains not a word on this "Pro-nazi" activity that had preceded the arrival of the Soviets.
Meanwhile Dulles, and his underground associates were making similar contacts with select Germans who had come to realize that, for them, the war was over. One of these was Hitler's new Foreign Minister, Count Schwerin von Krosigk. The book does mention that, in 1946, the former British prime minister, Winston Churchill "... had traveled to Fulton, Missouri, with President Truman where he made that famous speech in which he warned:
"From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe... Police governments are prevailing in nearly every case, and so far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is no true democracy."
This is what most of the public, around the world, have been led to believe; but this account is not accurate. What is not mentioned in this book is that this same speech, in almost the identical words, had been made by Count von Krosigk in Berlin a week before the surrender of Germany in May, 1945. In fact, a copy of this speech appeared in the Times of London on May 3, 1945, and this is where Churchill first read about the "Iron Curtain". On May 12th, just three days after the surrender of Germany, he wrote to Truman to express his concern about the future of Europe and to say that an "Iron Curtain: had come down to conceal everything that was going on within the Russian sphere. Such drastic changes inside of Germany were, to a considerable extent, attributable to the war-time in-roads of the OSS under the "old boy" craftsmanship of Allen Dulles.
It was this letter which led to Truman's invitation to Churchill to visit him in Washington and to travel on the Presidential train to Missouri. The rest is history. The part that is not "uncovered" history is that the role the OSS played in 1944 to reach out into the very heart of what remained of Hitler's Germany has not been reported, nor is the fact that these invisible promises of support gave them the courage to orchestrate the beginnings of an anti-Communist wave even while the Russian armed forces were still our nominal allies continuing the war against Japan.
It is this distinction between Allen Dulles, the international lawyer, and Dulles the natural-born intelligence sleuth that was made abundantly clear to those of us who knew him and worked with him in the Government. As an inbred lawyer he responded to the requests of his clients; as did his "Agency"... the Central Intelligence Agency. Few people seem to note the significance of the meaning of that definitive word, "Agency"... an organization that works for and at the request of its superiors. It is on this point that the story of "The Life of Allen Dulles" must be evaluated.
Such an evaluation must recognize and include the provisions of Section 403 of the National Security Act of 1947, wherein it prescribes the CIA's:
"(d) Powers and Duties.
For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council -"
Nowhere in this book is the legal emphasis on the function "coordination" made clear. In fact it is persistently avoided. The CIA was created "for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities" of other Government departments. The words "collect" and "covert/clandestine operations" do not appear anywhere in this law. The five sub-paragraphs that follow under "Sub-section (d)" are simply there to refine the coordinating function, and in no way do they broaden the scope of the meaning of the law itself. The word "cooperation" with others is used often in the book. It does not appear in the law. As prescribed by the law, the duty of the CIA was limited to "coordinating" the intelligence of others.
This common oversight makes it quite difficult to portray the CIA and the role of its long-time Director adequately, because many believe that both "collection" of intelligence, and the role of "Fun and Games" i.e. clandestine operations, were a lawful function of the CIA from its creation in 1947. It is reported that the Agency's original General Counsel, Lawrence Houston, had informed the first Director of Central Intelligence, Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter that "the empowering statutes gave the agency no authority to conduct covert operations; and that later that year "the National Security Council [Directive NSC 4-a] assigned a reluctant CIA responsibility for covert political warfare". Then, in February 1948, the new Secretary of Defense and one-time investment-banker, James Forrestal, known as the boy wonder of Wall Street, met with Allen and proposed a study of "Intelligence and National Security". Dulles agreed to head a team consisting of William H. Jackson and Mathias F. Correa. This report on the CIA's first year record was to be completed by January 1949, after the 1948 Presidential campaign election between Gov. Thomas E. Dewey, (R) of New York and the incumbent President, Harry S. Truman.
(When I was assigned the task, in 1955, of establishing in the Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, an office to "provide military support of the clandestine operations of the CIA", I was given one of the rare copies of this Dulles-Jackson-Correa report of 1949 for background information on this subject that was known to very few at that time. Dulles had emphasized the collection of intelligence and the simultaneous utilization of the same agents, the same networks, the same organization, at the same time. As a result of this Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report of 1949, we, the military departments, were enabled to create [1955-1956] a global system of military support of the CIA as visualized by Dulles, and not that limited by the more restrictive terms of the National Security Act of 1947.)
Dulles had assumed, as many others had, that Gov. Thomas E. Dewey would be elected President in 1948, and that he would be the new Director, replacing General Walter B. Smith. In 1948, I was teaching at Yale University. You can imagine the shock on that campus when the fact of the Dewey defeat began to sink in.
The author writes that "the last polls began showing that Truman was pulling ahead" and little else about that dramatic campaign. Dulles was not the only one who felt certain that Dewey would be the next President. The final Gallup poll showed Dewey ahead by a substantial five points. The New York Times predicted a Dewey victory, while the Wall Street Journal, Time and Newsweek saw a Dewey sweep. LIFE magazine carried a full-page photo of Dewey "The next President". And, in one of the most memorable photographs in the history of American politics, the "sure loser" Truman holds aloft a premature Chicago Daily Tribune front page banner headline "DEWEY DEFEATS TRUMAN" that he had been given while his train had stopped in St. Louis.
Adm. Hillenkoetter had been appointed the DCI by Truman on April 30, 1947, and served until October 7, 1950. At that time he was replaced as DCI by General Walter Bedell Smith, formerly General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff in Europe during World War II. In 1946 he had replaced Averell Harriman as Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Truman then called him back to Washington to become the DCI in 1948 and he served in that capacity until replaced by Allen Dulles in 1953 following the inauguration of President Eisenhower.
With this much background, it is my belief derived from first hand experience that the most important statement about Allen Dulles that appears in this book is the one Allen made to his partners at Sullivan & Cromwell:
"Let it be known quietly that I am a lawyer and not a diplomat."
As a lawyer he had been trained to carry out and to support the instructions of his clients. This is what he did best during those nine long years of his public service as the Director, Central Intelligence. His service in that capacity, along with that of his brother John Foster as Secretary of State, undoubtedly had more to do with the progress and tenure of the concept of a "Cold War" than any others in the history of the Twentieth Century. | | | | gchq | | Posted: Mon Nov 01, 2004 9:17 am Post subject: AMERICAN MILITARISM: THE SECRET TEAM |
| AMERICAN MILITARISM: THE SECRET TEAM
by L. Fletcher Prouty
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was President Eisenhower, one of America's greatest Generals who, in his farewell address to the nation articulated the concept of the "Military-Industrial Power Complex". He planted the seeds of an idea; but he failed to define exactly what he meant. Certainly no one knew better than General Eisenhower the value in time of war of the American Military Industrial Production team. The Axis powers would never have been defeated in World War II without the industrial might of the United States. In review then it becomes quite evident that President Eisenhower meant that there was something more than a military and industry combination when he warned the nation of a great and growing and ominous American power center.
It was not only the latest warrior President who warned of this problem, the first soldier President, George Washington, urged Americans "to avoid the necessity of those overblown military establishments which, under any form of government, are inauspicious to liberty and which are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty".
President Eisenhower in his final State of the Union Message declared, "Every dollar uselessly spent on military mechanisms decreases our total strength and therefore our security". In this speech he got closer to the point. He saw that if this great country bled away its strength and vitality in useless military expenditures it could do more harm to itself than some outside enemy could. This was, and is, a very great danger. National posturing before a bogey man of frightful assumed proportions can create costs which in themselves are economically, physically and morally degrading and unbearable. It is most ironical to observe that he said this shortly before turning the mantle of the Office of the President of the United states over to his successor, John F. Kennedy. Hardly had the echo of this stern warning resounded across the nation than it saw the beginning of the greatest and most useless expenditure of money on military mechanisms ever witnessed in all of the history of mankind. President Kennedy appointed the former president of the Ford Motor Company to be his Secretary of Defense, and never had one man been given so much money to spend as was Robert s. McNamara; and never was so little of value purchased with so much money.
It remains for history to underscore how right President Eisenhower was in saying that every dollar uselessly spent on military mechanisms decreases our strength and therefore our security. No matter what the future may bring, McNamara, later with the help and approval of Lyndon Johnson, proved him right.
As this country emerges from the spendthrift era of the Johnson years another voice joins the chorus to warn of the New American Militarism. Another outstanding battle commander, a wearer of the Congressional Medal of Honor, former Commandant of the United States Marine Corps and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Kennedy-McNamara period has warned of the present preoccupation with the military in this country which has become something like a religion, and "the basic appeals of anti-Communism, national defense and patriotism provide a foundation for a powerful creed upon which the Defense Department can build grow and justify its cost". This writer was General David M. Shoup. He did not talk about the "Military Industrial Power Complex" as such. He was concerned with the power of the military itself in this "Nation of Veterans" which has become a major power center in the United States as the decade of the sixties drew to a close.
Other voices, such as that of the New Republic Magazine** pointed out that the Great Debate was not limited to the overwhelming growth of the military as General Shoup had said, nor was it limited to the massive "Military Industrial Power Complex envisioned by General Eisenhower; but it was the result of the emergence of a most powerful New Team. The New Team of American Militarism must include the Department of Defense, its supporting industrial base, the Central intelligence Agency and certain other members of the National Security Council all aided and abetted by eminent lawyers, retired military and other governmental personnel and a host of others. The New Team is not so much a planning group or a super General Staff as it is a team of the security-cleared officials in and out of government who for one reason or other "have the clearances". They "have the need to know". They get the daily inside, controlled secret intelligence briefings and other data from the Central Intelligence Agency and from the national Security Agency, and their specialty is the ability to see communism everywhere and in everything and then to react to what the secret agent or secret report has told them. This, in brief is The Secret Team.
What really was meant by American Militarism and by the phrase "Military-Industrial Power Complex"? Do those who use these and similar terns refer to the military power center within the United States, to the national scene; or do they mean the military power which is that substantial portion of total national power as it applies to international relations and foreign policy? It is perhaps both of these which are linked together under the American Militarism banner as an umbrella for the total concept.
We can be quite certain that George Washington and Dwight Eisenhower were thinking more of the impact of the military on the country and on the world. General David Shoup in his more recent article starts out with emphasis upon the national scene and the great power of the military in this "Nation of Veterans" now some 23,000,000 strong; but he closes with emphasis on the international role, especially in the Dominican Republic affair of 1965 and in Vietnam, of the "New American Militarism".
The thing which is wrong with all of these concepts is that they are outdated and lack perception. Since General Shoup's statement was made in April 1969 it is quite significant to learn that a recent member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a man who is generally close to the Washington scene even in retirement should, as do many others, fail to see some of the most basic issues germane to the definition and description of the New American Militarism. It is equally amazing to find that President Eisenhower had hot discovered the true nature and direction of American Militarism in his time.
The militarism of the New Team is a posture, it is a cover story. It may seem to be military in its substance and appearance but it is not really military in its actions. If the New Team was really military it would be professionally and more traditionally military when it sent to war. Witness Korea and Vietnam. Both conflicts give ample evidence that the regular military professionals were not fully and unrestrainedly in control of either conflict. General MacArthur as the senior military commander in Korea knew that there could be no victory in Korea once the Chinese Communists entered the battle unless and until he could drive them out of Korea even if that took massive bombardment and follow-up military ground attacks on their bases on the mainland of China. A war, like the Olympic Games, can have no meaning if each battle and each race is not fought and run to the extreme limit.
In Vietnam one of the ablest and most experienced American Generals from the battlefield training grounds of World War II, Creighton W. Abrams, is certainly not the man who is calling the shots. If the conflict in Vietnam was a real war and was to be put under the full command of professional military men without the encumbrances of an Ambassador and the many other non-military agencies which are there to contend with, the action would be entirely different.
The New Team has the appearance of the American Military. It uses the military; but in Action it is pseudo-military or para-military at best. In this respect the New Team is second best. True and traditional military professionals complement statesmanship and diplomacy. This New Team pseudo-military posture obliterates statesmanship, and obscures diplomacy. Witness the eight year term of Dean Rusk as Secretary of State. What really was he and his department able to do during that long tenure? Even though the Department of State maintained an Ambassador in Saigon during all of this period Secretary Rusk went to Vietnam only a few times and then was treated more as a friendly dignitary than as the Secretary of State.
On the other hand Robert McNamara the Secretary of Defense, whose official representative in Saigon was either number two or number three man went to Saigon a number of times as though the Ambassador was his man and the policies in Saigon were his irrespective of the Department of State. The New Team of which McNamara was a member cut across organizational lines with abandon. The same example applies to this date for Secretary Rogers. The New Team ignores and does not understand statesmanship and planning on the international level. As a result what else can the diplomats do? They can not plan and they can not deal in a formal sense or in a continuing manner with foreign countries on major matters because the New Team cuts across their lines whenever it may see fit so to do.
In actual practice this is not the result so much of a willful matter as it is the result of its method of operation by reacting to intelligence data inputs. If it gets some information and a requirement to do something in some country, any country, the Secret Team will pursue that counterpunch action without regard for what might already be going on in that country. One of the best examples of this is when the Secret Team was working with the Katangese in that part of the Congo while the American Ambassador was doing all he could to work with the legitimate government of the Congo in Leopoldville. The 1958 Indonesian episode was similar and perhaps more tragic.
This Secret Team does not use planning and diplomacy to carry out international affairs. It does not use customary military strategic planning in contemplating war. It makes use of intelligence, it makes use of secrecy, it uses specially often clandestinely obtained data and specially interpreted data to support its actions. And most importantly its actions are as a consequence, re-actions. The Secret Team depends upon its ability to counterpunch, to re-act in national and international affairs.
This reliance upon the concept of defense and this reliance upon data inputs from a massive intelligence mechanism is at the foot of, and the very conception and germ of this Secret Counterpunch Team. There are many examples of its method of operation. At just the right time, as Congress is considering the new budget, Air Force intelligence "discovers" that the Russians have built and are flying a magnificent new fighter; the Air Force set up an urgent requirement for a newer and better fighter and asks industry to come up with this new aircraft and in turn asks Congress for funds for this plane. Central Intelligence "learns" that the Soviet Union is far ahead of the United States in the field of rockets and missiles. In no time at all this country is spurred to unusual effort, a major priority program is tossed into the lap of industry, and the closing of the U.S. Intelligence created "Missile Gap" becomes a national effort. From another angle, the steel industry, the conventional munitions industry and the shipbuilding industry respond to Navy Intelligence which "finds" that the Russians are developing a submarine which can launch missiles from off-shore, by proposing the Polaris Submarine program. It just "happened" that the Defense Department had decided but a short time earlier to build the Thor Missile as the beginning of a family of aviation industry missiles, to be powered with liquid fuel (no solid propellant) and to be armed with nuclear warheads (no conventional armament) and that these missiles would be very light and would require very little steel and iron products. The urgency of the Navy Intelligence to come up with this Russian weapon and of the heavy industries to endorse the requirement so fully was so rapidly and so masterfully timed that the Polaris Program is unique in that it was never approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as al major weapons systems are required to be. In another example, intelligence data made it appear that an over the beach invasion of Cuba, rather than the limited air drop missions which the Eisenhower administration had approved in concept, would succeed. The intelligence community gathered tremendous quantities of supplies, equipment and trained a large force of Cubans with an air armada larger than the one Castro had at the time; and then lost it all by poor coordination and planning. In the great volume of material which has been written about that event it seems to have gone unnoticed that the man who was in charge of the entire operation, Allen Dulles, was not in Washington at all on that week-end but with this major event underway he had chosen to take a vacation outside of the country. (Suppose General Eisenhower had taken a vacation at the time of the invasion of Normandy).
It was the intelligence community which came up with the speech given by Krushchev in which he stated that the Soviet Union would support all wars of national liberation, rise to a series of interpretations all suggesting subversive insurgency in as much as seventeen countries at a time. This at a time when the young, new and inexperienced President Kennedy was early in office. Intrigued by these interpretations he coined the watch-word of his administration and sent out forces into the far-flung reaches of the world to attack "subversive insurgency" with "counterinsurgency". This led to efforts of some magnitude in Laos, India, the Congo, the Dominican republic and Vietnam.
The better understand the New Secret Team it is essential to review what led up to it. The old battle trained and battle wise team went out of action with the passing of the Eisenhower era. The old team had served Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower. President Truman had presided over the final stages of a major world war and as Commander in Chief he directed the use of Atomic Weapons in combat over the home islands of Japan. President Truman knew well the horror of war and it was he who authorized the dismantling of the greatest war machine which had ever been 1/2it into the field by any country in history.. the World War II military establishment of the United States, including its industrial base.
It was President Truman who was forced to rebuild this machine and to use it in Korea against the north Koreans and the invasion of the Chinese Communists. It was Truman who called the Korean War a "police action" and who will have been proved correct by historians for recognizing that it was not a war. One way to clarify the difference between the Old Military Team and the Secret Team is to understand what war between nations really is. War is a positive action. Real total war is distinct and singular. Today there is a War on Poverty, a War on Pollution, a War on Crime and a Cold War. Before we confuse War with many other things and in so doing let our guard down, it would be well to review the definition of war.
Throughout the evolution of warfare it has been true that when diplomacy and other peacetime formal contacts between sovereign powers and protocol states fail then military force takes over and a state of war exists. It is equally thought that when a state of war exists the war which is waged is fought as a total effort without restraint for primary military objectives including the destruction of the enemy military forces, the enemy's will to fight and usually for territory or other positive tangible gain. In total war the struggle is all out. There can be no restraint placed on the use of all force available and the professional military men are charged with the successful prosecution of the war for one end... VICTORY. A major objective of War and of its pursuit of victory is that the vanquished have no choice. No room to negotiate. War is final.
This was true though out all of history to the period of World War II. In many quarters the Allied leaders were censured for issuing the "Unconditional Surrender" ultimatum to the Axis powers from the Casablanca Conference early in World War II. Nevertheless it was this statement which affirmed the war to be total and made it clear to friend and foe alike that there would be no quarter, either from the generals in the field or from the political leaders at the seat of government.
This traditional and unequivocal definition of war was not recognized and was not followed in the Korean War. Although the United States and the United Nations forces in Korea were engaged in an all-out life and death struggle up and down the Korean Peninsula the Commander in Chief of all U.S. Forces, President Truman withheld from his military commander in the Far East, General Douglas MacArthur, authority to employ all of his forces and the full weight of his available weapons, specifically nuclear weapons against the enemy. Also he placed a constraint on the use of available air power denying it the authority to pursue and destroy, to interdict, to seek out and bomb the real enemy deep in the China mainland.
Because of the concern over the possibility that the Russians might enter the war and might use the Atom Bomb if they did enter the war, if the Chinese Communist mainland were to be attacked, President Truman modified the limits of war as it was waged in Korea. It was something less than a war, and he permitted diplomacy and politics to override the full-fledged all-out unrestrained pursuit of Victory. In other words the basic objective of the Korean war was not to destroy all of the enemy absolutely, it was rather to destroy a portion of the enemy. It was not to destroy Chinese; but to fight the Koreans to a standstill. And as history, with the mellowing of time also confirms, President Truman was right in calling it a "police action". He ran it that way.
The lessons of the Korean War have had a major impact upon the concept of war in this country. In that conflict the generals were not in complete and total authority. In that war the Secretary of State and the fledgling Central intelligence Agency played a role which by its continuation into the Vietnamese conflict underscores that the Secret Team is not only the military-industry complex; but that it is made up of many other parts, The Secret Team consists of a great many more facets and all of them are in one way or another bound up in the prosecution of the Vietnamese War. It should be made clear here that the action in Vietnam is not actually a war either. Since the further pursuit of this theme will involve definition and terminology it may well be best to look back a little into the evolution of warfare.
From the dawn of civilization man has fought with whatever means were at hand. As warfare became increasingly complex and the weapons of war more intricate, armies and navies depended upon a production capability most of which took place during times of peace. In later days it was customary to speak of arsenals of war and of vast weapons storage sites or magazines which each nation maintained in order to either prepare itself for war or to defend itself from an enemy. These warmaking resources were produced by some industry. It might be said then that the military industrial power Complex had its origins far back in history.
It was one of the most remarkable generals of all time, Frederick the Great who best exemplifies the importance and the significance of this type of early military industrial combine. He placed magazines at all likely border areas so that his fast marching army could proceed from one zone to another unencumbered by the weight of supplies and the slowness of the supply train. But even more importantly his industrial base had made the first iron ram-rods. With these his trained forces were able to fire much faster than the enemy and this relative superiority in firepower made his armies invincible. He had a technological advantage and he had the supporting base to permit his army to capitalize on it.
As weapons improved and as armies have grown in size and in mobility the logistics base of the military force has become of over-riding importance. World War I brought together the most massive armed might ever assembled head to head. The Germans and the Allies were locked in close combat on the Western Front and this war which was characterized by the most massive small arms and artillery firepower ever assembled became a battle of supplies. Essentially the weapons available to both sides were about the same. At times the war seemed to be a stalemate. However it became clear that the army which could pour out the most bullets and the most shells into the enemy lines would be victorious. The entry of America into the war not only brought in fresh manpower but it assured an almost boundless flow of vital military munitions.
World War I saw the organization of the industrial military power base as an army of the national military force. The Munitions Board was as mighty as the Departments of War and Navy. It was absolutely essential to the armies in the field that production at home be managed and channeled totally in support of the war. The balance of Funs and Butter was precariously controlled by a national priorities list. In this instance industrial mobilization was as important as the mobilization of manpower. It was inevitable after World War I to find that the Military industrial Power relationship remained close even thought the military forces of the United States were drastically reduced during the period of the depression of the 1930's. During these slim years it was not uncommon to read of attacks on the Munitions Industries. It was commonly claimed that these great industries were living on the War machine and it was alleged that these tycoons were always ready to push this country into war in order to promote their business.
The outcry which arose when President Franklin D. Roosevelt began the rebuilding of a two ocean Navy during the late thirties was bitter in many sectors and was directed at the Military Industrial complex which was preparing for this build-up. In spite of the national outcry and the beginning which the President had authorized the United States was woefully short of both men and material when World War II started and most of the mobilization which occurred to support the vast world wide demand for military supplies and equipment took place just before war was declared in 1941 and during the war itself. The Military Industrial Complex may have had some influence in those days but in retrospect it is easy to see that it was very limited.
World War II was a prime example of the Military Industrial team in action. Everything from four engine heavy bombers to dehydrated canned ice cream was produced and delivered to the allied armies, including those of the Russians, all over the world. The true miracle of the war was performed by the industrial productive might and know-how of the United States, including the bo-us protection of the Atomic Bomb. The collateral miracle which made all of this meaningful was the fabrication of the greatest transportation system ever created and operated.
When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and destroyed a major portion of our effective Pacific Fleet, the military force of the United States was at its lowest ebb. Yet before the onslaught of American men and the relentless flow of supplies, the Allied Armies began close the circle around Germany and Japan and to march forward. The Russians surged back from Stalingrad into Germany, the British drove through El Alamein across the North African Desert destroying Rommel's elite forces as they went, the Free French began to rally around General DeGaulle and American forces made themselves felt in North Africa, Italy, Europe and from island to island in the Far East.
Victory was known to be attainable when production fueled the pipelines to all fronts and permitted the direct application of massive force against the homeland targets of Japan and Germany. Modern warfare as exemplified by World War II is a major and massive battle of attrition. The country which can outproduce and resupply its own attrition while at the same time its forces are wreaking so much devastation that the enemy can no longer outproduce its own losses is assured of victory.
There must be a proviso in this blanket statement as made above, because we now know that the Germans nearly upset this formula with a rocket and jet aircraft breakthrough which because of its technological superiority might have given them the upper hand despite the terrific pounding they were taking from allied bombardment and from ground action of both fronts. All of history is filled with examples of victory arising against great odds as a result of superior tactics, surprise or technical achievement. However in modern warfare such as in World War II the attrition rule holds quite true. If there is an all-out nuclear war it will be relative attrition which will spell victory and defeat.
This was the great lesson of World War II with one major exception. The Atomic Bomb was used during World War II. Few would argue with president Truman that the Atomic Bomb saved American lives, if its use made it unnecessary for American troops to invade the main islands of Japan. However World War II was hardly a test of Nuclear War as it is presently envisaged. The tests at Bikini Atoll and subsequent test up to that monstrous 58 megaton shot released by the Soviet Union have proven all of the old books on warfare are either worthless or at least they need total revision. This is one reason why the Korean War represented a major turning point in the evolution of warfare. It was the first example of a war fought under controls and restraint because of the spectre of the nuclear bomb.
The change in war planning had taken place a few years before the Korean War; but it was during this police action that the change became evident. After World War II the United States had realigned its military establishment and in accordance with the provisions of the National Security act of 1947, and amendments, the Army, Navy and Air Force were established essentially as we know them today. As an indication of the philosophical evolution which was taking place the old "War" Department was abolished and the military establishment was called the Department of Defense. This was symbolic of the times. In what may have been an attempt to avoid thinking about the unthinkable this country aligned its military forces and its essential war planning activity on the side of defense only. Because of the awesome might of nuclear weapons, which at that time only the U.S. possessed in became national policy as a somewhat gesture of magnanimity to declare that the United States would never strike first in any war. Such a policy places a tremendous psychological burden on military planners. They must always plan the counterpunch. This places a big requirement on the intelligence community. In practice the Military Planners abdicated their role of positive action from a position of strength to a secondary role of dependency upon intelligence and upon re-action to enemy moves. There have been many general officers and outstanding professional military men who have been forced to resign and who have resigned on their own initiative because they were found to be proponents of the use of military "first strike" power, or, in the case of the latter, because they could not accept this retaliation only doctrine.
This is a subtle reading of the meaning and intent of the National Security Act; but its course runs though all national policy since that date. As a major supporting factor of this view, it will be recalled that the national Security act of 1947 in addition to adding a separate Air Force to the military establishment alos created the Central Intelligence Agency and placed it under the direction of the National Security Council. Although this action is usually evaluated on its own merits, it is part and parcel of the same "Defense" theme. If a country concedes that it will never strike first - will never plan for necessary or desirable eventualities, it gives up its role of leadership in favor of a secondary position of re-acting to whatever the "enemy" does. This is the weakness which makes the "Domino Theory" seemingly so applicable. If we get pushed in one instance we shall be pushed again until they all fall down.
Because of these developments which seriously downgraded the role of strong and vibrant diplomacy, made strong and vibrant by the certain knowledge that it was backed up by superior military force the feeling for a need for better world wide intelligence was very great. There had been a number of instances, including the attack on Pearl Harbor itself, when it had been found that the existing intelligence organizations of the military services and of the Department of State were totally inadequate and were ridden with such inter-service rivalries that they tended to nullify each other. This was a matter which needed prompt correction. This was accomplished by the creation of a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central intelligence who was given complete authority over all intelligence organizations in the country.
There was a second reason why there was such an urgent reason for a major intelligence agency. This country had never devoted much effort to clandestine intelligence on a world wide basis. in fact there had been no effective organization for such activities except for the then defunct Office of Strategic Services of World War II fame. Since the United States was, at the end of World War II, the sole possessor of the nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them, it was found to be most urgent to create an intelligence agency which would complement the work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in order to protect this country from the loss of the Atomic Bomb know-how and other secrets to another nation; and, aware that the secrets of the physical sciences and of their supporting highly specialized industries were at best only short lived, to make it possible for this country to properly discover and evaluate the status of nuclear developments in all countries, especially in those behind the Iron Curtain.
In a third sense the United States embarked upon an era of emphasis upon intelligence data as a way of life because as was indicated in the use of the term "Defense" Department the country was not ready to pick up the mantle of world leadership and to rely upon its own national planning capability as a basis for action in the future. As a result the United States embarked upon the Age of Intelligence and created a most elaborate National Reaction capability.
One of the primary functions of a good intelligence system is to keep its eyes and ears open for all information and to feed this back to a central collating and interpreting authority where it is evaluated and prepared for release to those who need to know what is taking place all over the world. When a major intelligence system such as the CIA is utilized for input to the President and other highest level officials day after day year in and year out it becomes a way of life. Official Washington begins its day with the official White House intelligence briefings, and the content and tone of this master briefing sets the pace and scope of action for that day.
It is clear that if every major cabinet officer who has attended these briefings knows that the President and all of the White House staff have been briefed on a given subject for that day, they are certainly going to go back to their offices and tell their own staffs to get busy on that subject and to have everything available on that project, or that country for use during that day. No department wants to be left out of the action or to appear to be unable to contribute to the "hot subject" of the day.
This is the antithesis of planning. Officials do not plan what they are going to do from day to day; they become adept at reacting to the intelligence of the day and at directing the power and influence of their departments upon these fleeting targets. The former Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, best exemplified this method of operation.
By the time of the Korean War this method of operation had not become developed and entrenched as a working method as it was to become later. But the very fact that the military generals had not been unleashed meant that others than those in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense were making policy. In that era the State Department and a considerable influence on policy and the CIA was beginning to be heard regularly.
The CIA had a disproportionately large staff in Korea and the Far East. The CIA was getting its first chance at a major role in a major inflict and was participating in every possible way. The CIA became involved in special operations and clandestine activities as well as in matters which were purely related to intelligence gathering. It is important to note that the CIA became a factor in the councils of government during this period and that war plans and military intelligence were no longer the only source of information flowing back from the war front. As a policy matter this change became a matter of importance and presaged the development of the role and power of the Secret Team.
While the Korean War was withering away during the protracted negotiations at Panmunjom the CIA was flexing its newly developed muscle and was dipping into other areas of activity. In the Philippines the CIA began to take an interest in Hukbalahap rebellion, and with the help of some U.S. Military and Philippino Military the CIA discovered Capt. Magsaysay. This eager coalition of CIA-U.S. Military and Philippinos believed that they could create an opposition candidate to the President of the Philippines who was notoriously corrupt. They came up with an interesting public relations, image building scheme for their chosen candidate Magsaysay. They knew that there was considerable opposition to the corrupt Querino government. They also knew that Querino controlled the elections and that he had no real opposition since he would see to it that the ballots were counted his way in any event. To reverse this situation a splinter group of the Secret Team began to promote Magsaysay as the Phillipino's own "Robin Hood". With this powerful, secret backing and a blank check book underwritten by US/CIA money the rest of the build-up and campaign was easy. Magsaysay was elected and CIA's Robin Hood formula was a success.
This formula for Magsaysay worked so well that Admiral Radford, then the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), Cardinal Spellman, who felt a strong responsibility for the welfare of the millions of Catholics in Vietnam, Allen Dulles and many others saw in its capability the opportunity to work the same miracle in South Vietnam where there was a political vacuum as a result of the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. The same team, including many of the Philippinos, who had worked for Magsaysay moved to Saigon and began the development of the Ngo Dinh Diem legend as "Father of his Country".
Diem, who had lived in the United States for the sixteen years preceding his return to South Vietnam was hardly a popular or national figure in Saigon. Yet every door opened for him. Over night he had an army and an elite palace guard. The Secret Team saw to it that the things he needed and some of things he may not have needed were provided. To understand the power and influence of the Secret Team consider just one of the tasks which confronted Diem when he first became President of South Vietnam in 1954. At that time the French were still in South Vietnam, but had been defeated at Dien Bien Phu. With Secret Team help he began to attempt to remove the remaining French and to consolidate his position as head of a government over a piece of low value real estate which had never been a country. In 1955 he replaced Bao Dai as Chief of State and became President on October 26th 1955.
Where does a new and virtually unknown chief of state get a palace guard, an army and all of the other accouterments of government from such a precarious start as that. The Secret Team Robin Hood game was showing its strength and versatility. It was not long before special projects and programs involving respected personnel from many universities and such "think factories" as the Rand corporation began to show up in large numbers to "advise" Mr. Diem on how to run a government and stave off Communism at the same time. The Secret Team which had sharpened its operating procedures in Korea and in the Philippines began to get heavily involved in South East Asia. The Military Advisory Groups in Taiwan, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam grew appreciably every year. Most of their men were introduced as MAAG personnel, under one program or other, but many of them were assigned to CIA units. Many operations were handled by private civilian firms such as the notorious Air America Co. with its fabled coterie of Flyers of Fortune. Also a large group of para-military personnel had been introduced under various CIA, U.S. Military auspices.
By the time things were settled in Korea the Secret Team was well situated in South Asia. By this period, activities arising from intelligence inputs were becoming so large and by their size so instrumental in U.S. Foreign policy that the emergence of the new "counterpunch" team was becoming evident. Few Congressmen if any had figured this out yet, and few would have questioned it if they had. Like Senator Saltonstall, who was a charter member of the informal CIA Watch-dog Committee, "What I don't know won't hurt me" was the best way to slough it off. It remained for Sen. Fulright and a few others many years later to begin to ask pointed and meaningful questions.
It is somewhat ironical to find that the man who won election in 1952 on a platform dedicated to ending the war in Korea was the same man who presided over the growth of the Secret Team concept. During the Eisenhower era john Foster Dulles was Secretary of State. At the same time Allen Dulles was the Director of Central intelligence. Allen Dulles, who liked to think of himself as a real professional in the intelligence business, had been selected by President Truman to head a small but expert committee which was assigned the task of studying the U.S. Intelligence Community as it existed from 1947 through 1949, and to make recommendations to the President. This committee of Dulles, Jackson and Corea concluded their extensive work with a report which most certainly was Allen Dulles' "Mein Kampf". It was a monumental work and laid out all of the things which Dulles thought should be done immediately and those things which he hoped to achieve as time went by. The report made two basic points: the Director of Central Intelligence had not been successful in pulling the intelligence community together to make it an effective Central intelligence organization, and the NSC had been too restrictive in denying the CIA the right to develop and carry out secret (clandestine) operations.
On the basis of this outstanding work Dulles was name Deputy Director of Central intelligence and shortly thereafter he succeeded to the Directorship. This began an era of the utmost significance. Dulles achieved his goals and set things in motion which made the office of the DCI the paramount catalytic force in shaping the substance of the Secret Team and in moving it forward from its fragile, amorphous existence to a most powerful position as a special group at the highest echelons of government. Before going further with a description of the Secret Team and how it works it must be pointed out that although this team does have tremendous power it is more an expression of power from within, like a volcano, than it is the evidence of power at the top as in a corporation. Although the Secret Team gets things done at the top, the White House approval and cooperation, its membership, which varies continuously, consists of many experts and many minor officials and smaller power centers far down in the governmental structure, in industry, in universities sometimes in foreign governments and in the drive and energies of outside forces such as lawyers who have access to the White House and other places near the center of authority. The real characteristic of this Secret Team is that it is a sort of bureaucratic hydraulic system which is capable of transmitting small sharp pressures directly from the point of origin, to every part of the system, especially to the top, to the DCI, OSD and the White house. It is a remarkable product of our time living on and responding to intelligence data input, operating under a cloak of security utilizing the selective "need to know" principle and knit together by a most fabulous communications systems and overall cloaked in the powerful aroma of secrecy. It wields great internal power with its two crunching slogans "Need to Know" (if someone decides you do not need to know, you are a nobody even though you may be a cabinet officer. You are just excluded from meetings and information and without being informed you are just out of the action. This can be deadly in official Washington if you have not got the word you can't do a thing) and "Get of the Team" (this is the old tool of exclusiveness, Get of the Team, don't ask questions, or be left out. Like the Old Harry Byrd political system. You weren't forced or coerced, you were asked to Get on the Team and if you did not you were totally ignored. And because you were on the team and did not ask questions everything the team did was all right.)
continued.. | | | | gchq | | Posted: Mon Nov 01, 2004 9:19 am Post subject: |
| American Militarism Continuation...
Allen Dulles was not an administrator. In fact one of the first things he did when he took office as Director was to eliminate the post of Deputy Director, Administration. But what he lacked on that side, he more than made up in bull-dog determination, ambition, a certain useful inability to see problems. when he became Director he found that the intelligence community was not centralized as it should have been and that it was prohibited from setting up operations which were based upon secret intelligence inputs. Clandestine data which its agents had obtained. It was repugnant to Allen Dulles to find that the NSC specifically prohibited the CIA from carrying out such operations on its own initiative; and that it made good its restriction by prohibiting the CIA from building up a force of men and materials which would have been necessary to carry out such operations if approval had been granted. This left the CIA with the ability to get involved only in very small affairs or to have to turn to the military to flesh out an operation which it had been given authority to perform.
It might be added that it rankled Allen Dulles to find that the Director of Central Intelligence was not on the regular NSC level with the Cabinet officers and that his agency was subject to the direction of this not too well organized and motivated committee. But with his brother at the helm in State and his good friend Ike in the White House it did not take him long to change this and to improve this situation. It was not long before he had organized a group of top level writers and commentators of national and world renown to meet with him regularly on the basis that if they knew what was really going on right from the horses' mouth, then they could report more responsibly to the nation and to the world. This of course kept these chosen men highly informed and made them friends and sometimes tools of the Director.
This minor item is an important example of how the Secret Team works. It is one thing to exclude people from classified information on the basis of arbitrary "Need to know"; it is another thing to give them the information yourself as "cleared insiders". Through this device they now have the information but they are absolutely denied the use of that information because a record is kept, including a tape recording, and if they ever tried to use any of it they would be called to account for leaking Top Secret information. By this device smart and very able reporters have been bottled up by what seemed on the surface to be a most magnanimous gesture on the part of the Secret Team.
Consider the impact this device had upon the Kennedy-Nixon television debates of 1960. Nixon as Vice President presided over the NSC and knew precisely what the plans for Cuba were. And the fact that he knew and exactly what he knew were a matter of record. On the other hand, Senator Kennedy was technically an outsider. He did not know what the NSC knew. At least that was the official line. He was not on the "need to know" official record. However Kennedy did know exactly what was going on and what was being planned. Many of the upper and middle management level operators of the CIA did not like Nixon and were strongly in favor of Kennedy for President. As a result Kennedy knew what the plans were, and more importantly, he knew the Cuban principals of the planned operation well. On one occasion a member of the Secret Team was dispatched from the office of the Secretary of Defense to the Senate office building to pick up some men who were waiting in the office of Senator John Kennedy. They were met in the Senators office and driven across town to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. These four men were the leaders of the Cuban invasion team, and the date on which this occurred was before the invasion plans have been prepared by the CIA. Kennedy knew more about these people and their plans than Nixon did.
However when they appeared on television for that most crucial debate, Vice President Nixon was precluded by security restrictions from saying anything substantive about the plans of the government with regard to Cuba. On the other hand Sen. Kennedy can and did say anything he wanted to about them. This was a most important issue at that time. Nixons frustration and anger, at Kennedy's tactics, showed on the candid TV screen. Kennedy was relaxed and sure of himself. As the record shows, the vote was so close that the margin of victory was the slimmest in the history of a Presidential election and there is little doubt that the poor showing of Nixon during this vital debate on the major issue of Cuba could have made the difference. The sinister move of the Secret Team in exploiting the use of intelligence to help one party and to freeze out the other created a great victory on a national scale for the Team. It will be recalled that the only hold-over appointees made by Kennedy from the Eisenhower team included Allen Dulles.
To highlight the significance of the above it should be added that the Kennedy administration greatly expanded and endorsed the CIA's Cuban invasion plans even before inauguration. What had been a minor project of the Eisenhower administration blossomed into a major operation and invasion under Kennedy. The old General who had commanded the invasion of Normandy Beach in 1944, never did and never would have granted permission for such a hair brained scheme as came up after the election of Kennedy. It was unnoticed by all but certain select members of the Secret Team that later when the united States government had arranged a very large payment of ransom for all of the Cubans who had been captured after the Bay of Pigs invasion, a most unusual scene took place in the Orange Bowl stadium in Miami. The returned captives of the Cuban Brigade were assembled in a crowded Orange Bowl amid the cheers of thousands of Miamians and thousands of exiled Cubans. At the center of this scene was the bright young President welcoming back these valiant Cubans to the soil from which they had been so unceremoniously launched against their homeland. In the enthusiasm of the occasion President Kennedy walked over to these men and in an apparently spontaneous gesture his put his arm around the shoulder of one of these men. Unknown to the millions of TV viewers was the fact that this was not a random gesture. The man whom the President had walked up to and embraced was the same man who had been in his Senate Office in the summer of 1960, his old friend, the leader of the Cuban Brigade, Manuel Artime. Kennedy knew him well. He knew him and his plans and the CIA plans during the TV debate, and this information given to him by the Secret Team and kept from Nixon's use also by the rules of the Secret Team serves to show how, better than any other example, the Secret Team uses its power and resources.
It may be well for all enterprising candidates to keep in mind the two edged sword of the Secret Team. The incumbent may announce that he could say this or that about national policy but that he can not because of security restrictions. This is powerful medicine and it always sounds, and is often interpreted as meaning that he must know a lot. "He's on the Team". The shrewd incumbent goes one step farther. He makes a most magnanimous gesture and directs the Director of Central Intelligence, and other top level officials, to call in the opposing candidates to brief them and to give them all the chances he has. This reads very well and sounds like fair play. But the shrewd insider and his crafty Secret Team stalwarts know that by briefing the fledgling aspirant they have most effectively tied his hands and his tongue. Now, after the briefing if he so much as dares to say that he knows what is going on and what it is he knows he can be subject to violating security. This is a familiar and effective tactic. Because VP Nixon was not liked by the Secret Team in 1960 he could not use it. But it is used and used most effectively. Allen Dulles laid the groundwork for this with his briefings of newspaper men and TV and radio commentators many years ago. It has been developed into an art since then.
Similarly he surrounded himself with men from industry, finance and from the academic world. CIA had always been a haven for the Ivy League crowd and he made it more so. Thus he brought into the confines of and the confidence of the Agency strong representative groups of American power centers. this gave him a very broad base of strength and support in the most influential areas of national power. In a subtle sense this was done not so much for power-center reasons as it was to enhance the creditability of the product of the intelligence community and thus to assure result and approval when he felt action was warranted. many of the most useful adjuncts to the formal intelligence organizations were these businessmen and educators who are generally frequent travelers and who are not only well qualified to assist in the collection of information but usually relish the suggestion that they keep their eyes and ears open for Uncle Sam.
During the period of the later fifties there was not a real war underway in which U.S. troops were engaged but in the aftermath of McCarthyism (Sen. Joe of Wisconsin) and with the Cold War waxing hot all over the world the nation was not disarming after Korea as it did after World War II. The country remained more alert to the voice and warnings of American Militarism. The Secret Team by this time had quite regularly adopted the "cover" of American Militarism in most of its public announcements. The impact of intelligence data is more readily operable in military reactive moves than it is in diplomatic or economic actions. Here Allen Dulles and his staff of real experts showed their true genius. Back in the depression years of the thirties Congress had passed what was known as the Economy Act of 1932 and as amended it is still on the books and it is still operative. The Act, in order to save money and to discourage needless spending, permits one agency which needs goods and equipment to purchase them at an agreed price from another agency by an accounting off-set without spending "new money" for such items. As a result the Department of Agriculture could buy some surplus tractors from the Army at a price agreed upon by both parties even if was $1.00 each. Since they were not needed by the selling agency the price was usually very low. By means of this authority the CIA learned how to "buy" from all agencies of the government, primarily from the Department of Defense, a tremendous amount of new as well as unneeded equipment, and to take over bases at home and abroad for its own use without appearing to have spent any money and many times without the selling agency knowing the true identity of the buyer.
This method of purchase, or budgetary by-passing device has been brought to a fine art by the CIA. As an example, the CIA may wish to create an Army unit for some minor purpose which the Army and the Department of Defense are perfectly willing to grant. The CIA then has an organization which is listed on the Army roster of units as, for example, 1234 Special Supply Company, Fort Wyman, New Jersey. This small unit which may have a few Army personnel who are actually CIA employees who are Army reservists, and a few other personnel who are career employees may serve as a supply receiving point to hold agency material prior to overseas shipment. This is all above board.
After this unit has been operating for a while and has appeared to have become a bona fide Army unit not only to the rest of the Army personnel on Fort Wyman (no real Fort) but to certain real Army people who have in the course of events been assigned to this same 1234 Special Supply Company, it will begin to requisition supplies from the Army as though it was a real Army unit. This procedure will continue and then through the utilization of this Army requisitioning base the unit will begin to requisition in a perfectly normal manner items of equipment from the Navy and the Air Force. Cross requisitioning is acceptable today. The Navy and Air Force charge the Army, and the Army having records which show that the 1234 Supply Co. is real honors these requisitions; and in the space of a year or so the CIA has a source of supply that is virtually bottomless. Through the provisions of the Economy Act of 1932 and with the clever use of the "dummy" Army units the CIA can pad its arsenal as it desires.
The CIA has learned how to get a Research and Development contract started on various items of equipment and then to transfer the project to the Department of Defense to have it purchased in final form and in quantity by the military. Eventually through cross requisitioning the CIA could get all of these items it started the project on having expended only the first few dollars required to initiate the R&D contract.
Thus the CIA has become a catalyst within the government. Without appearing to have a very large budget or to have much other substance it has learned how to become a very large and a very influential organization. It did not take some of the major industries of this country long to learn how to exploit this Aladdin's Lamp. Companies which had found it tedious and costly to deal with the department of defense found that they could cut corners with the same items by dealing with the CIA. The famous, or infamous, M-16 rifle of Vietnam fame was originally brought into the Department of Defense through McNamara's office by the CIA before the ordnance people of the Army had had a chance to look at it. There were some Army officers on assignment with the CIA who worked on this weapon, and they were qualified to perform these duties; but this does not mitigate the fat that it was the CIA and not the Army which procured the rifle. As a matter of fact the first large procurement of the M-16 rifle was made by the U.S. Air Force for the CIA so that the Army would have to be requested to get into the act.
For many years CIA has maintained close contact with Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and with many other manufacturers of military equipment. It is through this routing that the Secret Team makes many of its major acquisitions in order to avoid the standard methods of procurement and to be able to make special arrangement when they feel it is necessary. For reasons which are generally justified on the grounds of "security" the Secret Team and its CIA partner have developed the capability to manufacture items normally made by many defense manufacturing companies for their own use.
it is useful to the Secret Team on occasion to appear not to have a large group of personnel assigned to some task. For example some overseas MAAG stations had staffs of forty personnel or so, yet a visitor to these offices would frequently note that there were several hundred people working at the MAAG compound. The way in which these people are kept from the record is for the CIA or other agency involved to provide funds, real or intended, equivalent to the sum of the salaries of the people on the job. This becomes unwieldy at the overseas site; but back in Washington the record will show only those people actually charged to the services involved. In this manner the Secret Team is able to support rather large projects in various foreign countries without having to reveal their extent at some budget review or other examination back in Washington. All of this is in addition to the fact that the CIA carries a large number of military personnel on its roles as a matter of regular assignment for the ostensible purpose of cross training. This does not count the thousands who may be assigned to the agency such as the "Green Berets", U.S. Army Special Forces troops were in Vietnam, and many other places.
This type of overseas activity gives the Secret Team considerable latitude in it dealing with the foreign country involved. For many reasons the secret Team will work with the military forces of a foreign country in ways in which the U.S. military do not. In fact the U. S. Military may be totally unaware that they are doing this and that they may be doing this as ostensible members of the MAG or some other legitimate military organization. This can have some strange results.
As an example, the force structure and the military aid given to a foreign country, such as Greece, is carefully tailored to its neighbors, Italy and Turkey, by the military Aid planners. Meanwhile, for example, the Greek Chief of Staff of the Air Force, may wish to have a squadron of modern Reconnaissance aircraft for his own uses and to provide certain extra information for the CIA. The Department of Defense may have had to turn down his request because they do not intend to give such planes to the Turkish and Italian services. The Greek General may travel to the United States, pay his respects to his military counterparts here and in addition may call on a CIA official who is know to him (This official might really be an Air Force general). Because the Secret Team feels that its requirements are valid it will take the foreign request to the White House directly and the "Greeks" (or other) will get the Squadron of modern Reconnaissance fighters.
There is another way in which the Secret Team dominates certain areas simply because of an intelligence requirement which creates some re-action on the part of the U.S. government. This re-action then may stir up unrest and bad feeling on the part of other states and in the long run the effect will have been negative, as most counterpunching is.
This catalytic action provides the Secret Team with enough leverage to get anything it wants started at any level of government as well as on the international scene. A simple request for a few Navy Doctors and some U.S. Army Special Forces instructors to serve in Panama was the beginning of what became the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Another request to move a squadron of helicopters from Laos to South Vietnam in the early sixties, and this request over the strenuous objection of the military, did more than any other single event to pave the way for escalation of the conflict in Vietnam.
A message from an agent, or a reply from an agent, sets off a chain reaction which as it snowballs ends up on secret operations as a proposal for action. When this has been approved within the agency it may be referred to certain "cleared" (Secret Team) members in DOD, State, EOB, etc. In many instances they "join" the action. By "joining" or endorsing the project the Army, for example, could be teaming up with the CIA to get into some activity which it would never be allowed to do as a military service.
When this very special and very secret staffing has been coordinated and completed, CIA meets with the special group of the NSC (a smaller group cleared for Secret Team activity or to put it more realistically a small group of those who are there because the others were not cleared). in accordance with the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 this group, which includes a member from the White House who specifically represents the President, approves or disapproves of this project.
Once it is approved at that ultimate level the CIA is in the driver's seat and the project, blossoming under the usual military and other governmental rush to support it, gets underway. Contrary to the expectation of the National Security Act some of these projects grow to be sizable operations.
The U-2 project started modestly as did the clandestine participation in Laos. A unique combination of smaller projects which had involved the Philippines, Taiwan, Laos, Thailand, Special Forces development and available readiness, the Bay of Pigs back-lash, Army and Navy rivalry at the MacArthur and Radford level of command, the French defeat, all mixed together to create the weird and unfortunate conflict in South Vietnam. From reviewing this brief list it can be seen that the Secret Team was at the center of things.
As projects grow they proliferate into supporting areas. Universities are asked to make area studies, "Think" Factories such as the Rand corporation are asked to provide all manner of material including personnel in the field, University teams are dispatched to the area to study everything from tribal customs to nutrition problems, industry teams are flown out to the area to see what they can do to meet requirements, the Press arrives on the scene in strength: all of these factors to shore up the project which the Secret Team has fallen in not because it was planned that way; but because some bit of intelligence suggested that something might be done. A reaction process.
This inevitable initial build-up invariably leads to an increase in the size of the project which he would like to see himself involved with and he volunteers to assist. Years ago the old die-hard eager beaver General Iron Mike O'Daniel volunteered to take a one star reduction in grade to be assigned to a job in Vietnam so he could work "for the good of the country". In those early days he publicized Vietnam and the "American Cause" there more than anyone else. There have been many Secret Team sponsors and activists. Second to Allen Dulles there might be any of the following: Maxwell Taylor, Henry Cabot Lodge who while United Nations Ambassador many years ago dabbled in Greek internal problems and got to know how the Secret Team operates. Since many of the middle management level personnel of the Secret Team got their early training in Greece they have since gone on the big game in Vietnam and with them Henry Cabot Lodge. Or Edward G Lansdale, who was the scenario writer of the Magsaysay script and because of that the fair-haired boy of Admiral Radford and Allen Dulles to name a few. And Robert S. McNamara whose computerized approach to problems made them all alike because they had equal numbers.
He is the one who installed the Combat Development Test Center idea in Vietnam and numbered all problems for #1 to infinity, serially and saw to it that eachone was taken care of. A minor n---- problem would get the same treatment which some major tactical problem would get and he would spend his own time on them accordingly. This makes for a lot of action and a lot of busy people; but it is entirely possible that he never once sat down and really thought out what the American Objective the basic Military Objective was in Vietnam. He kept busy every day doing all of the little things and never saw the big picture.
Then there is William Bundy the quiet older brother of McGeorge Bundy. Bill had served many years with the CIA and came over to the Office of the Secretary of defense with McNamara. here was a man with a sorts of education and learning yet he was totally lost with the hard facts of Vietnam. He was a conduit for the CIA party line in Defense and took that role with him when he went to the State Department. Although the Bundy's have been fro A to Z on matters pertaining to Vietnam and have been from Hawk to Dove on their stated views, the best thing that can be said about these learned and inexperienced men is that they were able pipe lines for their associates and masters.
It was McGeorge Bundy who moved into the chair once occupied by Maxwell Taylor in the White House. This position is never fully described for public consumption but Eisenhower had a right hand man meet with the special group of the NSC to chair the meetings which were convened from time to time to pass on requests made by the CIA for clandestine activities. After the Bay of Pigs Kennedy designated a team to review that project. This group included Admiral Arleigh Burke, Allen Dulles, Bobby Kennedy and Maxwell Taylor. General Taylor had retired from the service after having been Army Chief of Staff dissatisfied with the role which the Eisenhower administratio had assigned to the Army. He found early favor with the Kennedy administration and after serving with this investigation group he had become close to Bobby Kennedy and through him, with the President. Since the assignment of a man to this super-secret job in the White House was of major significance to the CIA and the Secret Team, Allen Dulles and Bobby Kennedy recommended Maxwell Taylor for the post of Special Military Advisor to the President.
To the "uncleared" it seemed that President Kennedy was dissatisfied with the military and especially with General Lyman Lemnitzer, then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was good cover, and a typical ploy of the Secret Team. The Bay of Pigs blame was shared with the Military although the regular military up to and including Lemnitzer had had very little, other than logistics support, to do with it. So it seemed that Taylor's job would be to keep an eye on the military. Actually it was to fill this position in the White House which was responsible for passing on clandestine activities. After some time in this capacity, during which he learned much about the inner workings and methods of the CIA, Taylor became Chairman of the JCS, Dulles retired from the CIA and John McCone followed him there. This left a major vacancy to be filled by McGeorge Bundy.
By this time the secret Team had a nearly full house. With McNamara in Defense and Taylor with the JCS, and with one Bundy in the White House and the other in Defense, later State, there was almost no one in any major part of the government who was in a position to stop or even slow down any proposal made by the CIA and the Secret Team. This made it easy for the Secret Team to gain complete control of Vietnam and to build it up as they wished.
It is useful to see how some of this worked for combined purposes. Maxwell Taylor had quit the Army because the stress during the Eisenhower years had been toward "Massive Retaliation", SAC and Missiles, which with the Thor-Jupitor decision, went against the Army. Now he was able to preside at a major rebirth of the Army, and a major reliance on general warfare. Vietnam was more to his liking than Sac and Missile strategy. In two short years the new President heard little else but the ideas of Taylor and his cronies and Vietnam was the kind of thing they understood more than the complexities and non-ground war nature of Nuclear Strategy.
It was no long before things were beginning to move so far in Vietnam that it was assuming the spot-light. Even President Diem made some attempts to slow down the Americanization of the war. Eventually this cost Diem his life and ended the Diem regime which in a brief ten years had done much to get that country started. It is significant to recall that President Diem died just as Ambassador Henry Cabot lodge was leaving the country to come back to the US and just as Maxwell Taylor was arriving to take over the number one U.S. job in Vietnam, the Ambassadorship. As Taylor arrived the government was in the hands of the Generals. Just after Diem died, just after Taylor arrived in Saigon, President Kennedy himself died and a whole new era of "Get on the Team" began in Saigon. The groundwork was laid in 1963, preparations were consolidated in 1964 and major escalation took place shortly thereafter.
No one can say that the Secret Team did all of this. But that is the characteristic of the Secret Team which is most important. Because it works in response to things, because it counterpunches, because it passes ever pressure big and little throughout the system as in a hydraulic system, and because it is to a great degree faceless and amorphous the Secret Team performs best in something senseless and useless like Vietnam.
In many ways it serves to generate rivalries between the services and then to take advantage of them. In the earl days of Laos and Vietnam the CIA worked very closely with the Green Berets, the U.S. Army Special Forces. In fact until the end of 1963 all Special Forces troops in Vietnam and Laos were under the operational control of the CIA. Because of this favored position of the Green Berets, the other services through that it would be wise for them to have some "Special Forces" also. The Air Force had quite a handful of special aircraft and crews which had been left over from the Bay of Pigs disaster. They organized these into the nucleus of Special Air Warfare units and as soon as they could they were sent to Vietnam to work with the CIA.
Not to be outdone the Navy built up some special units known as SEAL Teams and hurried them to Vietnam also to work with the CIA. Since the Navy did not have the kind of small boats required for some of the action there and because President Kennedy had been a PT-boat man, the Navy ordered a flotilla of PT Boats from Norwegian shipbuilders and shipped them directly to Vietnam to join other boats which were transferred from the U.S. Coast Guard.
All of these things which developed more from inter-service rivalry to "Get of the Team" with the CIA and the Secret Team resulted in a considerable build-up of forces in Vietnam. Of course once they were there something had to be done with them. For example, because the Air Force contribution consisted of units of C-123 medium transport aircraft, McNamara had squadrons of these planes converted at considerable cost to become defoliant sprayer aircraft (one of the most insidious and terroristic tactics devised for war in a country where most of the population was from time immemorial accustomed to eat food from the trees, from shrubs, berries and grass food like rice and millet).
The Secret Team has existed now for so many years that it has alumni who are in universities and industry in great numbers. It may be entirely true that the CIA has more alumni, proportionately, in industry than does the military. The Military-Industrial Power Complex is supposed to be under scrutiny as a seed-bed for "deals" between ex-military men and the industrial giants because these industries have employed senior military men. But regular military officers are very highly regulated by law from selling to the military, and there is no such restriction on CIA men.
This Secret Team is a creation of the times. It had grown from below. From the pressures of the defensive philosophy and of re-action based upon intelligence data inputs, and in particular from its absolute control of security clearances - not just the usual "Secret" and "Top Secret" clearances, but the "Need to Know" requirement which eliminates non-team members regardless of clearance, and by the "Black-Box" (Lie Detector). It is this Black Box and its records and their use, which perfects the system. This is why Secret Team members are not able to talk. Once a man has been subjected to the Black Box and has been briefed on team activities there is little chance that he will ever discuss them with anyone except team members and then only with those whom he knows have the "need to know".
The Secret team is not so much a product of individual effort as was the development of Nazism and Fascism. It is a product of the times. Certainly Allen W. Dulles made it possible and men like Maxwell Taylor brought it to a high state of the art.
Its real and most descriptive name should be "The New American Pseudo-Military Super-Secret Counterpunch Team". It is here to stay until leaders in the federal government begin to lead, not follow. Real leadership will let the air out of the Secret Team balloon. Real planning will always beat counterpunching just as it does in a championship boxing match.
But in the meantime the Secret Team runs rampant. It will never let us out of South Vietnam until it has another place to go. It is essentially parasitic. So watch Laos again, Taiwan and the off-shore islands, Korea, the middle East where the Secret Team has long been allied with elements in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and even Egypt, Latin America where the team has close contacts in Bolivia and in Columbia, Cuba, India and Pakistan or even Korea again. We are withdrawing from South Vietnam but we are not escaping. We are en route to everywhere. Watch the intelligence bulletins.
It should be noted that it is a characteristic of the Secret Team that it never finishes anything it starts. It walked away from Korea leaving that country divided half with the Communist world and the other half depending upon U.S. Aid and 55,000 troops. The team got heavily involved with Cuba. It made a ridiculous move there, the Bay of Pigs, and then dropped the whole thing. It got into the Congo. Became extended there when it supported both sides at the same time and left. It became involved in Indonesia and after encouraging tens of thousands of rebels to overthrow the government it left them to their fate. It worked its way into the India-Pakistan border affair with China. By its crude and precipitous handling of this action it alienated Pakistan and dabbled with India's problems on the border. earlier it had supported the Dalai Lama in Tibet; got him out of there and then when it had a major force of loyalists armed and fighting against the Chinese invaders it left them totally to fend for themselves.
The Team went into Laos many years ago. It moved tens of thousands of loyal Meo tribesmen in what had been a most hostile area. It armed and equipped them to fight against the Pathet lao and then when the Team became embroiled in South Vietnam it pulled out and left them. It has done the same in Bolivia, Columbia and the Middle East.
As a force of re-action the secret Team ricochets from one spot to another. By its constitution and philosophy it will never accomplish anything. It raises huge forces, spends tremendous amounts of other people's money, employs hundreds of thousands of supporting people: yet as the businessman says, it cannot "Close the Deal".
The Secret Team proves what President Eisenhower said to be true, "Every dollar uselessly spent on military mechanisms decreases our total strength and therefore our security". The nation, in any war, hot or cold which is being consumed by attrition is losing. Certainly for those who believe Communism to be the "enemy" what has been happening to this country ever since the Korean War proves that this series of conflicts and useless affairs has cost this country hundreds of billions of dollars, irreparable loss of resources and tens of thousands of human lives; not to put a price on the moral degradation of this country which has occurred because of the listlessness and debilitating existence caused by needless and pointless continuing involvement in such events enumerated above.
This whole philosophy of carrying out the international affairs of this great nation on a re-active basis in response to intelligence data inputs needs to be brought to an end. If the Cold War really is a war in any sense then it too will be won or lost on the basis of relative attrition rates for both sides. If as we have been led to believe for the past quarter century the Communist World and specifically Russia is our enemy, to the extent that ANTI-COMMUNISM is a cry to battle anywhere at anytime then consider what the real attrition is. Vietnam serves as the best example. We have lost 45,000 American lives there and the Russians have lost none. We have expended more than $100,000,000,000 there and the Russians have expended perhaps 2% of that. How can even the most rabid anti-Communist support our present course of action against the logic of those figures?
It is time for this country to begin to show real leadership and to end this role of the counterpuncher. if there is a major peacetime job to be done in this troubled world, and there certainly is, then let it be done the American way, directly, above board, honestly and in a planned and businesslike manner. And if the day comes when our goals can not be met through honorable and effective statesmanship and there is no other alternative than to resort to the force of arms, then let us do that honorably too. If that means that we must fight Vietnamese; let's fight them and win. No holds barred. And if that means that we must fight the Chinese; let's pick the best weapons we have and fight them. And if the day comes when this honest show of determination does not convince any other nation in the world that we intend to stand upon our rights and those of our allies, then we must be prepared to fight them too and we most likely will have to that with Nuclear Weapons.
It would be hoped that before that day may come the force of reason and determination would prevail and that a final showdown might not be necessary; but failing that and if it is necessary there is no other alternative. The course we are on now will bleed us to death certainly as our country weakens and our resources pour out in useless endeavors. | | | | gchq | | Posted: Tue Nov 02, 2004 9:11 am Post subject: THE CIA'S SECRET WAR ON CAPITALISM |
| THE CIA'S SECRET WAR ON CAPITALISM
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the Fifties and Sixties the Central Intelligence Agency fought clandestine wars against Communism, and suddenly in the Seventies comes the news that the CIA is also fighting a secret war against capitalism. A report published by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities says that the CIA secretly owns a complex of businesses, including insurance companies, airlines, and a private investigating firm. These businesses, called "proprietaries", were mostly bogus corporations that existed only on paper, but some of them, with real assets worth about $60 million, did operate and occasionally returned sizable profits.
The operating proprietaries were used heavily to extend the CIA's presence abroad, to provide support for paramilitary operations, to spread propaganda, and to manage the CIA's private investments. These proprietaries enmeshed themselves deeply in the American business and financial communities. They invested their capital and profits in domestic securities markets and ran the task of unfair competition with private companies in the same business fields.
On the heels of the Senate report came an announcement by the General Aircraft Corporation that it was suing the CIA for $25 million. From the Fifties until 1975, General Aircraft, of Bedford, Massachusetts, received construction contracts from the CIA, but now the company says the CIA has driven it into near bankruptcy by using its name and the name of its subsidiary, Helio Aircraft, as a cover for its agents performing secret operations in the Congo, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. General Aircraft claims the CIA, by "forgery, misrepresentation, and other devices", obtained false Helio sales-representative identification cards for its agents. The use of the Helio name by CIA agents caused Helio to suffer stigmatizing and the loss of sales in other-wise favorable markets.
In the Sixties, General Aircraft was about to close a sale of a large number of planes to the Government of the Congo, but at the same time CIA agents in the Congo were posing as Helio representatives. General Aircraft says the CIA was using the cover to carry on activities that resulted in the death of Government officials and the fall of the Congolese government. As a result, the company contends in its suit, Helio and its legitimate employees were expelled from the African country.
The Helio Aircraft Corporation was a pioneer in the creation of short-take-off-and-landing (STOL) planes. Shortly after World War II, Dr. Lynn L. Bollinger, a co-founder of Helio who was a professor at the Harvard Business School, got together with Dr. Otto Koppen, head of the Aeronautics Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Koppen had some ingenious ideas about how to manipulate the molecules of air around the wing of a plane in slow flight, and he had proved that his ideas would work. Bollinger was a former airline pilot and he was sure that he and Koppen could get their idea into the air and into business. They did, and one day in the late Forties newspapers carried a picture of a small, but robust aircraft taking off from a tennis court in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The picture and the accompanying story caught the eye of many airmen and also members of the CIA. CIA agents carrying U.S. Air Force identification traveled to Boston and dropped in for an eventful visit at the factory research center where the Helio STOL plane was being developed. The agents liked what they saw and made arrangements to purchase a number of the planes, which presented a problem.
The CIA is supposed to be the quiet intelligence arm of the President and is not supposed to be buying aircraft. To buy the aircraft the CIA could do one of two things: have the Air Force or Army buy these planes, or create a "proprietary" company and have it buy the planes. The CIA did both. Air America in the Far East and Southern Air Transport, which operated primarily in the Caribbean, were CIA proprietaries engaged in clandestine activities for the CIA.
The CIA also had the Army and Air Force procure these planes and they were concealed in the far-flung reaches of the services. In order to maintain absolute secrecy for clandestine missions, it was necessary to create "black flight" or "sanitized" airplanes. These planes are unmarked and unable to trace to the U.S. Government. It was a requirement of national policy that, if the military was engaged in any way with clandestine activities, every attempt be made to assure that the U.S. Government could disclaim involvement in the operation. It is impossible to conceal the identity of normal aircraft. If an Air Force plane, one bought by the CIA and maintained and operated every day by the Air Force as though it really belonged to the Air Force, was ever lost on a clandestine mission, it would be easy for any competent intelligence organization to identify it as a U.S. aircraft and embarrass the U.S. Government. But if the CIA could sanitize its aircraft or have a proprietary fly its mission, the U.S. Government could remain uninvolved. To sanitize its aircraft, the CIA produced extra, backup planes from spare parts. Maintenance facilities put in orders for spare parts and constructed planes without decals or identifying numbers on the fuselages or engines or other parts. If a CIA unit lost a plane on a clandestine mission, it would be an aircraft that no one could identify.
All of this is an insider's look at how the CIA operates. I was in Laos in the Fifties and I had the opportunity to see how Civil Air Transport, the proprietary that eventually became Air America, and "sanitized aircraft" were used by the CIA to support the Meo hill tribesmen in their fight against the Communist-supported Pathet Lao. The CIA saw enormous potential in the versatility of STOL planes for their clandestine activities. The Helio Corporation produced a plane called the "Courier" and the CIA used it in Southeast Asia.
In 1951a Communist Laotian nationalist movement was formed in North Vietnam, and in 1953 this guerrilla movement, the Pathet Lao, invaded northern Laos, seeking to overthrow the pro-Western factions of the Laotian government. The French-trained Royal Laotian Army was considered lethargic, so the CIA recruited the Meo hill tribesmen, the best fighters in Laos, and formed them into a clandestine army. The Meos couldn't fight in the jungles and grow food at the same time. An airplane that could fly into the primitive areas where small airstrips were cut out of the dense jungle was necessary. The "Courier", with its fixed rugged landing gear and slow flying speed could land on a strip of land the size of a football field and supply the Meos with food, medicine, arms, and advisors.
The Helio "Courier" is an odd-looking, special-purpose aircraft that can fly at a crawl and carry a heavy load. These feats are possible because the plane has an unusually powerful engine, a high tail and large rudder for control at slow speeds, and wings fitted with forward-edge slats. The slats create a "fat" wing effect, causing air going over the upper surfaces of the wing to move more rapidly than air passing under the relatively flat lower surfaces, creating a decrease in pressure and lifting the plane into the air more quickly. Pilots say the plane can be flown backwards by throttling down to thirty-five miles an hour in a forty-mile-an-hour head wind.
In the Sixties, STOL planes like the "Courier" played a large role in Vietnam. Cargoes of gasoline and ammunition were delivered by pilots making precipitous corkscrew landings to avoid enemy fire. The United States Information Agency used the planes to carry public address systems for broadcasting appeals to the Vietcong. Forward air controllers hovering over targets directed artillery fire from these planes. And the puddle-jumper has also been used as a fighter-bomber. Rockets have been fired from it, and with the aid of a winch it can even drop bombs. Behind much of the clandestine activity of the CIA in Southeast Asia was Air America, which used STOL planes. Few people really know the full strength and the vast power of this fabled air organization. At one time Air America had two huge bases in South-East Asia, each with more than four thousand men. Air America, and we use that name here for as many as one hundred other covert and undercover organizations all related to that airline, covered the world. Devout Moslems traveling thousands of miles to make the Hadj to Mecca and Medina rode Air America, disguised as a charter airline.
Cuban exiles being trained in Guatemala in C-46 aircraft prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961 were trained by Air America pilots and Filipino Green Beret specialists. Indonesian rebels preparing to revolt against the Communist leaning government of Sukarno set up air-drop targets deep in the jungles of Sumatra, and Air America cargo planes dropped tens of thousands of rifles on target. Military airlift requirements between Japan, Guam, Manila, Okinawa, and Korea were put up for bid by the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force and the ubiquitous Air America would win a share of the bid and fly "legitimate" to make the unaware believe they were a normal and respectable airline. Air America, to perfect its cover as a legitimate airline, could not live the life of a prostitute with no visible means of support. It was this "legitimate" business which brought about some serious problems. During the latter years of the Fifties the CIA was spread all over the globe, and Agents needed airlift for "black" flights and airlift for their own support.
It is not easy to create a small airline operator and to set up a company in some strange country, unless that company can show enough business to warrant its being there. With each requirement for such "cover" outfits (proprietaries), the CIA was forced to find some reason for their existence. In all too many cases the military, a relief program handled by the Agency for International Development, a Foreign Training Mission or any other suitable cover was utilized at considerable risk. These "covers" could be made to work if the CIA could line up military support, and many of these small enterprises have existed for years without being blown; but for a company as large as Air America this took a lot of cover, and that veil of cover was precarious.
Air America actually grew out of a complex of small airlines which had been formed in the Far East at the end of World War II. When the Flying Tiger fighter pilots with their renowned General Claire Chennault found themselves out of the war and facing peaceful pursuits, a number of them quickly formed an airline which rounded up at "salvage" cost, if any, twenty-five twin-engine aircraft known as the C-46. They began on the mainland of China; but as the Communists pushed Chiang Kai-Shek and his troops out of mainland China, Chennault and his Flying Tigers were driven with the Nationalist Chinese into Taiwan.
The Tigers had the foresight to round up all the machinery and spare parts they could rustle up, along with a big surplus U.S. Navy LST. The LST was loaded, overloaded, for her last voyage from China to Taiwan, a snug harbor on the southwest coast of Taiwan. There the Flying Tigers set up shop. Soon this organization bred Civil Air Transport that was later called CAT airlines and eventually Air America. In 1949 when the airline was near bankruptcy, a deal was made with the CIA to avoid a Communist takeover of the airline, and from that time on the airline and its huge maintenance organization led a double life.
The headquarters was at Taipei, the capital of Taiwan, and Civil Air Transport became the busy national airline of the island in order to "cover" its relationship with the CIA. During the Korean War the airline flourished and it received many airlift contracts from the U.S. military for cargo and passenger flights between Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Guam, Manila, and many other Pacific ports of call. The CIA had made an excellent deal also because the airline flew on legitimate business to any places where the CIA had major operational offices. The airline was able to add undercover flights when the CIA had a requirement for a stop at its secret bases on Okinawa, the Mariana Islands, and other places. During the late Fifties the CIA found it necessary to organize its vast, global airline operations under one controlling headquarters. It created the Pacific Corporation, chartered in Delaware, the parent of Air America. For the most part Air America was a legitimate cap over the many and far-flung aviation interests of the CIA. These interests included airline operations, maintenance, buying and selling aircraft, and many mercenary activities. This corporate airline giant had a board of directors which included such illustrious high-ranking officers as Admiral Arthur Radford, Admiral Stump, and Admiral Harry Felt, all of whom had been Commander in Chief Pacific at one time or another and all of whom were most helpful to favorable support for Air America.
But at about this same time the military airlift contracts which financed Air America and other legitimate private airlines in the far Pacific dwindled to a trickle. What had once been a flourishing business had all but dried up. The Korean War was over and the Vietnam War had not yet begun. Many small airlines had to go out of business or cut back drastically. This drought hit Air America. The CIA could not give Air America enough legitimate business to provide adequate cover for its clandestine business which was growing day by day. This created quite a problem and as was so often the case the CIA put that problem on the doorstep of the military.
Allen Dulles, from 1953 to 1961 the Director of Central Intelligence, sent a carefully worded letter to the Secretary of the Air Force, James Douglas. In this letter Dulles requested that Air America be made aware of each U S Government request for bids in the air lift and air maintenance business. He was careful to phrase his words so that he was not giving the appearance of insisting that Air America be given the contract. Rather, he said that for national security purposes it would be desirable that Air America be informed. The idea was that Air America would then place its bids so that it would win sufficient contracts to remain in business.
This was all well and good; but Allen Dulles never left himself open. The official to whom such bids were processed in the Air Force was the Deputy for Civil Air and oddly enough this Deputy had the same office number, room number, that the Secretary of the Air Force had (4E871). This is a most interesting coincidence, which tips off the special relationship which existed between these officials. Who would ever expect, in opening the Pentagon telephone book, to find that one of the Deputies had the same room number as the Secretary? It could cause someone to conclude that this Deputy for Civil Air was a rather special official. He was! The incumbent, during these years, was an official of the CIA who had been placed in that job for very particular purposes and it is entirely possible that the Secretary of the Air Force did not know why he was there. If he did, there was nothing he could do about it.
Air America kept winning contracts and on one occasion the competition had been unusually keen. There was a scarcity of Government airlift contacts and few air routes left for flying them, and there were a lot of very hungry charter airlines scrambling for work. At this crucial time Air America was again awarded a contract and one of the losers was a practically penniless operator whose planes were in hock for inability to pay fuel bills. With nothing to lose because he had so little to lose, the owner of that scorned airline, Ed Daly, jumped into a plane and went to Washington.
As the wily owner of World Airways, Daly had the uncanny ability to turn a bad deal into a winning hand, and his ability to parlay that gamble into a series of winning combinations created one of the greatest fortunes in the airline business. While the other small charter airlines were dying for lack of military business, Daly came charging into the Pentagon and demanded to see the Air Force Secretary.
It may not be possible to know how much, if anything, Daly knew before hand about the facts of life regarding the real identity and parentage of Air America, but it is a well-known fact that at almost any bar in Asia, from the Peninsula bar in Kowloon to the Raffles in Singapore, stories about Air America and its band of freewheeling aerial mercenaries were legend. Anyone who wanted to know could have learned easily that Air America was the child, or at least the step-child, of the CIA. It may be presumed that Ed Daly knew this when he coolly laid his plans to invade Washington and joust with the Princes of the Pentagon on their own pad. If he did not know this in the beginning on that day when he charged the secretary's door and found that "Civil Air" office, he certainly knew it a little later. His treatment on that first day was courteous but firm. He was confidently assured that everything about the bidding process had been correct and above board. His bid had been low. As a matter of fact it had been at rock bottom; however, he was told Air America had come in with a lower bid. As others before him had been told: "Nothing can be done about it. The decision has been made!"
But there was a difference. When the others had lost their bids they cringed and had to take it in silence. But for Daly this loss meant something else. He was the last competitor. What he may have heard and what he may have conjectured appeared to be fact not fiction. Air America was, somehow, the recipient of preferential consideration and he had lost. Either Air America had been given the award at a higher price on a directed procurement basis or Air America had some other hidden source of funds and could afford to "buy" the deal with an absurdly low bid. It had to be one or the other, and Daly had planes to get out of hock.
Acting quickly and shrewdly, Daly took the word of the "Deputy Assistant" without argument and left the Pentagon on a beeline for the only kind of legal counsel which could do him any good then. Washington abounds with that very special breed of lawyer who knows how to help men in positions such as that in which Daly found himself. One of the very best of these, one of the quietest and most effective, one with worlds of Pentagon experience was Eugene Zuchert. Daly wasted no time in laying his case and the issues before him.
Meanwhile, back at the Pentagon, the Deputy Assistant scented the possibility of further attack. Daly's departure had been too simple and too abrupt. This assistant alerted everyone who "needed to know" about the World vs. Air America issue, including the Secretary of the Air Force and his Deputy, the General Counsel, the Special Assistant for Special Operations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the select "cleared" contracting officer who had awarded the contract. And of course he informed Allen Dulles, other key men in the CIA, and the president of Air America.
Within a short time he was glad he had done his homework because it was not long before Ed Daly's footsteps were pounding the door of "E" ring, the executive corridor of the Pentagon. And this time they were matched by the firm, familiar pace of the old pro, Gene Zuchert. He was at home among the vast complexities of the Pentagon. He wasted no time turning toward the door of the Assistant. He walked into the office of the Secretary, an old friend.
Actually very little needed to be said. The Secretary knew that Zuchert knew where the bones were buried. All they needed to do was to work out the device which would mollify Ed Daly. Of course the game winning "ace in the hole" was alluded to but not played. Ed would not ever want to be in a position which would force him to go to court or otherwise reveal to the public the true relationship between Air America, the CIA, and the Pentagon.
That idea may have been phrased and hinted; and if it was, one may be sure that it was done most discreetly. The meeting was very brief. A confident Zuchert departed with another satisfied client. The moves of the power brokers are deft and assured.
Not long after that meeting it was determined that one of the military services had found that the earlier airlift requirement was not adequate and that actually it should have been about double that which had been posted. Having come to this finding, in haste, there was but one way to avoid further delay. The procurement officer called World Airways and asked if they would accept this new offer on the terms bid. It just happened that World Airways was willing to do just that. World continued to fly routes over the Pacific and Air America stayed in there too. Once the genie is out of the bottle there is really no need to put it back. As a matter of fact Ed Daly cultivated these skins and exploited his new found advantage. More and more awards were made to Air America and more and more awards found their way magically to World Airways. The timing was just right. As the decade of the Sixties began, a whole new generation of airlift contracts flourished in the wake of the escalation of the Vietnam War. Hundreds of millions of dollars were paid to charter air carriers and World Airways became the world's largest. Air America had all the contracts it could handle, especially with runaway demands for helicopter operations and maintenance.
By the late Sixties, World, Air America, Continental, Pan-Am, United and many other air carriers shared a Government contract market that reached three-quarters of a billion dollars. The lean days were over and Ed Daly emerged at the top of the heap thanks to the "loss" of one small contract and the "hush money" system which fed into his lap. The other small carriers disappeared. They never were able to figure out the Daly formula or to fight the Air America exclusion. Not only were they destroyed but other small companies like General Aircraft and Helio have been driven into bankruptcy or near bankruptcy because of their relationship to the CIA. The proprietaries may have been essential to the CIA and to its method of doing a certain type of undercover business, but in the wake of these operations a large number of legitimate smaller businesses were destroyed. They lost business for reasons they could never understand or discover. Many of them, to this day, still do not know why they could not win contracts or why everything they did went sour | | | | gchq | | Posted: Wed Nov 03, 2004 9:36 am Post subject: COINTELPRO: The FBI Takes the Law into Its Own Hands |
| COINTELPRO: The FBI Takes the Law into Its Own Hands
May 1985
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE: This is a broad coverage of this subject and is intended as much to describe methods and patterns as it is to provide historical coverage. As such more material is presented than is needed for one article.
There are many countries in this world where it is necessary to protect the security and lives of those who control the authority of the State against political opponents... foreign and domestic. In such cases the Intelligence organization, with the power to arrest, is the first line of defense. In these countries there is an "Elite" or "Palace" guard staffed and trained for such purposes. This awareness carries over into all governments, to a degree, and the intelligence organizations of all countries tend to drift in this direction whether they are authorized by law to perform such functions or not.
In this country where the CIA is specifically precluded by law from having police, subpoena or law enforcement powers, there is in fact no law that authorizes the existence of its sister agency, the National Security Agency; but the NSA is a part of the Department of Defense and is presumed to have the same restrictions in this area as the military even though it operates under deep secrecy.
The FBI on the other hand, does have certain specific police powers. The FBI is authorized from time to time to investigate the actions of citizens primarily to keep a wary eye on enemies of the State, foreign and domestic. There have been times when the Bureau over-stepped these bounds. One of these cases was its program called COINTELPRO.
On March 8, 1971, the FBI resident agency in Media, PA, was broken into and FBI documents acquired during this break-in carried the caption: COINTELPRO... an acronym unknown to the public at that time. As a result of a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit brought by an NBC reporter, other documents were obtained and COINTELPRO was exposed. Less than two months later, April 27, 1971, the FBI reported they had terminated this program. This action proved many things. One thing it proved was that "terminated" doesn't mean the same thing to the FBI as it does to you and me.
COINTELPRO had begun in 1956 and during the next 15 years the FBI conducted an elaborate vigilante operation directed at the prevention of first amendment rights of free speech and free association, and much more. The FBI had taken it upon itself to do whatever it believed was necessary in order to combat perceived threats to the existing social and political order. In actual practice the law enforcers became the law breakers. The FBI utilized extralegal methods to counter what they themselves perceived to be threats to national security and public order because they had persuaded themselves to believe that ordinary legal processes which apply equally to all citizens were insufficient to do the job. "In essence," as the Select committee to Study Governmental Operations of the US Senate said, in 1976, "the Bureau took the law into its own hands, conducting a sophisticated vigilante operation against domestic enemies."
Fifty years earlier, Justice Louis D. Brandeis of the U.S. Supreme Court had written:
"Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people, by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law, it invites every man to become a law unto himself. To declare that in the administration of criminal law the end justifies the means - to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of the private criminal - would bring terrible retribution. Against the pernicious doctrine this Court should be resolutely set its face." Olmstead v. U.S. 277 U.S.439,485 (1927)
COINTELPRO was a "Rough, tough, dirty business" in the words of a top-echelon FBI spokesman. It was an acronym for "counterintelligence program" This is what is supposed to be on the surface. Counterintelligence is as old as Intelligence and nations have practiced intelligence operations for thousands of years. As far back as we can trace recorded history the Chinese sent trained emissaries to the Arab lands and to Eastern Europe. Their goal was the acquisition of, and the exchange of knowledge. They went bearing gifts and lived in their host country for many years. They returned to China with priceless knowledge, customs and artifacts.
Centuries later the Portuguese began to explore the east coast of Africa and sailed on to India and eventually to China and Japan. They came with guns. They looted and pillaged the land. Their visits were unfriendly, and it became necessary for the people of the Far East to defend themselves against these marauders. The age of counter-intelligence was born.
Although the USA did not have a central, coordinating intelligence organization before and during WWII it did have active counter-intelligence units in the Army and Navy and in the FBI. All of these organizations were active against infiltration by the Germans, Italians and Japanese. During WWII this was an effective and respected profession.
SPECIAL NOTE: It may be recalled that Lee Oswald was called to active duty in the Fall of 1941 and assigned immediately to Intelligence duties. He was trained in Washington at the U.S. Navy Yard and then sent to New York City for further training with the Office of Naval Intelligence b-Branch, that was a counter-intelligence unit. From there he was ordered for Intelligence duties to the Cavite Naval Base near Manila in the Philippines. En route he attended more intelligence schools in the San Francisco area.
It may well be that the orders that we have been able to gather from the U.S. Navy since that time are incomplete and that they may have been "cover" orders for his actual duties. As a result they only give a glimpse now and then of what he was actually doing. It is quite normal for a Counter-Intelligence officer to be assigned to a ship, or other duty station and then quickly removed, for other reasons, as soon as he has been able to expose some unlawful action. It appears that this may have happened several times during this phase of LRH's Navy service. In any event there is much more to be learned about that period and about the service that he was performing.
Suffice it to say here, when he was called to duty, it was partly on the account of a letter sent by a prominent U.S. Senator to President Roosevelt. His actual orders to duty were signed by the famous Five Star Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and all during this phase of Lee Oswald's duty his orders were originated in Intelligence channels and kept in Intelligence files. This is identified by the "16" code on the letter-head among other codes that are evident all through his orders. END NOTE
It isn't surprising then that, when the FBI decided to move out and take the law into its own hands, it chose to perform extralegal activities under the cloak of "counterintelligence". What the Bureau did during those 15 years was not traditional and actual counter-intelligence.
Up to this period in time counter-intelligence had been defined as those actions by an intelligence agency that were intended to protect its own security and to undermine hostile intelligence operations. The CIA, with no domestic police powers, had a strong and active counter-intelligence division under the able, old professional, James Angleton. It was the task of that division to guard the agency against penetration from the outside and defectors from the inside. During the 1960's, carried away with the "Anti-War" fever that was sweeping the country, the CIA did use informants to secretly penetrate domestic groups but not to the extent that the FBI was active with informants. The FBI cultivated informants from two sectors: a) it recruited and hired people and inserted them into the target group and: b) it "turned" or recruited members of the group to be FBI informants. In this second capacity the FBI was always alert to "defectors" or it recruited individuals whom it could label "defectors". This tactic tended to give the informant more credibility as a true dissident.
In addition to such classes of informants, the FBI used "Confidential Sources". These are people who furnish the FBI with information that is available to them because of the position they hold in some organization. Such confidential sources are frequently bankers, secretaries, computer personnel, telephone company employees, and landlords, to name a few examples. This is a particularly insidious "informant" because there is no way to safeguard the narrow distinction between the work of a professional counter-intelligence expert and some busy-body who reports on associates for personal, perhaps malicious reasons.
This is a particularly dangerous activity. I have had such FBI files made available to me during work being performed while I was assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The thing about these files that is dangerous is that they are written up precisely as reported by the agent. There is no editing. There is no evaluation. There is nothing to tell under what circumstances the report was made. There is nothing to guarantee that the information has been checked or otherwise validated. Usually the stack of material in an individual's file would consist of one or more five or six inch thick stacks of papers just bound together. Anything can be in that file from a shopping list found in the trash to a record of a bugged telephone conversation. When one considers the millions of such files and the billions of such records, this becomes a most sinister body of material and a potentially dangerous record on most any one of us for use by anyone else at anytime. This is one of the great dangers of such programs as COINTELPRO.
As the Senate Committee learned, the FBI had originally planned its covert action programs against five targets that it perceived as threats to national security and domestic tranquillity. These were: a) the "Communist Party-USA"; b) the "Socialist Workers Party"' c) the "White Hate Group"; d) the "Black Nationalist Hate Group"; and e) the "New Left". There is no certainty that any of these groups can be identified as hostile or even to be in existence. There were general concepts to be used as nebulous targets for the program.
When this program began it was said that all activity would be cleared with FBI headquarters in Washington before it was set in motion. In actual practice it was discovered that the field offices operated on their own and before COINTELPRO had been terminated 2,370 separate counterintelligence actions had been approved. There is no telling how many thousands more took place without specific approval by anyone.
Whenever such a program gets underway there are new bosses who want to make a name for themselves, and new recruits who want to prove how good that are. Many of the recruits were criminals, or little more than common criminals. They knew how to get action. When they could not find trouble, they would incite trouble. They became effective "agents provocateur".
There is an exquisite distinction between a criminal and an agent provocateur. The criminal infiltrates an unsuspecting group, e.g. a group planning to rob a bank, and incites that criminal actions he gets caught with the others and is punished as they are. The agent provocateur infiltrates a similar unsuspecting organization and incites an even bigger criminal action. He gets caught as the rest are; but he does not get punished. He is innocent, because he works for the government. These informers like their role. It gives them all kinds of special advantages to pursue the business of an informer, and to pursue other criminal matters on their own behalf. Then they either go scot free because they were working in their informer role, or they threaten to reveal their FBI relationship and "blow the deal"; so they go free either way.
Another great weakness of the agent provocateur, or informer program, is that there just are not that many organizations or individuals who really represent a threat to the national security of this 230 million man nation; or even a credible threat to domestic tranquillity on a major scale. Are 200, 2,000 aroused activists on the steps of the Pentagon a real threat to the national security: The FBI's COINTELPRO action was predicated on the validity of that kind of "threat". Since this is a fact, i.e. that there are not many bona fide organizations that are a real threat, the informant - to make points - must invent, or create the atmosphere of these threatening organizations and people. This is done in many ways. What follows are examples by type and method and may not necessarily represent actual cases. No one, without subpoena authority, can discover exactly what goes on behind the cloak of the Government process; but by experience and diligent research one can discover methods.
Have you ever noticed, in downtown areas, the posters that appear on bare walls, on mail boxes and city trash bins, or in any other public place? Have you ever noticed that these posters, ostensibly by obscure and unknown groups, all seem to have been drawn and printed by the same people? Well they are! The invention, creation, printing and circulation of such posters is a big inside deal. It makes the public believe there are such weird, oddly-named outfits; and these posters and handbills do attract some people who are taken in by them. They are part of a program of psychologically clever work. They do have some appeal to certain people in special situations. When these few people show up for the "Big Event", e.g. to "Liberate Lithuania", our agent provocateur, all sweetness and light, throws a little money around, and announces the visit of a major underground dignitary and a most important meeting. He signs up several unwitting souls, and all of a sudden there is a new wing of the "Socialist Workers Party" or some such facade.
A democratic society has no place for extralegal organizations and activities sponsored by the Government and directed against its citizens, no matter what their intention. There is no way this country can be threatened seriously by any such imaginary groups. Even the Anti-War Movement of the Sixties, at its peak, was no genuine threat to the Government of the United States. It was simply trying to say to the Government that it was wrong. They had the right to assemble, and they had the right to say the Government was wrong. The real wrong was that most of the really violent activists in the groups were in reality underground informers and agents provocateurs who incited the action.
The far greater threat to domestic tranquillity is the action of the thousands upon thousands of undisciplined agents who incite illegal and terrorist acts themselves in order to embroil and involve others, who if left on their own without provocation, would not have done such things. These agents have money, they can get weapons and explosives, they can be supported with such things as posters and hand-bills, they can hire halls, rent public address systems and do anything designed to stir up trouble where trouble may not have existed. They are the danger; not the people they say they are after.
Our concern today, in 1985, is that we know that William Sullivan, Deputy Director of the FBI in 1971, did prepare and sign the memo that terminated COINTELPRO. But we also know that the FBI left the door open to start the program again if they, the Bureau, ever perceived the need again. We also know that COINTELPRO-like programs are underway in several branches of the government. They must be exposed and terminated as they were in 1971.
Men have fought to preserve their freedoms. We may wish to recall the words of Sir Thomas May, from his "Constitutional History of England"... from the 19th Century:
"Men may be without restraints upon their liberty; they may pass to and fro at pleasure: but if their steps are tracked by spies and informers, their words noted down for crimination, their associates watched as conspirators - who shall say that they are free?" | | | | gchq | | Posted: Thu Nov 04, 2004 9:15 am Post subject: Curbing The CIA |
| Curbing The CIA
Does Rocky Want To Do It?
April 1975
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even before the CIA was created in 1947, people talked about how they were going to control it so it wouldn't become a "Frankenstein". Shortly before he died, Lyndon Johnson told his old friend, Leo Janos, that he knew that the CIA operated a "Murder Inc." in the Caribbean and that he knew the Warren Commission was wrong in reporting that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone killer of President Kennedy.
These statements, coming as they did from a man who had spent his entire life in the "kill or be killed" arena of big-time politics, mean a lot more in retrospect than they do on the first reading.
Johnson did not have to add that when he was President he also found out that he could not control the Vietnam War, its escalation and its tempo. In one of his speeches in March 1968, he announced that he would not run again for President. Of all the uncharacteristic things Johnson did when he was President, this had to be the most startling. Here was a rough and ready freewheeler, strong and robust, giving up - throwing in the sponge. What ailed him?
This proud man had accepted the role of Vice President and sat in a car behind President Kennedy during that fateful parade in Dallas. He saw the President murdered. He saw one of his oldest and best friends, John Connally, shot. And those shots echoing through Dealey Plaza rang in his ears. They rang for years. The "Discipline of Death" is powerful medicine and LBJ knew in his gut that he must not rock the boat. People wonder why he did not change the Kennedy cabinet more than he did. They wondered why he did not "take charge" as he had always done on the Hill. Why was it that he permitted the CIA to do things he knew about and knew he should stop? Why did he permit the Warren Commission to turn in a misleading report of the "lone assassin" and then say nothing about it? He knew were the power was, and he played along with the team.
Today the big debate is, "How do we control the CIA?" More than ten years ago people questioned the CIA's role in the Bay of Pigs. During the Vietnam War people who knew what the CIA was doing questioned its trouble making role there. The "Pentagon Papers" reveal how Allen Dulles would deliver an erudite National Intelligence Estimate to the White House warning about the peril of a ground war in Vietnam (August 1954), and then during that same month Allen Dulles would be secretly building up the clandestine "Saigon Military Mission" (A CIA team and not a military team) for subversive activities in Indochina.
Other reports have revealed the CIA's role in the My Lai affair, in the Special Forces murder of "reported" enemy agents and of the CIA's role in the horrible "Phoenix" murder and assassination program.
Since Vietnam, the CIA has been uncovered in the intervention in Chile and it has been discovered in and around and about the Watergate operations. More recently, the New York Times has reported that the CIA has been deeply involved in domestic spying along the lines of the discredited Charles Huston plan.
With all of these things on its record, why is it that the CIA cannot be put under control? Let's face it;The CIA is powerful. The CIA knows how to use its power, and a lot of people in key positions know so little about the CIA that though they could do something, they will not.
Nelson Rockefeller is a good example of this. As head of the president's blue ribbon committee to investigate the CIA he has unusual qualifications. But, will he use them or permit a whitewash of the Agency?
News reports refer to his service on the President's National Intelligence Advisory Board. This experience is relatively conventional. What is more important is that during Eisenhower's first term Rockefeller had the job, equivalent to the one Henry Kissinger has today, as National Security Advisor to the president. That is the cover name of the job. It really means he was head of the "Forty Committee" of that period and the man responsible for CIA liaison with the House. In that job, years ago, Rockefeller really had an insider's view of CIA clandestine activity. Significantly, Rockefeller resigned from the under cover job and recommended its elimination.
As I mention below, General Lyman Lemnitzer has had considerable experience with the CIA and with clandestine operations. Many expect that President Ford's committee will whitewash the CIA in the same manner that the Warren Commission smoothed over the JFK murder. However, we may be in for a surprise.
Rockefeller and Lemnitzer have the experience and if they decide to use it, things could change drastically at the CIA.
Two little known documents of great significance were published by Kennedy in June 1961. They mark the beginning of his plan to put the CIA-genie back in the bottle. They were National Security Action Memoranda #55 and #57.
NSAM #55 was entitled "Relations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President in Cold War Operations". Only a few insiders knew what this title really meant. "Cold War Operations" or "Peacetime Operations" are euphemisms for "Clandestine" or "Undercover" operations. Since the military is never supposed to become involved in clandestine operations, it is surprising to see the President addressing the Chairman of the JCS directly on this subject. It was also most unusual in the rigid protocols of Washington to find that President Kennedy signed this document himself, and that he addressed it individually to the Chairman. He sent copies only to the Secretary of Defense and to General Maxwell Taylor, who then served as Kennedy's National Security Advisor, the official contact with the CIA, He did not send a copy to Dean Rusk, his Secretary of State.
It may be tedious to go into so much detail here but in top-level government circles such details are of extreme importance and significance. I was the Action Officer who received this letter from Kennedy and in due course I took it in to the then Chairman, General Lemnitzer, and "briefed" it to him. Lemnitzer, one of the men appointed by President Ford to the CIA Review Committee, was an exceedingly able administrator, and knew exactly what this meant. He directed that I put the NSAM on the agenda for the next meeting of the Chiefs. It was acted upon and "red striped" - given full approval and recognition. He girded for action to put the CIA under control.
Perhaps the most important line in this rather brief paper was: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff have a responsibility for the defense of the nation in the Cold War similar to that which they have in conventional hostilities."
What Kennedy was doing was informing the JCS that it was they who would be his primary advisers on matters pertaining to "clandestine" operations and not the CIA. He was not going to have any more Bay of Pigs operations, and one way to do that would be to take the CIA out of that line of business. Having published this document, he then addressed a similar and related NSAM #57 to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. This document followed with further details on how JFK planned to limit the activities of the CIA and to get that agency out of clandestine operations. NSAM # 57 said that the CIA would, when properly authorized, become involved in "cold war operations" only if such operations were truly of an "intelligence nature", truly clandestine, and performed in such a manner that the United States government would be able to disclaim plausibly its part in the operation and importantly, and only if the operation was very small. The idea was that any truly clandestine operation must of necessity be a small operation - one that would not show the hand of the United States government.
These two strong directives set off a series of very heated meetings. There could be no arguing about the meaning of NSAM #55 but there was endless argument about NSAM #57 and what was meant by "small". This led to an even more intricate argument over transition of control. The CIA's argument went: "if the CIA got into an operation which was truly clandestine and very small, and then its success or potential success required that the operation be continued and enlarged... at what point, if any, would the control of this clandestine operation be transferred from the CIA to the JCS? This argument, which never ended, carried over right into the Vietnam War. There the CIA did transition the war which it had started to the military.
The CIA fought back so hard and moved so deeply into other activities secretly that Kennedy never did achieve real control over the agency, and his murder on Nov, 22, 1963, ended the last direct, top-level attempt by any President to put the agency under control. The CIA can be controlled; but it will require the combined and concerted effort of the House and Senate, of the President and the support of the Courts. The law that established the CIA, the National Security Act of 1947, was written in such a manner that if it were to be carried out to the letter, the agency could be kept under control. There are only five duties specified for the CIA and to put it under control, the CIA must be strictly limited to those duties, which are:
-"to advise the National Security Council (NSC) in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the government departments and agencies as relate to national security." (This is strictly an intelligence function and is related to "advice" only.)
-"to make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the government as relate to the national security." (Again, intelligence only, and this time the role of the CIA is limited to "coordination".)
"to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: Provided further, That the departments and other agencies of the government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: And provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." (Again basic Intelligence-correlation, evaluation, dissemination.)
-"to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional service of common concern as the NSC determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally."
-"to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."
This fifth clause is the one that Allen Dulles and others have leaped upon as the opening to the world of clandestine operations. It means nothing of the sort, and the CIA has never been given that authority legally. Note that this clause says the CIA may carry out other functions from "time to time".
On the master copy of one of the NSC directives on this subject, President Eisenhower had written in the margin in his own handwriting that no department should ever provide the CIA with enough men, material, overseas facilities or money in such quantity that the CIA could ever do more than the one, small operation approved by the NSC. It was the full intent of the writers of this clause that this be the control over the CIA, to assure the "time to time" character of any of its exploits.
Furthermore this clause stipulates that the CIA be given such authority only by "direction" of the NSC. In official Washington legalese, this is a most important stipulation Allen Dulles tried to make people believe that if he took a proposed clandestine plan to the NSC and got its approval, that was sufficient. Because he operated in an environment controlled by his Secretary of State brother and an uninvolved Secretary of Defense, Charlie Wilson, he got away with it. And the few people who knew what this most secret work was all about did not question his activity.
However, it is a matter of two different worlds for the NSC to "approve" and for the NSC to "direct". And the law said "direct". When the NSC directs it is because it has come up with a problem, studied and discussed the problem, and then decided to carry it out. At this point the NSC may call in the CIA and say. "You are directed to do thus and so." This is what Congress intended, and this is the only way clandestine operations should ever be carried out.
President Ford will not be able to bring the CIA under control alone. Congress is going to have to demand compliance or cut off funds. The Executive Branch is going to have to demand compliance with the law or prosecute, and the Courts are going to have to back up Congress and the Executive Branch. But more than all of these, all of us American citizens are going to have to insist that this is what must be done.
The Vietnam War was brought to an end by the frustration and demands of the public. Watergate would not be pushed under the rug because of the demands and insistence of the public. Again the public must be heard. It is possible to return the CIA to its intended role as the "quiet intelligence arm of the President" - and nothing more. | | | | | ©2002-2009 WarWithoutEnd.co.uk |
