| Author | Message | | Alpha | | Posted: Wed Aug 11, 2004 7:52 pm Post subject: Y.Ibrahim:Dem neo-cons worse than Bush's neocons |
| From: "Ronald" <rbleier@igc.org> Add to Address Book
To: "rbleier" <rbleier@igc.org>
Subject: Y.Ibrahim:Dem neo-cons worse than Bush's neocons
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 2004 21:27:52 -0400
Excellent article. The disastrous effects of our pro- Israeli policy is slowly gaining currency although it's much too little and late to effect positive change. An interesting sidelight is the schizophrenia of many left Zionists who are strongly anti-Bush without recognizing that their support for Israel empowers the worst of his policies and (see below) the policies of a potential Kerry administration. --RB
----- Original Message -----
From: cbrad4334@aol.com
Sent: Wednesday, July 07, 2004 7:14 PM
Subject: [eFreePalestine] Great Article!
A Gulf News (UAE) opinion by former NY Times Mideast correspondent Youssef Ibrahim sees a greater danger in Democratic 'neo-cons' coming to power in a Kerry victory than the existing Republican neo-cons.
http://www.gulfnews.com/
NEO-CONS, PART II
By Youssef M. Ibrahim
Gulf News, Opinion (UAE) June 29, 2004
For three years the world fumed over the chauvinism, arrogance and policies of Republican neo-conservatives (neo-cons as they are known) riding over George W. Bush's administration. They advocated regime changes and wars-of-choice. They dumped the western alliance, forged even stronger bonds with Israel, dropping the Palestinians altogether, and occupied Iraq.
But for those millions, who aspire to better days under a Democratic administration led by Senator John Kerry, think again. The Democratic Party's neo-con vampires are a lot worse than the current ones - the second movie could be more frightening than the first. One of the Democratic Party neo-con intellectual gurus, Leslie Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations has proposed in a New York Times Opinion-Editorial a few months ago the partition of Iraq, stirring quite! a fuss, but no real objection by anyone of weight inside the Kerry camp.
Gelb's answer to how American troops get out of Iraq is to split it into three states: Shiites in the South, Kurdish in the North and one Sunni state in the middle. Then American troops can leave a new mess, and say bye-bye.
Another major guru of the Democratic neo-cons, Peter W. Galbraith, wrote a huge analysis in the New York Review of Books on May 13 (volume 51-number 8) in which he argued this model would "solve" many of the contradictions of modern Iraq.
"The Shiites could have their Islamic republic, while the Kurds could continue their secular traditions. Alcohol would continue to be a staple of Kurdish picnics while it would be strictly banned in Basra... The three-state solution would permit the United States to disengage from security duties in most of Iraq," Galbraith asserted. Of course, America would keep some American military bases - just in case.
Never mind that such a solution would result in shifting out major segments of populations, like the two million Shiites living in Baghdad's Sadr city district, as well as hundred of thousands of Sunnis Arabs from Kurdistan and from the South. Far worse, it is a guaranteed formula for a bloody civil war, the destabilisation of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait next door and the entry of Iran into this mess.
The rest of the democratic neo-cons world vision is even more frightening. For the Greater Middle East, their view is to appoint Israel in effect the American pro-consul for the Arab world by supplying it with more military and financial aid while diminishing such aid to Egypt and other Arab countries.
This would permit Israel to complete its ongoing takeover of the West Bank and squeezing most Palestinians into a tiny pseudo state in Gaza whose land, sea and sky borders would be under Israeli control -a cage in which the Palestinians can rot. They will not be able to fly, sail or drive in or out of it without Israeli permission. Nor will they have open borders with Egypt or Jordan.
The other chief target in the Democratic neo-cons crosshair is Iran. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee, AIPAC, the most powerful pro-Israel lobby in America, has made it clear to both Republicans and Democrats that Iran must be contained again because after the demise of Iraq it remains the only danger to Israel. Among other things, AIPAC has asked that Iran be stripped of nuclear research facilities and that sanctions be imposed on Russia if it continues to help Iran in this area.
In fact, the Greater Middle East strategy of Democratic neo-cons is the same as the existing ones: what is good for Israel is good for America. It goes without saying that establishing diplomatic relations with Israel by all Arab countries will become a must for maintaining friendly relations with America.
The next target is the "reform" of Muslim countries and Muslim doctrines. The "war against terror" will become the war against Islam in various forms, targeting school programmes, religious education, public institutions, economic reforms, all under the guise of human rights, free economy and democracy.
There is nothing wrong with more democracy - God knows this region can use it - as long as it is not a Trojan horse for more control by the west and Israel.
Finally, Europe, both new and old, must be neutralised in the sense of understanding it cannot and will not have any influence that is separate or different from America's. This of course will include new pressures to bring an increasingly independent! Russia back into line. In the view of Democratic neo-cons, Vladimir Putin the Russian president, is far too independent for their taste. Russia cannot be allowed to rise again as an industrial, strategic or even oil power. Russian oligarchs, many of whom happen to be strong supporters of Israel, have already been cultivated and "prepped", as they say, to use both their money and influence in support of the taming of Putin, or, his removal in favour of a more pliant Russian leader. Economic sanctions and such threats should, the Democratic neo-cons believe, be invoked too if necessary.
So if you are upset about the current movie "Republican Vampires" watch out for part two, "Democratic Vampires". Things could get scarier.
Youssef M. Ibrahim is former Middle East correspondent for the New York Times and former energy editor of the Wall Street Journal.
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http://groups.Yahoo.com/group/eFreePalestine/messages Archives! | |  | | foppe37 | | Posted: Wed Aug 11, 2004 8:06 pm Post subject: The Real Reasons for the Upcoming War With Iraq |
| The article
The Real Reasons for the Upcoming War With Iraq:
A Macroeconomic and Geo-strategic Analysis of the Unspoken Truth
by William Clark
april 2003
can be summarised as follows:
Since WW II the US$ has been the reserve currency of the world, partly because after the war the USA was the only country where anything could be bought, partly because the US$ was seen as stable in value.
Because of this oil was priced and paid for in dollars.
The US$ exchange rate is higher that it would be because of the reserve and payment for oil function.
This higher US$ exchange rate is profitable for the USA consumers, and a pity for USA exporters.
A few years ago the Euro was introduced, the writer wonders whether this was done to challenge the USA.
I wonder, never heard anything like that.
In our view it just was a step in making European internal trade simpler and with less risks, no more exchange rate risks, and cheaper to pay internationally within Europe.
Three things happened that challenged the tradional role of the dollar: the very existence of the Euro, the weak USA economy (trade deficit and budget deficit), and Iraq's decision to price (and sell) oil in Euro's.
On top of that the USA is now seen with distrust or even hate, because of its unilateral course in world affairs; this does not encourage keeping reserves in US$.
The dollar exchange rate in relation to the Euro has gone down.
The above makes it not impossible that OPEC will switch to Euro pricing
as the EU does not have a trade balance deficit, and no significant budget deficits.
The above in combination with the dollar devaluation will lead to central banks all over the world keeping their reserves in Euro's in stead of in USdollars.
This will mean that vast amounts of dollars will be on offer, and will mean a sharp reduction in the dollar value, what will be in any case a crisis for the USA, and any country, as Japan, having large dollar assets. | | | | Alpha | | Posted: Wed Aug 11, 2004 9:50 pm Post subject: Leo Strauss and American Foreign Policy |
| The Claremont Institute
http://www.claremont.org/writings/crb/summer2004/west.html.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Leo Strauss and American Foreign Policy
By Prof. Thomas G. West
tomwest@acad.udallas.edu
July 12, 2004
Quite a few of President Bush's critics maintain that since some
prominent
members of the administration and their defenders are known to be
former
students of Leo Strauss or of Straussians, one can trace Bush's foreign
policy to
Strauss's political ideas. Straussians in Washington tend to be
neoconservatives,
and, in foreign policy, prominent neocons like William Kristol and
Robert
Kagan advocate a policy of "benevolent hegemony." In their argument, a
benign
American imperialism is justified for two reasons. First, it provides
security
against foreign attack; that is, it delivers "strategic benefits." But
their
real enthusiasm is reserved for its second purpose, which is democratic
reform of
the rest of the world.
That stance, they argue, not only serves American interest; it is a
moral
imperative. The policy of benevolent hegemony will "relish the
opportunity for
national engagement, embrace the possibility of national greatness, and
restore
a sense of the heroic." Kristol and Kagan also argue that their view is
supported by the principles of the American founding: "For
conservatives to preach
the importance of upholding the core elements of the Western tradition
at home,
but to profess indifference to the fate of American principles abroad,
is an
inconsistency that cannot help but gnaw at the heart of conservatism."
My impression as an outside observer is that Straussian influence in
the
administration has been grossly exaggerated. But let us assume for
discussion's
sake that it is strong. Since Strauss has been wildly accused of
everything from
being an admirer of Hitler to being a devotee of Wilsonian
progressivism, I
think it high time to clarify Strauss's understanding of foreign
policy. I
shall argue that although there is some common ground, Strauss's
overall approach
is quite different from that of Kristol, Kagan, and other prominent
neoconservatives in and out of the administration.
Foreign Policy and the Classics
The confrontation of the West with Communism, Strauss wrote in The City
and
Man, has demonstrated that "no bloody or unbloody change of society can
eradicate the evil in man: as long as there will be men, there will be
malice, envy
and hatred, and hence there cannot be a society which does not have to
employ
coercive restraint." Strauss implies, among other things, that the
extravagant
hope for permanent progress in human affairs believed in by Woodrow
Wilson and
his contemporary admirers is a delusion. In particular, Strauss wrote,
the
ideal of "a universal state, unitary or federative" (Strauss appears to
be
speaking of the United Nations) is also a delusion. "If that federation
is taken
too seriously," said Strauss, "as a milestone on man's onward march
toward the
perfect and hence universal society, one is bound to take great risks
supported
by nothing but an inherited and perhaps antiquated hope, and thus to
endanger
the very progress one endeavors to bring about."
To begin with, then, according to Strauss each nation should conduct
its own
foreign policy, and it should not turn its policy over to international
organizations. In current parlance, Strauss was a unilateralist, not a
multilateralist.
Strauss concluded the passage quoted above by remarking that the lesson
of
the Cold War is that "political society remains what it always has
been: a
partial or particular society whose most urgent and primary task is its
self-preservation and whose highest task is its self-improvement."
In his book What Is Political Philosophy? Strauss addressed the grounds
of
that lesson in the principles of classical political philosophy. For
the
classics, wrote Strauss, foreign policy is primarily concerned with
"the survival and
independence of one's political community." For that reason, "the
ultimate
aim of foreign policy is not essentially controversial. Hence classical
political philosophy is not guided by questions concerning the external
relations of
the political community. It is concerned primarily with the inner
structure of
the political community…."
For Strauss, then, who closely followed the classics on this subject,
foreign
policy is ministerial to domestic policy, because "self-improvement" or
human
excellence is the "highest task" of politics. The purpose of foreign
policy
is therefore to secure the means, admittedly the "urgent and primary"
means,
namely, preservation, or national security, to that high end. For that
reason,
Aristotle singled out Sparta for strong criticism in his Politics.
Sparta's
error was to organize its laws around the belief that the purpose of
politics is
the domination of other nations by war.
Thus according to Strauss, the purpose of foreign policy is or ought to
be
survival and independence, or self-preservation, and nothing else.
In The City and Man, Strauss comments on one of the very few
discussions of
foreign policy in Plato's Republic as follows:
the good city is [not] guided in its relations to other cities, Greek
or
barbarian, by considerations of justice: the size of the territory of
the good
city is determined by that city's own moderate needs and by nothing
else; the
relation of the city to the other cities belongs to the province of
wisdom rather
than of justice; the good city is not a part of a community of cities
or is
not dedicated to the common good of that community or does not serve
other
cities.
The last part of Strauss's remark implies that the foreign policy of a
sensible nation is never devoted to the good of other nations, except
to the extent
that the good of another nation accidentally happens to promote one's
own
nation's existence. For the same reason, a sensible nation will not
engage in
imperial expansion for its own aggrandizement—though it might have to
do so for
its own survival. In Plato's Republic, Socrates advocates a war of
imperial
expansion in order to acquire the territory needed to sustain the
city's material
needs. By the time Socrates has finished purging the city of luxuries,
its
territorial needs are likely to be quite small. This expansionist war,
then, is
not likely to amount to much.
We must face up to this disturbing Socratic endorsement of expansionism
or
imperialism in case of necessity. For although the size of the conquest
may not
"amount to much," it might mean something quite drastic to the
neighboring
city that happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. It will
definitely
require the seizure of property and killing of men who oppose this
expansion.
Socrates in effect shows that he knows how problematic his open defense
of
aggressive warfare is, when he says that the government must lie to the
citizens
about the true origin of the city's territory. The citizens will be
told, in
a noble lie, that the native land on which they are born was their
mother, not
that it was taken by force from a foreign nation.
We may sum up the Socratic approach by saying that although foreign
policy is
in principle amoral, because it is dictated by the selfish needs of the
political community, it is also moderate, because the needs of the city
are
limited, given the primacy of its concern for civic virtue and
therefore domestic
policy.
Later in the Republic, Socrates proposes a striking mitigation of the
usual
Greek manner of conducting war: the city that they are founding will no
longer
kill or enslave the conquered population, nor destroy its property, if
the
conquered city is Greek. The ground of this policy is that Greeks are
ethnically
akin. If a city is defeated in war, says Socrates, only those who are
responsible for the war will be punished. It is probable that this
Socratic suggestion
arises from the humanity of his philosophic orientation, which
transcends
loyalty to a particular political regime. We can perhaps see in this
proposal the
roots of the much milder rules of conquest established by Locke and
other
early modern thinkers.
The Perils of Empire
Would Aristotle agree with this Strauss-endorsed Platonic approach to
foreign
policy? One of Aristotle's arguments against domination of other
nations is
that it is "not even lawful" for one city to "rule and exercise mastery
over"
other cities "whether they wish it or not." That is, Aristotle, who is
always
closer to "common sense" than Plato, speaks as if there is after all
such a
thing as justice and injustice among nations. Strauss seems to take
Plato's view,
not Aristotle's, as the genuine expression of the classical approach.
Perhaps
that is because Plato's analysis goes to the root of the matter, while
Aristotle deliberately remains on the level of the perspective of the
citizen and
statesman (visible in Aristotle's interchangeable use of "lawful" and
"just" in
the passage quoted).
The classical thinker who seems to be the most obvious exception to
Strauss's
account is Thucydides. Unlike Plato or Aristotle, he made foreign
policy
central to his account of the political. Nonetheless, Strauss denied
that
Thucydides disagreed with Plato about the importance of a good regime
at home.
Instead, Thucydides showed that the intransigent urgency of questions
of survival,
conquest, and war often overwhelms what would otherwise be, in
Strauss's words,
"the overriding concern with domestic politics." As for "the good order
within
the city," Thucydides "leaves [it] to the moderate citizens."
Strauss's discussion of Thucydides brings out forcefully the same
twofold
theme that we noticed in his interpretation of Plato. In Thucydides'
opinion, as
summarized by Strauss, there is on one side "what one may call the
natural
right of the stronger" to conquer and expand, but on the other side,
this natural
right "does not lead in all cases to expansionism. There are limits
beyond
which expansion is no longer safe." In other words, "to say that under
certain
conditions empire is possible and necessary is not the same as to be an
'imperialist.'"
The Athenian experiment with indefinite expansionism was doomed (among
other
reasons) by a simple fact, which the Athenian leaders after Pericles
failed to
recognize: "it is in the long run impossible to encourage the city's
desire
for 'having more' at the expense of other cities without encouraging
the desire
of the individual for 'having more' at the expense of his fellow
citizens."
The Athenians did not see, as Socrates did see in his recommendation of
the
"noble lie" in the Republic, that a frankly expansionist foreign policy
is bound
to undermine the political order at home as well as, eventually, the
imperialist policy abroad.
It is important to understand why, for Strauss and the classical
political
philosophers, the purpose of foreign policy should be limited to
self-preservation or necessity. Obviously, it is not because life has
no higher purpose than
mere survival. Rather, it is because all policy, foreign and domestic,
should
be in the service of one thing: the well-being or happiness of society.
This
means that government's most important task is to help the citizens
live the
good life by promoting the right ideal of human excellence. That is
emphatically
a matter of domestic policy, not foreign. For that reason, in
principle,
foreign policy is easy, and domestic policy is very difficult. No one
disputes
that preservation is better than death; but all claims about the
content of the
life of human excellence are inherently controversial.
Someone might object that the classical approach endorsed by Strauss
seems to
be nothing but a crass "realism." It might seem that any nation,
however
tyrannical or degraded, is justified in defending its own survival
using any means
that happen to be effective. This would be a correct assessment of the
classical position, if it were not for the point just mentioned: for
the classics,
the fundamental rightness or wrongness of political action or policy
depends on
the rightness or wrongness of the political regime which it supports.
For the
classics, justice, or what Strauss called natural right, is to be found
in
the best political order, or, to use his term, the best political
regime.
"Political activity is then properly directed," wrote Strauss in
Natural Right and
History, "if it is directed toward human perfection or virtue….
[Therefore] the
end of the city is peaceful activity in accordance with the dignity of
man,
and not war and conquest."
In sum, the classics' "realist" conception of foreign policy is
ultimately
justified only insofar as it serves their "idealist" conception of
domestic
policy.
Strauss's Principles Today
Today, liberals favor the idea that the nations of the world should
turn
their foreign policy over to international bodies like the United
Nations or the
European Union. On this point, the neoconservatives as well as the
classics
would dissent. No one can be expected to understand the interests of a
nation
better than its own citizens and statesmen. For this reason, the
classics would
have viewed multilateral organizations with suspicion. Strauss did so
explicitly, as we saw earlier.
Moreover, the purpose of foreign policy is national security, not
humanitarian benevolence, though this does not imply that all alliances
are to be shunned.
For one thing, it is easy to see that the United States, or any nation,
is
justified in making alliances with other nations for the sake of its
own
survival. In a dangerous world, one needs allies, and alliances may
require sending
one's own soldiers to die on behalf of other nations.
In the classical or Straussian approach, alliances are justified even
with
nations who oppress their own people. One's own survival, not the
well-being of
the peoples of other nations, is the standard. In order to defeat
Hitler,
America had to support Stalin, the most murderous tyrant in world
history. To
defeat Iraq, America arguably had to ally itself with despotic Saudi
Arabia.
But another implication of Strauss's approach is more controversial. It
is
the ruthless subordination of the good of other nations to one's own
good. The
foreign policy of the classics is essentially selfish, because the main
purpose
of all good politics is "self-improvement," the advantage of one's own
political community, not the common good of other political
communities. The foreign
policy of Strauss and the classics seeks neither hegemony over other
nations
nor benevolence toward other nations, unless, accidentally, one or the
other
is a means to survival.
Yet this very selfishness leads to results that are quite moral, if
morality
is defined as cultivation of the good life for one's own people, while
refraining from injuring others unless they attempt to injure you.
Straussian foreign
policy does not seek to be benevolent, but its inherent moderation
makes it
in effect benevolent, especially in contrast with the kind of
imperialism
practiced by regimes that merely want to lord it over as many nations
as possible.
Let us apply this criterion—improve one's own nation, but leave other
nations
alone, except when one's security is at risk—to the war in Iraq that
began in
2003. For Strauss and the classics, the sole justification for the war
would
have been that Iraq was a national security threat to the United
States, or,
what is the same thing, to the allies of the United States. The most
convincing
evidence of that threat would not have been whether or not Iraq
possessed
"weapons of mass destruction." After all, many other nations, such as
France and
Britain, have nuclear weapons, and no serious American is arguing that
this
poses some sort of threat to America's security. For Strauss, the truly
important question to consider is whether Iraq (or any other nation)
has been actively
planning or supporting the killing of American citizens or citizens of
America's most important allies. As it happens, there is quite a bit of
evidence
that Iraq was doing just that. Angelo Codevilla's excellent series of
articles in
the Claremont Review of Books has convincingly shown the connection
between
Iraq and terrorists who seek to harm, and who have harmed and do harm,
American
citizens and their allies. But for some reason the Bush Administration
was
not very energetic in presenting that case to the public. The
administration
sometimes does make this kind of argument in defense of the war, but it
seems to
prefer to stress that the war is good because it serves the interest of
other
nations.
Obviously it is in America's interest that foreign governments stop
sponsoring and aiding murderous acts against America and its allies,
especially against
Israel, its most reliable ally in the Middle East. To that end, it was
appropriate not only to defeat Iraq militarily, but also to deter
future hostility
to America by punishing the members of the former Iraqi government who
supported these murderously anti-American policies. So far American
forces have not
done much punishing. Instead, their focus has been on responding to
attacks, and
"nation-building." But if Strauss is right, it is not America's job to
provide its defeated enemies with democratic or just governments,
unless there is
some real connection with American national security. The question is
whether
there is such a connection. If there is, and if it is possible to build
a
democratic Iraqi government, then nation-building makes sense. If the
classical-Straussian approach is right, neoconservatives and other
defenders of the Bush
policy should explain how nation-building (1) is possible and (2)
serves
America's security. Whether it happens to be good for the Iraqis should
not be the
criterion of America's Iraq policy.
From Strauss's point of view, however, the case against nation-building
in
Iraq is strengthened by the fact that neither Iraq nor any of its major
regions
has ever in history been governed democratically. It appears that Iraq
lacks
the elementary preconditions of constitutional democracy. I mean the
minimal
democratic virtues of personal self-restraint and feisty self-assertion
in
defense of liberty, along with a widespread belief in the moral and/or
religious
obligation of everyone to respect the equal rights of others to life,
liberty
(including the free exercise of religion), and property.
It has been reported that American academics have been giving lectures
in
Iraq telling their audiences that they need to adopt Thomas Jefferson's
view of
religious liberty. What these academics seem not to understand is that
government protection of the free exercise of religion only works when
there are
enough people in the regime who actually believe in it. But for most of
the world
and throughout most of human history, there has been no separation of
religious
from political authority. This is true of Iraq, alas. Words on a piece
of
paper (an Iraqi Constitution, for example) will have zero political
effect if
there is no strong support for their enforcement, and no understanding
of why
their enforcement is a good thing.
Strauss would recommend that America stick to doing what serves its
security.
If that involves doing good to other nations, so be it. If it involves
leaving other nations alone, that is fine too. But Americans should not
confuse
matters by engaging in enthusiastic talk about national greatness and
restoring a
sense of the heroic by sending their own soldiers to die in battles
that
perhaps serve others' interests, but not our own.
Worse, the attempt to build democracy in a place where the minimal
preconditions of democracy are not present may well cause more harm
than good. How many
civilians will the American forces have to kill before it becomes clear
that
that well-intentioned goal is indefinitely out of reach? The attempt to
do good
where the good in question is impossible may lead to the unnecessary
deaths
not only of American soldiers, but also of many Iraqis.
If victory in Iraq is defined as democracy in Iraq, American forces
will have
to remain there for a long time. During their prime, Rome and Britain
were
pretty good at governing other nations. With few exceptions, Americans
have n
ever had the heart for it.
Foreign Policy and American Principles
Kristol and Kagan have another argument for benevolent hegemonism. This
one
is grounded on the specific nature of the American political order.
They argue
that the principles of the founding imply that America has a moral
obligation
not only to make the world safe for democracy but to make the world
democratic. I believe that the political thought of the founding is
opposed to that
view. With regard to foreign policy, the principles of the founding
lead to the
same conclusion as do the principles of Strauss and the classics,
though by a
different path.
The classical approach is one of ruthless selfishness for an elevated
end:
the noble and good life of the citizens. The founders rejected that
approach in
the name of the natural moral law, which denies the legitimacy of
expansion
and hegemonism except in case of necessity. Yet both approaches lead to
a
moderate foreign policy in the service of a just political order.
According to America's Declaration of Independence, every nation is
entitled
to a "separate and equal station" among "the powers of the earth." That
is
because of "the laws of nature and of nature's God," which tell us that
"all men
are created equal" and that we are obliged to respect men's equal
rights to
"life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." One way that the right
to liberty
is exercised is through each nation's collective right to consent to
its own
government, in a "separate and equal station" independent of the
government of
other nations. There is therefore no right of one nation to conquer or
interfere in the affairs of any other nation, except to the extent
required for
self-preservation. Locke's strictures against conquest in the Second
Treatise are
based on exactly this understanding of the law of nature.
In The Federalist, Madison explains what the relations will be between
the
United States under the proposed Constitution of 1787, and any states
that may
refuse to ratify the Constitution. His answer: "although no political
relation
can subsist between the assenting and dissenting States, yet the moral
relations will remain uncancelled. The claims of justice, both on one
side and on the
other, will be in force, and must be fulfilled; the rights of humanity
must
in all cases be duly and mutually respected." As we have seen, this is
not the
orientation of Plato or Thucydides.
For Madison and the founders, the natural law obligates a nation to
respect
"the rights of humanity" in other nations. The same natural law, which
is also
the ground of the social compact, obligates a nation's government to
secure
the lives, liberties, and estates of its own citizens. It does not
authorize
government to sacrifice its own citizens for the sake of other nations'
citizens.
That is why John Quincy Adams, one of the chief architects of early
American
foreign policy, declared in a speech delivered on July 4, 1821: America
"goes
not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to
the
freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator
only of her
own."
Commenting on this famous Adams quotation, Kristol and Kagan write,
"But why
not [go abroad in search of monsters to destroy]? The alternative is to
leave
monsters on the loose, ravaging and pillaging to their hearts' content,
as
Americans stand by and watch."
Strauss and the classics, together with John Quincy Adams, would admit
that
there always will be many monsters abroad in the world, ravaging and
pillaging
to their hearts' content. It is not the obligation of one nation to
solve
other nations' problems, no matter how heartbreaking. For the founders,
that would
be to violate the fundamental terms of the social compact. For Strauss
and
the classics, that would be a distraction from the highest purpose of
politics,
self-improvement through the right domestic policy. The Americans
rejected
Machiavelli's belligerent republicanism, with its celebration of
hegemonism and
conquest. Instead, the founders, following thinkers like Locke and
Montesquieu,
restored to politics a proper restraint on the dangerous human passion
to
dominate others, both at home and abroad. For this reason, the
founders'
anti-imperialist conception of foreign policy remains fully
comprehensible and
defensible in terms of Strauss's account of classical political
philosophy.
To avoid misunderstanding, I should emphasize that neither Strauss nor
the
founders were isolationists. In his Farewell Address (1796), when
Washington
warned, "'Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances,
with any
portion of the foreign world," he was thinking of America's former ally
France,
whose quarrel with Britain was not America's quarrel. "Europe has a set
of
primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation.
Hence she
must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are
essentially
foreign to our concerns." But Washington was far from opposing all
alliances.
Without the alliance with France a few years earlier, America's war for
independence might have failed. He therefore recommended "temporary
alliances" so that
America would retain freedom of action to "choose peace or war, as our
interest guided by justice shall counsel." America's interest (national
security)
was to be limited by justice (refraining from violating the rights of
other
nations).
In light of this summary of the positions of Strauss, the classics, and
the
American Founders, one must conclude that the neoconservative approach,
as
articulated by Kristol and Kagan, is only partly compatible with that
of Strauss
and the American Founders. It appears that the neocons are influenced
by the
political principles of American Progressivism—of modern liberalism.
That is
why, I suspect, Kristol and other neocons frequently express their
admiration for
Theodore Roosevelt, a man who by and large rejected the principles of
the
founding and the limited foreign policy spawned by those principles.
Roosevelt's
foreign policy did not seek merely to preserve the nation against
foreign
enemies. Instead, as T.R. wrote in "Expansion and Peace" (1899), the
best policy
is a frank imperialism all over the world: "every expansion of a great
civilized power means a victory for law, order, and righteousness."
Thus the American
occupation of the Philippines, T.R. believed, will enable "one more
fair spot
of the world's surface" to be "snatched from the forces of darkness.
Fundamentally the cause of expansion is the cause of peace."
Yet there is still a big difference between Kristol and today's
liberals who,
also, follow the Progressive ideal of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow
Wilson.
Kristol, like Roosevelt, but unlike Wilson, never forgets that
"strengthening
America's security" must always remain a leading purpose of foreign
policy. At
the beginning of this article, we noted that the neoconservatives
defend
benevolent hegemony as being both in America's security interest and in
the
interest of the nations whom we liberate. As neoconservative Max Boot
has observed,
neocons are "hard," not "soft" Wilsonians. Kristol therefore opposes
the
liberal-Wilsonian preference to turn American foreign policy over to
international
institutions like the United Nations. He also opposes the Wilsonian
tendency
to think that any policy that serves the self-interest of America is
morally
suspect.
The question that remains, however, is whether the neoconservative
devotion
to benevolent hegemony really is compatible with a foreign policy that
secures
the lives and liberties of Americans. A vain attempt to establish
democracy in
places like Iraq that have lived for millennia under one despotism
after
another may lead not to a more secure America, but to a needless and
immoral waste
of American lives.
What then should be done in Iraq? Answer: America should return to the
principles of Washington and John Quincy Adams, and focus on two
things. First, it
should make sure that important Iraqis who supported Saddam Hussein are
punished. Second, it should help Iraqis to set up a government which is
likely to
have at least some stability and decency, and which is unlikely to turn
against
America in the near future. American military forces should leave as
soon as
these two goals can be achieved. Events themselves may be moving
American policy
in precisely this direction. Lest my judgments seem too categorical, I
will
add this: given the multitude of possible means to these two simple
ends, much
must be left up to the prudence, the good sense, of the politicians to
whom we
constitutionally entrust our foreign policy.
None of this is meant to disparage the war in Iraq, or any other
American
intervention abroad, so long as it truly promotes the preservation of
America.
Nor are Americans obliged to wait for a foreign threat to become
imminent before
going to war, as many of President Bush's critics have argued. War is
effectually declared, to invoke Locke again, whenever anyone evinces
"by word or
action, not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate settled design," upon
the life of
another. Saddam Hussein's decade-long series of attempts to kill
Americans,
using either his own forces or surrogates, was evidence enough. But we
must not
forget that in the end, war, like all public policies, must serve what
Strauss, the classics, and the founders regarded as the purpose of
political
life—namely, the cultivation of "peaceful activity in accordance with
the dignity of
man."
Thomas G. West is Professor of Politics at the University of Dallas,
and is a
senior fellow of the Claremont Institute. He is the author of
Vindicating the
Founders.
Copyright © 2004, The Claremont Institute.
Visit the Claremont Institute at claremont.org.
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RePorterNoteBook@aol.com | | | | foppe37 | | Posted: Thu Aug 12, 2004 6:08 am Post subject: USA philosophy |
| The USA's philosophy since Wilson, and through Franklin Roosevelt always was 'that was good for the world also was good for the USA'.
Both Bernard Baruch, self nominated 'presidential adviser', and Henry Morgenthau jr, Roosevelt's secretary of the Treasury, state this in their memoirs.
Roosevelt's strategy was to make the USA the world leader, assisted by three lesser nations: Britian, China and the USSR.
Roosevelt just lived long enough to witness the end of his ideals, historians still debate if the Cold War began in October or November 1944.
Stalin had no intention of being subjugated to the benevolent USA; he had seen enough of the USA, and of Britain and France, after the communist coup in 1917.
After the collapse of the USSR in 1989 the USA just continued this policy.
Democracy has just been brought to Afghanistan and Iraq; anyone can see daily on his tv screen how happy the people in those countries are.
The Vietnamese, Cambodians, Chileans, Iranians, Greeks, Chinese and so on and so forth were nearly just as happy. | | | | Alpha | | | | Alpha | | | | Alpha | | Posted: Sat Aug 14, 2004 11:50 pm Post subject: Re: Zionist Neocons Switching to Kerry Camp |
| | Alpha wrote: | | http://www.antiwar.com/justin/?articleid=3300 |
The following article by Buchanan conveys just how leftist (Trotsky/Communist) some of these Neocon (Israel firsters) are as they defect from Bush to Kerry camp apparently:
http://www.antiwar.com/pat/?articleid=2371
If the new book by Buchanan about the Zionist JINSA/CSP/PNAC Neocons in the Bush regime is anything like the following article, it will be a MUST READ:
With Buchanan's new book coming out as I am hoping that it follows what he mentioned in his excellent 'Whose War?' article:
http://www.amconmag.com/03_24_03/cover.html | | | | | ©2002-2009 WarWithoutEnd.co.uk |
