| Author | Message | | Alpha | | Posted: Thu May 06, 2004 10:38 pm Post subject: TORTURE INTERCONNECTIONS - The U.S. and Israel |
| TORTUREGATE
TORTURE INTERCONNECTIONS - The U.S. and Israel
ISRAELI TORTURE and U.S. COMPLICITY THEN AND NOW
Mid-East Realities - MER - www.MiddleEast.Org - 6 May 2004:
The U.S. and Israel have been torture interconnected in the Middle East for quite a long time. Those now infamous hoods -- finally infamous because of the dramatic pictures from a U.S.-run prison in Iraq -- have long been used by the Israelis in prisons where Palestinians are treated far worse but the world has looked the other way for decades now. Indeed Israeli 'training' of Americans to 'deal with the Arabs' may well be the secret so-far untold aspect of today's 'torture scandal' now dominating today's headlines. TortureGate now dominates Washington and has the potential to threaten the Bush Presidency as the Monica scandal affected Clinton's.
The top Pentagon civilian officials -- Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith -- both Jewish and both known for their extremely close relationships with top officials in Israel and the Zionist movement, are believed to have personally authorized clandestine Mossad officials to be in Iraq working closely with U.S. military intelligence. Something similar is believed to have been secretly authorized by the head of the CIA, George Tenet. Many in Washington find it hard to believe that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfled did not know and approve; even if the information was not provided to the President who many believe at the time would not have cared or understood the implications anyway.
As of today TortureGate is at the least further erupting into a profound earthquake-like public relations catastrophy for the U.S. American credibility has been shredded to pieces. The President himself is unusually personally involved in attempting damage-control. Talk of Donald Rumseld being forced to take the fall this time is beginning to be heard above whispers.
As for the U.S. and Israeli torture connection it has grown considerable in recent years and certainly needs to be investigated -- but just as certainly not by the American Congress which is itself quite complicitous despite all the loud protestations otherwise.
Even as far back as a decade before the first Palestinian Intifada began in 1987, the U.S. government was already very much aware and complicitous in, the 'systematic torture' of Palestinians by Israel.
In 1979 U.S. Foreign Service officers serving in the Jerusalem Consulate -- an unofficial Embassy responsible for dealing with the Palestinians in the 'Occupied Territories' -- did their job and provided the political leaders in Washington detailed and conclusive information about the ongoing torture of Palestinians. When top officials in Washington did nothing and in fact ordered everything covered up classified State Department cables were leaked from persons inside the State Department and published by Mark Bruzonsky who at the time was Forum Editor of The Middle East Magazine in London. Bruzonsky is now the Publisher of Mid-East Realities (MiddleEast.Org). In a major censorship story never publicly told the classified torture documents were first made available by Bruzonsky for exclusive publication in a New York newspaper. But severe pressure from the U.S. government and persons associated with the Israeli-Jewish lobby forced the story to be spiked at the last minute even after the front-page banner-headline had been set in type and personally approved by the editor and publisher. This is the story of the once secret "Torture Cables" as published in the April 1979 issue of The Middle East Magazine. | |  | | Alpha | | | | Alpha | | | | Alpha | | Posted: Fri May 07, 2004 7:53 am Post subject: More on Israeli Torture |
| Forwarded:
Note the methods of torture during the First Intifada (as cited by
the Public Committee Against Torture), and the methods that contrinue
today despite the "ban" on torture by Israel's High Court in 1999.
http://www.palestinemonitor.org/factsheet/factsheet_on_torture.htm
Most, if not all of the methods in the First Intifada have been
utilized in the Abu Ghraib prison.
Consider this info with the fact that Israelis trained US troops with
regard to insurgents.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1102940,00.html
There is more info available on the Net, but these are a couple items
that should grab the attention of national media outlets, given that
they are always looking for interesting angles to stories.
Sherri
And let it direct your passion with reason, that your passion may
live through its own daily resurrection, and like the phoenix rise
above its own ashes. ~Khalil Gibran
--- End forwarded message --- | | | | Alpha | | Posted: Fri May 07, 2004 8:16 am Post subject: US Military Intelligence Behind Iraq Torture |
| Subj: US Military Intelligence Behind Iraq Torture
Date: 5/2/04 3:45:33 PM Pacific Daylight Time
From: hectorpv@comcast.net
To: hectorpv@comcast.net
Sent from the Internet (Details)
Friends,
US Military Intelligence Behind Iraq Torture
It appears that the torture of the Iraqis was actually a policy pushed by military intelligence, not simply the actions of a few perversely sadistic individuals. In this message I have included the New Yorker article by the intrepid Seymour Hersh and a summary of the article from the New York Times. As the Times writes: "The suggestion by Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski that the reservists acted at the behest of military intelligence officers appears largely supported in a still-classified Army report on prison conditions in Iraq that documented many of the worst abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison, west of Baghdad, including the sexual humiliation of prisoners." But the question is: who in command of military intelligence ordered such an approach? Is that simply the usual way of treating prisoners? Or did some higher-up order "special treatment" [my words] for these particular Iraqi prisoners? How far up does the responsibility go? Is someone actually intentionally trying to inflame the entire Islamic world in order to set off the neocons' World War IV?
Moreover, it is questionable as to whether these sadistic approaches actually provide beneficial information. As Hersh writes: "The mistreatment at Abu Ghraib may have done little to further American intelligence, however. Willie J. Rowell, who served for thirty-six years as a C.I.D. agent, told me that the use of force or humiliation with prisoners is invariably counterproductive. ‘They’ll tell you what you want to hear, truth or no truth,’ Rowell said. "‘You can flog me until I tell you what I know you want me to say.’ You don’t get righteous information."
Much of the actual imprisonment itself is a violation of international law.
"Under the fourth Geneva convention, an occupying power can jail civilians who pose an ‘imperative’ security threat, but it must establish a regular procedure for insuring that only civilians who remain a genuine security threat be kept imprisoned. Prisoners have the right to appeal any internment decision and have their cases reviewed. Human Rights Watch complained to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that civilians in Iraq remained in custody month after month with no charges brought against them. Abu Ghraib had become, in effect, another Guantánamo."
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http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/02/international/middleeast/02ABUS.html?position=&ei=1&en=d0a8290ad8addad7&ex=1084474268&pagewanted=print&position=
May 2, 2004
Officer Suggests Iraq Jail Abuse Was Encouraged
By PHILIP SHENON
ASHINGTON, May 1 — An Army Reserve general whose soldiers were photographed as they abused Iraqi prisoners said Saturday that she knew nothing about the abuse until weeks after it occurred and that she was "sickened" by the pictures. She said the prison cellblock where the abuse occurred was under the tight control of Army military intelligence officers who may have encouraged the abuse.
The suggestion by Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski that the reservists acted at the behest of military intelligence officers appears largely supported in a still-classified Army report on prison conditions in Iraq that documented many of the worst abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison, west of Baghdad, including the sexual humiliation of prisoners.
The New Yorker magazine said in its new edition that the report by Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba found that reservist military police at the prison were urged by Army military officers and C.I.A. agents to "set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses."
According to the New Yorker article, the Army report offered accounts of rampant and gruesome abuse from October to December of 2003 that included the sexual assault of an Iraqi detainee with a chemical light stick or broomstick.
While reports of abuse of Iraqi prisoners by American and British soldiers have come to light in the last several days, the report cited by The New Yorker indicates a far more wide-ranging and systematic pattern of cruelties than previously reported.
General Karpinski was formally admonished in January and "quietly suspended" from commanding the 800th Military Police Brigade, the New Yorker article reports. while under investigation.
In a phone interview from her home in South Carolina in which she offered her first public comments about the growing international furor over the abuse of the Iraq detainees, General Karpinski said the special high-security cellblock at Abu Ghraib had been under the direct control of Army intelligence officers, not the reservists under her command.
She said that while the reservists involved in the abuses were "bad people" who deserved punishment, she suspected that they were acting with the encouragement, if not at the direction, of military intelligence units that ran the special cellblock used for interrogation. She said that C.I.A. employees often joined in the interrogations at the prison, although she said she did not know if they had unrestricted access to the cellblock.
According to the New Yorker article, by the investigative journalist Seymour M. Hersh, one of the soldiers under investigation, Staff Sgt. Ivan L. Frederick II, an Army reservist who is a prison guard in civilian life, may have reinforced General Karpinski's contention in e-mails to family and friends while serving at the prison.
In a letter earlier this year, Sergeant Frederick wrote, "I questioned some of the things that I saw." He described "such things as leaving inmates in their cell with no clothes or in female underpants, handcuffing them to the door of their cell." He added, "The answer I got was, `This is how military intelligence wants it done.' "
Prisoners were beaten and threatened with rape, electrocution and dog attacks, witnesses told Army investigators, according to the report obtained by The New Yorker. Much of the abuse was sexual, with prisoners often kept naked and forced to perform simulated and real sex acts, witnesses testified. Mr. Hersh notes that such degradations, while deeply offensive in any culture, are particularly humiliating to Arabs because Islamic law and culture so strongly condemn nudity and homosexuality.
General Karpinski said she was speaking out because she believed that military commanders were trying to shift the blame exclusively to her and other reservists and away from intelligence officers still at work in Iraq.
"We're disposable," she said of the military's attitude toward reservists. "Why would they want the active-duty people to take the blame? They want to put this on the M.P.'s and hope that this thing goes away. Well, it's not going to go away."
The Army's public affairs office at the Pentagon referred calls about her comments to military commanders in Iraq.
General Karpinski said in the interview that the special cellblock, known as 1A, was one of about two dozen cellblocks in the large prison complex and was essentially off limits to soldiers who were not part of the interrogations, including virtually all of the military police under her command at Abu Ghraib.
She said repeatedly in the interview that she was not defending the actions of the reservists who took part in the brutality, who were part of her command. She said that when she was first presented with the photographs of the abuse in January, they "sickened me."
"I put my head down because I really thought I was going to throw up," she said. "It was awful. My immediate reaction was: these are bad people, because their faces revealed how much pleasure they felt at this."
But she said the context of the brutality had been lost, noting that the six Army reservists charged in the case represented were only a tiny fraction of the nearly 3,400 reservists under her command in Iraq, and that Abu Ghraib was one of 16 prisons and other incarceration centers around Iraq that she oversaw.
"The suggestion that this was done with my knowledge and continued with my knowledge is so far from the truth," she said of the abuse." I wasn't aware of any of this. I'm horrified by this."
She said she was also alarmed that little attention has been paid to the Army military intelligence unit that controlled Cellblock 1A, where her soldiers guarded the Iraqi detainees between interrogations.
She estimated that the floor space of the two-story cellblock was only about 60 feet by 20 feet, and that military intelligence officers were in and out of the cellblock "24 hours a day," often to escort prisoners to and from an interrogation center away from the prison cells.
"They were in there at 2 in the morning, they were there at 4 in the afternoon," said General Karpinski, who arrived in Iraq last June and was the only woman to hold a command in the war zone. "This was no 9-to-5 job."
She said that C.I.A. employees often participated in the interrogations at Abu Ghraib, one of Iraq's most notorious prisons during the rule of Saddam Hussein.
General Karpinski noted that one of the photographs of abused prisoners also showed the legs of 16 American soldiers — the photograph was cropped so that their upper bodies could not be seen — "and that tells you that clearly other people were participating, because I didn't have 16 people assigned to that cellblock."
The photographs of American soldiers smiling, laughing and signaling "thumbs up" as Iraqi detainees were forced into sexually humiliating positions provoked outrage just as the American military was trying to pacify a rising insurgency and gain the trust of more Iraqis before turning over sovereignty to a new government on June 30.
General Karpinski, who has returned home to South Carolina and her civilian life as a business consultant, said she visited Abu Ghraib as often as twice a week last fall and had repeatedly instructed military police officers under her command to treat prisoners humanely and in accord with international human rights agreements.
"I can speak some Arabic," said General Karpinski, a New Jersey native who spent almost a decade as an active duty soldier before joining the Army Reserve in 1987. "I'm not fluent, but when I went to any of my prison facilities, I would make it a point to try to talk to the detainees."
But she said she did not visit Cellblock 1A, in keeping with the wishes of military intelligence officers who, she said, worried that unnecessary visits might interfere with their interrogations of Iraqis.
She acknowledged that she "probably should have been more aggressive" about visiting the interrogation cellblock, especially after military intelligence officers at the prison went "to great lengths to try to exclude the I.C.R.C. from access to that interrogation wing."
She was referring to the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has been given access over time to Iraqi detainees at the prison.
General Karpinski's lawyer, Neal A. Puckett, a former military trial judge, said he believed that she was being made a scapegoat for others in the military, especially for military intelligence officers who knew what was going on in Cellblock 1A.
He said General Karpinski had repeatedly insisted that troops under her command in Iraq receive instruction in proper treatment of detainees, but that despite her best efforts, some reservists joined in the abuse at Abu Ghraib. "All you can do is give training, give guidance and assume that your soldiers are going to follow orders and are not going to become sick bastards," he said.
After the first allegations of abuse circulated earlier this year, Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, the senior American commander in Iraq, ordered sweeping inquiries into whether any commanders — including General Karpinski — should be held responsible. He also ordered a review of policies and procedures at all of the prisons controlled by occupation forces in Iraq.
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May 2, 2004 | home
http://www.newyorker.com/printable/?fact/040510fa_fact
TORTURE AT ABU GHRAIB
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
American soldiers brutalized Iraqis. How far up does the responsibility go?
Issue of 2004-05-10
Posted 2004-04-30
In the era of Saddam Hussein, Abu Ghraib, twenty miles west of Baghdad, was one of the world’s most notorious prisons, with torture, weekly executions, and vile living conditions. As many as fifty thousand men and women—no accurate count is possible—were jammed into Abu Ghraib at one time, in twelve-by-twelve-foot cells that were little more than human holding pits.
In the looting that followed the regime’s collapse, last April, the huge prison complex, by then deserted, was stripped of everything that could be removed, including doors, windows, and bricks. The coalition authorities had the floors tiled, cells cleaned and repaired, and toilets, showers, and a new medical center added. Abu Ghraib was now a U.S. military prison. Most of the prisoners, however—by the fall there were several thousand, including women and teen-agers—were civilians, many of whom had been picked up in random military sweeps and at highway checkpoints. They fell into three loosely defined categories: common criminals; security detainees suspected of "crimes against the coalition"; and a small number of suspected "high-value" leaders of the insurgency against the coalition forces.
Last June, Janis Karpinski, an Army reserve brigadier general, was named commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade and put in charge of military prisons in Iraq. General Karpinski, the only female commander in the war zone, was an experienced operations and intelligence officer who had served with the Special Forces and in the 1991 Gulf War, but she had never run a prison system. Now she was in charge of three large jails, eight battalions, and thirty-four hundred Army reservists, most of whom, like her, had no training in handling prisoners.
General Karpinski, who had wanted to be a soldier since she was five, is a business consultant in civilian life, and was enthusiastic about her new job. In an interview last December with the St. Petersburg Times, she said that, for many of the Iraqi inmates at Abu Ghraib, "living conditions now are better in prison than at home. At one point we were concerned that they wouldn’t want to leave."
A month later, General Karpinski was formally admonished and quietly suspended, and a major investigation into the Army’s prison system, authorized by Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, the senior commander in Iraq, was under way. A fifty-three-page report, obtained by The New Yorker, written by Major General Antonio M. Taguba and not meant for public release, was completed in late February. Its conclusions about the institutional failures of the Army prison system were devastating. Specifically, Taguba found that between October and December of 2003 there were numerous instances of "sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses" at Abu Ghraib. This systematic and illegal abuse of detainees, Taguba reported, was perpetrated by soldiers of the 372nd Military Police Company, and also by members of the American intelligence community. (The 372nd was attached to the 320th M.P. Battalion, which reported to Karpinski’s brigade headquarters.) Taguba’s report listed some of the wrongdoing:
Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees; pouring cold water on naked detainees; beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair; threatening male detainees with rape; allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed against the wall in his cell; sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick, and using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee.
There was stunning evidence to support the allegations, Taguba added—"detailed witness statements and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence." Photographs and videos taken by the soldiers as the abuses were happening were not included in his report, Taguba said, because of their "extremely sensitive nature."
The photographs—several of which were broadcast on CBS’s "60 Minutes 2" last week—show leering G.I.s taunting naked Iraqi prisoners who are forced to assume humiliating poses. Six suspects—Staff Sergeant Ivan L. Frederick II, known as Chip, who was the senior enlisted man; Specialist Charles A. Graner; Sergeant Javal Davis; Specialist Megan Ambuhl; Specialist Sabrina Harman; and Private Jeremy Sivits—are now facing prosecution in Iraq, on charges that include conspiracy, dereliction of duty, cruelty toward prisoners, maltreatment, assault, and indecent acts. A seventh suspect, Private Lynndie England, was reassigned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, after becoming pregnant.
The photographs tell it all. In one, Private England, a cigarette dangling from her mouth, is giving a jaunty thumbs-up sign and pointing at the genitals of a young Iraqi, who is naked except for a sandbag over his head, as he masturbates. Three other hooded and naked Iraqi prisoners are shown, hands reflexively crossed over their genitals. A fifth prisoner has his hands at his sides. In another, England stands arm in arm with Specialist Graner; both are grinning and giving the thumbs-up behind a cluster of perhaps seven naked Iraqis, knees bent, piled clumsily on top of each other in a pyramid. There is another photograph of a cluster of naked prisoners, again piled in a pyramid. Near them stands Graner, smiling, his arms crossed; a woman soldier stands in front of him, bending over, and she, too, is smiling. Then, there is another cluster of hooded bodies, with a female soldier standing in front, taking photographs. Yet another photograph shows a kneeling, naked, unhooded male prisoner, head momentarily turned away from the camera, posed to make it appear that he is performing oral sex on another male prisoner, who is naked and hooded.
Such dehumanization is unacceptable in any culture, but it is especially so in the Arab world. Homosexual acts are against Islamic law and it is humiliating for men to be naked in front of other men, Bernard Haykel, a professor of Middle Eastern studies at New York University, explained. "Being put on top of each other and forced to masturbate, being naked in front of each other—it’s all a form of torture," Haykel said.
Two Iraqi faces that do appear in the photographs are those of dead men. There is the battered face of prisoner No. 153399, and the bloodied body of another prisoner, wrapped in cellophane and packed in ice. There is a photograph of an empty room, splattered with blood.
The 372nd’s abuse of prisoners seemed almost routine—a fact of Army life that the soldiers felt no need to hide. On April 9th, at an Article 32 hearing (the military equivalent of a grand jury) in the case against Sergeant Frederick, at Camp Victory, near Baghdad, one of the witnesses, Specialist Matthew Wisdom, an M.P., told the courtroom what happened when he and other soldiers delivered seven prisoners, hooded and bound, to the so-called "hard site" at Abu Ghraib—seven tiers of cells where the inmates who were considered the most dangerous were housed. The men had been accused of starting a riot in another section of the prison. Wisdom said:
SFC Snider grabbed my prisoner and threw him into a pile. . . . I do not think it was right to put them in a pile. I saw SSG Frederic, SGT Davis and CPL Graner walking around the pile hitting the prisoners. I remember SSG Frederick hitting one prisoner in the side of its [sic] ribcage. The prisoner was no danger to SSG Frederick. . . . I left after that.
When he returned later, Wisdom testified:
I saw two naked detainees, one masturbating to another kneeling with its mouth open. I thought I should just get out of there. I didn’t think it was right . . . I saw SSG Frederick walking towards me, and he said, "Look what these animals do when you leave them alone for two seconds." I heard PFC England shout out, "He’s getting hard."
Wisdom testified that he told his superiors what had happened, and assumed that "the issue was taken care of." He said, "I just didn’t want to be part of anything that looked criminal."
The abuses became public because of the outrage of Specialist Joseph M. Darby, an M.P. whose role emerged during the Article 32 hearing against Chip Frederick. A government witness, Special Agent Scott Bobeck, who is a member of the Army’s Criminal Investigation Division, or C.I.D., told the court, according to an abridged transcript made available to me, "The investigation started after SPC Darby . . . got a CD from CPL Graner. . . . He came across pictures of naked detainees." Bobeck said that Darby had "initially put an anonymous letter under our door, then he later came forward and gave a sworn statement. He felt very bad about it and thought it was very wrong."
Questioned further, the Army investigator said that Frederick and his colleagues had not been given any "training guidelines" that he was aware of. The M.P.s in the 372nd had been assigned to routine traffic and police duties upon their arrival in Iraq, in the spring of 2003. In October of 2003, the 372nd was ordered to prison-guard duty at Abu Ghraib. Frederick, at thirty-seven, was far older than his colleagues, and was a natural leader; he had also worked for six years as a guard for the Virginia Department of Corrections. Bobeck explained:
What I got is that SSG Frederick and CPL Graner were road M.P.s and were put in charge because they were civilian prison guards and had knowledge of how things were supposed to be run.
Bobeck also testified that witnesses had said that Frederick, on one occasion, "had punched a detainee in the chest so hard that the detainee almost went into cardiac arrest."
At the Article 32 hearing, the Army informed Frederick and his attorneys, Captain Robert Shuck, an Army lawyer, and Gary Myers, a civilian, that two dozen witnesses they had sought, including General Karpinski and all of Frederick’s co-defendants, would not appear. Some had been excused after exercising their Fifth Amendment right; others were deemed to be too far away from the courtroom. "The purpose of an Article 32 hearing is for us to engage witnesses and discover facts," Gary Myers told me. "We ended up with a c.i.d. agent and no alleged victims to examine." After the hearing, the presiding investigative officer ruled that there was sufficient evidence to convene a court-martial against Frederick.
Myers, who was one of the military defense attorneys in the My Lai prosecutions of the nineteen-seventies, told me that his client’s defense will be that he was carrying out the orders of his superiors and, in particular, the directions of military intelligence. He said, "Do you really think a group of kids from rural Virginia decided to do this on their own? Decided that the best way to embarrass Arabs and make them talk was to have them walk around nude?"
In letters and e-mails to family members, Frederick repeatedly noted that the military-intelligence teams, which included C.I.A. officers and linguists and interrogation specialists from private defense contractors, were the dominant force inside Abu Ghraib. In a letter written in January, he said:
I questioned some of the things that I saw . . . such things as leaving inmates in their cell with no clothes or in female underpants, handcuffing them to the door of their cell—and the answer I got was, "This is how military intelligence (MI) wants it done." . . . . MI has also instructed us to place a prisoner in an isolation cell with little or no clothes, no toilet or running water, no ventilation or window, for as much as three days.
The military-intelligence officers have "encouraged and told us, ‘Great job,’ they were now getting positive results and information," Frederick wrote. "CID has been present when the military working dogs were used to intimidate prisoners at MI’s request." At one point, Frederick told his family, he pulled aside his superior officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Phillabaum, the commander of the 320th M.P. Battalion, and asked about the mistreatment of prisoners. "His reply was ‘Don’t worry about it.’"
In November, Frederick wrote, an Iraqi prisoner under the control of what the Abu Ghraib guards called "O.G.A.," or other government agencies—that is, the C.I.A. and its paramilitary employees—was brought to his unit for questioning. "They stressed him out so bad that the man passed away. They put his body in a body bag and packed him in ice for approximately twenty-four hours in the shower. . . . The next day the medics came and put his body on a stretcher, placed a fake IV in his arm and took him away." The dead Iraqi was never entered into the prison’s inmate-control system, Frederick recounted, "and therefore never had a number."
Frederick’s defense is, of course, highly self-serving. But the complaints in his letters and e-mails home were reinforced by two internal Army reports—Taguba’s and one by the Army’s chief law-enforcement officer, Provost Marshal Donald Ryder, a major general.
Last fall, General Sanchez ordered Ryder to review the prison system in Iraq and recommend ways to improve it. Ryder’s report, filed on November 5th, concluded that there were potential human-rights, training, and manpower issues, system-wide, that needed immediate attention. It also discussed serious concerns about the tension between the missions of the military police assigned to guard the prisoners and the intelligence teams who wanted to interrogate them. Army regulations limit intelligence activity by the M.P.s to passive collection. But something had gone wrong at Abu Ghraib.
There was evidence dating back to the Afghanistan war, the Ryder report said, that M.P.s had worked with intelligence operatives to "set favorable conditions for subsequent interviews"—a euphemism for breaking the will of prisoners. "Such actions generally run counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility, attempting to maintain its population in a compliant and docile state." General Karpinski’s brigade, Ryder reported, "has not been directed to change its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI interrogations, nor participate in those interrogations." Ryder called for the establishment of procedures to "define the role of military police soldiers . . .clearly separating the actions of the guards from those of the military intelligence personnel." The officers running the war in Iraq were put on notice.
Ryder undercut his warning, however, by concluding that the situation had not yet reached a crisis point. Though some procedures were flawed, he said, he found "no military police units purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices." His investigation was at best a failure and at worst a coverup.
Taguba, in his report, was polite but direct in refuting his fellow-general. "Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that surfaced during [Ryder’s] assessment are the very same issues that are the subject of this investigation," he wrote. "In fact, many of the abuses suffered by detainees occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment." The report continued, "Contrary to the findings of MG Ryder’s report, I find that personnel assigned to the 372nd MP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed to change facility procedures to ‘set the conditions’ for MI interrogations." Army intelligence officers, C.I.A. agents, and private contractors "actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses."
Taguba backed up his assertion by citing evidence from sworn statements to Army C.I.D. investigators. Specialist Sabrina Harman, one of the accused M.P.s, testified that it was her job to keep detainees awake, including one hooded prisoner who was placed on a box with wires attached to his fingers, toes, and penis. She stated, "MI wanted to get them to talk. It is Graner and Frederick’s job to do things for MI and OGA to get these people to talk."
Another witness, Sergeant Javal Davis, who is also one of the accused, told C.I.D. investigators, "I witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section . . . being made to do various things that I would question morally. . . . We were told that they had different rules." Taguba wrote, "Davis also stated that he had heard MI insinuate to the guards to abuse the inmates. When asked what MI said he stated: ‘Loosen this guy up for us.’‘Make sure he has a bad night.’‘Make sure he gets the treatment.’" Military intelligence made these comments to Graner and Frederick, Davis said. "The MI staffs to my understanding have been giving Graner compliments . . . statements like, ‘Good job, they’re breaking down real fast. They answer every question. They’re giving out good information.’"
When asked why he did not inform his chain of command about the abuse, Sergeant Davis answered, "Because I assumed that if they were doing things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone would have said something. Also the wing"—where the abuse took place—"belongs to MI and it appeared MI personnel approved of the abuse."
Another witness, Specialist Jason Kennel, who was not accused of wrongdoing, said, "I saw them nude, but MI would tell us to take away their mattresses, sheets, and clothes." (It was his view, he added, that if M.I. wanted him to do this "they needed to give me paperwork.") Taguba also cited an interview with Adel L. Nakhla, a translator who was an employee of Titan, a civilian contractor. He told of one night when a "bunch of people from MI" watched as a group of handcuffed and shackled inmates were subjected to abuse by Graner and Frederick.
General Taguba saved his harshest words for the military-intelligence officers and private contractors. He recommended that Colonel Thomas Pappas, the commander of one of the M.I. brigades, be reprimanded and receive non-judicial punishment, and that Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jordan, the former director of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center, be relieved of duty and reprimanded. He further urged that a civilian contractor, Steven Stephanowicz, of CACI International, be fired from his Army job, reprimanded, and denied his security clearances for lying to the investigating team and allowing or ordering military policemen "who were not trained in interrogation techniques to facilitate interrogations by ‘setting conditions’ which were neither authorized" nor in accordance with Army regulations. "He clearly knew his instructions equated to physical abuse," Taguba wrote. He also recommended disciplinary action against a second CACI employee, John Israel. (A spokeswoman for CACI said that the company had "received no formal communication" from the Army about the matter.)
"I suspect," Taguba concluded, that Pappas, Jordan, Stephanowicz, and Israel "were either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuse at Abu Ghraib," and strongly recommended immediate disciplinary action.
The problems inside the Army prison system in Iraq were not hidden from senior commanders. During Karpinski’s seven-month tour of duty, Taguba noted, there were at least a dozen officially reported incidents involving escapes, attempted escapes, and other serious security issues that were investigated by officers of the 800th M.P. Brigade. Some of the incidents had led to the killing or wounding of inmates and M.P.s, and resulted in a series of "lessons learned" inquiries within the brigade. Karpinski invariably approved the reports and signed orders calling for changes in day-to-day procedures. But Taguba found that she did not follow up, doing nothing to insure that the orders were carried out. Had she done so, he added, "cases of abuse may have been prevented."
General Taguba further found that Abu Ghraib was filled beyond capacity, and that the M.P. guard force was significantly undermanned and short of resources. "This imbalance has contributed to the poor living conditions, escapes, and accountability lapses," he wrote. There were gross differences, Taguba said, between the actual number of prisoners on hand and the number officially recorded. A lack of proper screening also meant that many innocent Iraqis were wrongly being detained—indefinitely, it seemed, in some cases. The Taguba study noted that more than sixty per cent of the civilian inmates at Abu Ghraib were deemed not to be a threat to society, which should have enabled them to be released. Karpinski’s defense, Taguba said, was that her superior officers "routinely" rejected her recommendations regarding the release of such prisoners.
Karpinski was rarely seen at the prisons she was supposed to be running, Taguba wrote. He also found a wide range of administrative problems, including some that he considered "without precedent in my military career." The soldiers, he added, were "poorly prepared and untrained . . . prior to deployment, at the mobilization site, upon arrival in theater, and throughout the mission."
General Taguba spent more than four hours interviewing Karpinski, whom he described as extremely emotional: "What I found particularly disturbing in her testimony was her complete unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her command to both establish and enforce basic standards and principles among its soldiers."
Taguba recommended that Karpinski and seven brigade military-police officers and enlisted men be relieved of command and formally reprimanded. No criminal proceedings were suggested for Karpinski; apparently, the loss of promotion and the indignity of a public rebuke were seen as enough punishment.
After the story broke on CBS last week, the Pentagon announced that Major General Geoffrey Miller, the new head of the Iraqi prison system, had arrived in Baghdad and was on the job. He had been the commander of the Guantánamo Bay detention center. General Sanchez also authorized an investigation into possible wrongdoing by military and civilian interrogators.
As the international furor grew, senior military officers, and President Bush, insisted that the actions of a few did not reflect the conduct of the military as a whole. Taguba’s report, however, amounts to an unsparing study of collective wrongdoing and the failure of Army leadership at the highest levels. The picture he draws of Abu Ghraib is one in which Army regulations and the Geneva conventions were routinely violated, and in which much of the day-to-day management of the prisoners was abdicated to Army military-intelligence units and civilian contract employees. Interrogating prisoners and getting intelligence, including by intimidation and torture, was the priority.
The mistreatment at Abu Ghraib may have done little to further American intelligence, however. Willie J. Rowell, who served for thirty-six years as a C.I.D. agent, told me that the use of force or humiliation with prisoners is invariably counterproductive. "They’ll tell you what you want to hear, truth or no truth," Rowell said. "‘You can flog me until I tell you what I know you want me to say.’ You don’t get righteous information."
Under the fourth Geneva convention, an occupying power can jail civilians who pose an "imperative" security threat, but it must establish a regular procedure for insuring that only civilians who remain a genuine security threat be kept imprisoned. Prisoners have the right to appeal any internment decision and have their cases reviewed. Human Rights Watch complained to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that civilians in Iraq remained in custody month after month with no charges brought against them. Abu Ghraib had become, in effect, another Guantánamo.
As the photographs from Abu Ghraib make clear, these detentions have had enormous consequences: for the imprisoned civilian Iraqis, many of whom had nothing to do with the growing insurgency; for the integrity of the Army; and for the United States’ reputation in the world.
Captain Robert Shuck, Frederick’s military attorney, closed his defense at the Article 32 hearing last month by saying that the Army was "attempting to have these six soldiers atone for its sins." Similarly, Gary Myers, Frederick’s civilian attorney, told me that he would argue at the court-martial that culpability in the case extended far beyond his client. "I’m going to drag every involved intelligence officer and civilian contractor I can find into court," he said. "Do you really believe the Army relieved a general officer because of six soldiers? Not a chance." | | | | Alpha | | Posted: Fri May 07, 2004 10:39 am Post subject: TORTURE As Made in US/UK/Israel, et. al. |
| (202) 362-5266 2 May 2004 MER@MiddleEast.Org
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TORTURE
As Made in US/UK/Israel, et. al.
Mid-East Realities - MER - www.MiddleEast.Org - 2 May 2004:
Now why should we be so surprised really? The Israelis have been using all kinds of torture techniques for a very long time on the subjugated Palestinians. And key American allies including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and of course Iraq of yesteryear when considered an important up-and-coming U.S. 'client regime', have been using torture on their own. But there's something about pictures rather than words...of course that is it. And so the American President, et. al., all tell us now -- post public pictures of course -- how 'disgusted' they are. Yet the reality is that the CIA, the 'School of the Americas', and various arms of the Pentagon, have been notorious over the years for teaching various kinds of torture techniques to others. And the reality is that many of the secret police trained by the U.S. over the years -- especially in the Middle East and Latin America -- have been routinely using torture techniques learned from and with the Americans and then further enhanced on their own. Indeed, as far back as 1979 the publisher of MER, then one of the Editors of The Middle East Magazine in London, published actual 'top secret' State Department documents prepared for top officials in the Clinton Administration detailing the torture of Palestinians by the Israelis. The story had to be published in London because at the last minute even as the presses were about to roll intense pressures caused a U.S. newspaper to spike the story even after it had been set in type as a cover story. Indeed as well the U.S. government has been covering up matters relating to torture for a very long time now, just as they attempted to do with the pictures that finally got released to world view a few days ago now. Indeed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon personally phoned the President of CBS News 'urging' him not to go with the story. Then, after holding it for weeks, CBS finally went with it; but only after it got word other news organizations were preparing to do so. The pictures of American troops torturing and grossly humiliating Iraqi prisoners have now been spread far and wide and will be one of the lasting visual images of the American invasion/occupation of Iraq. And then yesterday, maybe as a result of the American stories this time, pictures of British troops doing much the same finally came out as well. Despite all the claims of 'shock' and 'disgust', until the US, British, and Israeli prisons are opened to serious and ongoing international inspection the assumption will now be that these practices by the occupiers are not so uncommon...only that the clear revelation of them is.
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SHAME OF ABUSE BY BRIT TROOPS
By Paul Byrne
[The Daily Mirror - UK - 1 May 2004] A HOODED Iraqi captive is beaten by British soldiers before being thrown from a moving truck and left to die.
The prisoner, aged 18-20, begged for mercy as he was battered with rifle butts and batons in the head and groin, was kicked, stamped and urinated on, and had a gun barrel forced into his mouth.
After an EIGHT-HOUR ordeal, he was left barely conscious and close to death. Bleeding and vomiting and with a broken jaw and missing teeth, he was driven from a Basra camp and hurled off the truck. No one knows if he lived or died.
URINATED ON: A British soldier urinates on an Iraqi prisoner in a vile display of abuse. The captive was beaten and hurled from a moving truck. Army chiefs are investigating.
The shocking pictures on this page were handed to us by one of the attackers and a colleague. We have agreed to protect their identities as they fear reprisals.
Last night, their damning testimony was in the hands of appalled ministers and Army chiefs who pledged an urgent investigation.
Chief of the General Staff General Sir Michael Jackson said: "If this is proven, the perpetrators are not fit to wear the Queen's uniform. They have besmirched the good name of the Army and its honour."
No 10 said: "The Prime Minister fully endorses the general's statement."
The outrage, which emerged the day after US troops were pictured torturing Iraqi prisoners of war, makes a mockery of the Army's attempts to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people.
GUN TO HEAD: The terrified suspect cowers as a gun is placed at his head - then the rifle barrel was forced into his mouth
Army chiefs believe it was an isolated incident involving a few rogue troops. But, it is claimed, officers turned a blind eye. One of the soldiers said: "Basically this guy was dying as he couldn't take any more. An officer came down. It was 'Get rid of him - I haven't seen him'. The paperwork gets ripped. So they threw him out, still with a bag on his head."
Weeks after the pictures were taken, a captive was allegedly beaten to death in custody by men from the same Queen's Lancashire Regiment. It is also alleged a video was found of prisoners being thrown off a bridge.
Soldier A told how the young victim was hauled in suspected of stealing from the docks.
He said: "You pick on a man and go for him. Straightaway he gets a beating, a couple of punches and kicks to put him down. Then he was dragged to the back of the vehicle."
Immediately a sandbag was placed over the man's head and his hands tied behind his back.
Soldier A said:
As we took him back he was getting a beating. He was hit with batons on the knees, fingers, toes, elbows, and head.
You normally try to leave off the face until you're in camp. If you pull up with black eyes and bleeding faces you could be in s**t.
"So it's body shots - scaring him, saying 'We're going to kill you'. A lot of them cry and p*** themselves.
Because it was so hot we put him in the back of a four- tonner truck which has a canopy over it. That's where the photos were taken. Lads were taking turns giving him a right going over, smashing him in the face with weapons and stamping on him. We had him for about eight hours.
BLEEDING: Blood seeps through the mask of battered suspect
You could see blood coming out early from the first 'digs'. He was p****d on and there was spew.
"We took his mask off to give him some water and let him have a rest for 10 minutes. He could only speak a few words, pleading 'No, mister' . No, mister'.
I did less than the others. But I joined in. Me and my mate calmed down. Then two lads come on and it starts again.
"He was missing teeth. All his mouth was bleeding and his nose was all over the place. He couldn't talk, his jaw was out. He's had a good few hours of a kicking. He was on his way to being killed. There's only so much you can take.
After the officer allegedly told the attackers to get rid of the suspect he was driven off.
Soldier A said: "The lads said they took him back to the dock and threw him off the back of a moving vehicle. They'd have freed his hands, but he'd still be hooded. He'd done nothing, really. I felt sorry for him. I'm not emotional about it, but I knew it was wrong."
Referring to the second alleged beating in custody - said to have taken place in September - Soldier B said: "It was only a matter of time.
BUTT IN GROIN: A rifle is cruelly jabbed in the young man's groin as his eight-hour nightmare goes on
"We had one who fought back. I thought 'Don't do that', it's the worst thing you can do. He got such a kicking. You could hear your mate's boots hitting this lad's spine.
"One of the lads broke his wrist on a prisoner's head. Another nearly broke his foot, kicking him. We're not helping ourselves out here. We're never going to get the Iraqis on our side. We're fighting a losing war."
Soldier B claimed after the alleged September beating troops were told to destroy incriminating evidence.
He said: "We got a warning, saying the Military Police had found a video of people throwing prisoners off a bridge. It wasn't 'Don't do it' or 'Stop it'. It was 'Get rid of it.' "
The death is being probed. At least one soldier is expected to be charged with manslaughter.
The two infantrymen claim abuse has started because Iraqi police are powerless to process suspects.
Soldier B said: "There's no point taking them to the police station because they're released within 20 minutes. The coppers don't want any comeback and let them go. All we do is teach them a lesson our way.
"You're knackered and you don't want to be going to a police station and doing statements, just for them to be released. Give them a kicking, then it's done and dusted.
"A lot of the younger ones are worse. It's as though they've something to prove. You've got a gun and you're the law. You can make people do whatever you want."
Both men fear the situation is worsening , with UK troops now seen as the enemy, rather than liberators.
One said: "I can't believe it has taken the Iraqis so long to fight back. If it had been me or my family, I'd have retaliated straightaway.
"They've just got f****d around so much. You can't go in now, and say 'Right, let's forget about what has happened and start again'.
"We're struggling now. There are too many people against us."
The MoD confirmed eight cases of alleged mistreatment of Iraqis by British personnel are being investigated by the army's Special Investigations Branch. A spokesman said: "All allegations will be investigated - and
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Subject: Re: MOSSAD AGENTS INVOLVED IN IRAQ PRISON ABUSE
From: "George Leroy Tyrebiter, Jr." tyrebiter@commiemartyrs.edu
Date: 5/6/04 3:23 PM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id: <rhel90l6cts3d4mtai648aa300rqgthf08@4ax.com>
On 06 May 2004 20:13:26 GMT, morris434@aol.com (MORRIS434) wrote:
>MOSSAD AGENTS INVOLVED IN IRAQ PRISON ABUSE:
>
>http://www.warwithoutend.co.uk/the-americas/2004/05/06/mossad-agents-involved-in-iraq-prison-abuse.php
I did find googling that the head of CACI, Dr London, got some big
award in Israel not long ago.
And I noticed one of the employess had on a resume that he had
completed, as I recall, "The Israel Course"
Our soldiers did not understand the concept of "shame" which is so
powerful with muslims, and it is entirely possible that more
knowledgeable Israelis, directly or indirectly, pushed us in the
direction of this humiliation tactic.
>
>Iraq: "Severest Form of Injuries I've Seen in My Career":
>
>http://www.warwithoutend.co.uk/middle-east-and-asia/2004/05/06/iraq-severest-form-of-injuries-i-ve-seen-in-my-career.php
>
>OUR 'FRIEND' ISRAEL:
>
>http://www.warwithoutend.co.uk/middle-east-and-asia/2004/05/06/our-friend-israel.php
>
>
>Brahimi versus Chalabi: The daggers are drawn:
>
>http://www.warwithoutend.co.uk/middle-east-and-asia/2004/05/05/brahimi-versus-chalabi-the-daggers-are-drawn.php | | | | Alpha | | Posted: Fri May 07, 2004 10:46 am Post subject: and now...The Coverup |
| and now...The Coverup
Mid-East Realities - MER - www.MiddleEast.Org - 3 May 2004:
The big torture coverup is now underway. The U.S. military has its top 'information' Generals on TV far and wide, there will be a few 'investigations', a few soldiers are being 'reprimanded' and 'relieved', and the woman Reserve General in charge of Iraqi prisons is already on TV, her lawyer at her side, saying in effect that if she's responsible so is 3-star commanding General Ricardo Sanchez and hinting at the 'intelligence' people who were really in charge. With a little further investigative effort, the super-secret super-classified world of CIA torture might even see a little light of day...and Director George Tenet might have to answer a few further questions in public on Capitol Hill.
But in a world where what is being done to the Palestinians is the 'peace process', where Ariel Sharon's Plans offer 'hope' for the 'roadmap' and a 'Palestinian State', and where the Secretary of State and CIA Director boldly lie to the world in front of the Security Council about 'weapons of mass destruction' and the 'no choice' but to invade Iraq ploy, who can possibly believe the Americans and their British and Israeli side-kicks at this point in history?
And after all this...they are going to investigate themselves?
And all this coming as Kofi Annan, the U.S.-installed Secretary-General in New York, is further working overtime to bail out the Americans with still more political fig leaves and historical duplicity coming from the now also much discredited United Nations.
International Affairs is now in a kind of sexed-up Alice in Wonderland phase it seems; one George Orwell and the Big Lie disciples of yesteryear would no doubt marvel at.
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TORTURE AT ABU GHRAIB
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
American soldiers brutalized Iraqis.
How far up does the responsibility go?
The New Yorker - 2004-05-10: In the era of Saddam Hussein, Abu Ghraib, twenty miles west of Baghdad, was one of the world’s most notorious prisons, with torture, weekly executions, and vile living conditions. As many as fifty thousand men and women—no accurate count is possible—were jammed into Abu Ghraib at one time, in twelve-by-twelve-foot cells that were little more than human holding pits.
In the looting that followed the regime’s collapse, last April, the huge prison complex, by then deserted, was stripped of everything that could be removed, including doors, windows, and bricks. The coalition authorities had the floors tiled, cells cleaned and repaired, and toilets, showers, and a new medical center added. Abu Ghraib was now a U.S. military prison. Most of the prisoners, however—by the fall there were several thousand, including women and teen-agers—were civilians, many of whom had been picked up in random military sweeps and at highway checkpoints. They fell into three loosely defined categories: common criminals; security detainees suspected of “crimes against the coalition”; and a small number of suspected “high-value” leaders of the insurgency against the coalition forces.
Last June, Janis Karpinski, an Army reserve brigadier general, was named commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade and put in charge of military prisons in Iraq. General Karpinski, the only female commander in the war zone, was an experienced operations and intelligence officer who had served with the Special Forces and in the 1991 Gulf War, but she had never run a prison system. Now she was in charge of three large jails, eight battalions, and thirty-four hundred Army reservists, most of whom, like her, had no training in handling prisoners.
General Karpinski, who had wanted to be a soldier since she was five, is a business consultant in civilian life, and was enthusiastic about her new job. In an interview last December with the St. Petersburg Times, she said that, for many of the Iraqi inmates at Abu Ghraib, “living conditions now are better in prison than at home. At one point we were concerned that they wouldn’t want to leave.”
A month later, General Karpinski was formally admonished and quietly suspended, and a major investigation into the Army’s prison system, authorized by Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, the senior commander in Iraq, was under way. A fifty-three-page report, obtained by The New Yorker, written by Major General Antonio M. Taguba and not meant for public release, was completed in late February. Its conclusions about the institutional failures of the Army prison system were devastating. Specifically, Taguba found that between October and December of 2003 there were numerous instances of “sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses” at Abu Ghraib. This systematic and illegal abuse of detainees, Taguba reported, was perpetrated by soldiers of the 372nd Military Police Company, and also by members of the American intelligence community. (The 372nd was attached to the 320th M.P. Battalion, which reported to Karpinski’s brigade headquarters.) Taguba’s report listed some of the wrongdoing:
Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees; pouring cold water on naked detainees; beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair; threatening male detainees with rape; allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed against the wall in his cell; sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick, and using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee.
There was stunning evidence to support the allegations, Taguba added—“detailed witness statements and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence.” Photographs and videos taken by the soldiers as the abuses were happening were not included in his report, Taguba said, because of their “extremely sensitive nature.”
The photographs—several of which were broadcast on CBS’s “60 Minutes 2” last week—show leering G.I.s taunting naked Iraqi prisoners who are forced to assume humiliating poses. Six suspects—Staff Sergeant Ivan L. Frederick II, known as Chip, who was the senior enlisted man; Specialist Charles A. Graner; Sergeant Javal Davis; Specialist Megan Ambuhl; Specialist Sabrina Harman; and Private Jeremy Sivits—are now facing prosecution in Iraq, on charges that include conspiracy, dereliction of duty, cruelty toward prisoners, maltreatment, assault, and indecent acts. A seventh suspect, Private Lynndie England, was reassigned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, after becoming pregnant.
The photographs tell it all. In one, Private England, a cigarette dangling from her mouth, is giving a jaunty thumbs-up sign and pointing at the genitals of a young Iraqi, who is naked except for a sandbag over his head, as he masturbates. Three other hooded and naked Iraqi prisoners are shown, hands reflexively crossed over their genitals. A fifth prisoner has his hands at his sides. In another, England stands arm in arm with Specialist Graner; both are grinning and giving the thumbs-up behind a cluster of perhaps seven naked Iraqis, knees bent, piled clumsily on top of each other in a pyramid. There is another photograph of a cluster of naked prisoners, again piled in a pyramid. Near them stands Graner, smiling, his arms crossed; a woman soldier stands in front of him, bending over, and she, too, is smiling. Then, there is another cluster of hooded bodies, with a female soldier standing in front, taking photographs. Yet another photograph shows a kneeling, naked, unhooded male prisoner, head momentarily turned away from the camera, posed to make it appear that he is performing oral sex on another male prisoner, who is naked and hooded.
Such dehumanization is unacceptable in any culture, but it is especially so in the Arab world. Homosexual acts are against Islamic law and it is humiliating for men to be naked in front of other men, Bernard Haykel, a professor of Middle Eastern studies at New York University, explained. “Being put on top of each other and forced to masturbate, being naked in front of each other—it’s all a form of torture,” Haykel said.
Two Iraqi faces that do appear in the photographs are those of dead men. There is the battered face of prisoner No. 153399, and the bloodied body of another prisoner, wrapped in cellophane and packed in ice. There is a photograph of an empty room, splattered with blood.
The 372nd’s abuse of prisoners seemed almost routine—a fact of Army life that the soldiers felt no need to hide. On April 9th, at an Article 32 hearing (the military equivalent of a grand jury) in the case against Sergeant Frederick, at Camp Victory, near Baghdad, one of the witnesses, Specialist Matthew Wisdom, an M.P., told the courtroom what happened when he and other soldiers delivered seven prisoners, hooded and bound, to the so-called “hard site” at Abu Ghraib—seven tiers of cells where the inmates who were considered the most dangerous were housed. The men had been accused of starting a riot in another section of the prison. Wisdom said:
SFC Snider grabbed my prisoner and threw him into a pile. . . . I do not think it was right to put them in a pile. I saw SSG Frederic, SGT Davis and CPL Graner walking around the pile hitting the prisoners. I remember SSG Frederick hitting one prisoner in the side of its [sic] ribcage. The prisoner was no danger to SSG Frederick. . . . I left after that.
When he returned later, Wisdom testified:
I saw two naked detainees, one masturbating to another kneeling with its mouth open. I thought I should just get out of there. I didn’t think it was right . . . I saw SSG Frederick walking towards me, and he said, “Look what these animals do when you leave them alone for two seconds.” I heard PFC England shout out, “He’s getting hard.”
Wisdom testified that he told his superiors what had happened, and assumed that “the issue was taken care of.” He said, “I just didn’t want to be part of anything that looked criminal.”
The abuses became public because of the outrage of Specialist Joseph M. Darby, an M.P. whose role emerged during the Article 32 hearing against Chip Frederick. A government witness, Special Agent Scott Bobeck, who is a member of the Army’s Criminal Investigation Division, or C.I.D., told the court, according to an abridged transcript made available to me, “The investigation started after SPC Darby . . . got a CD from CPL Graner. . . . He came across pictures of naked detainees.” Bobeck said that Darby had “initially put an anonymous letter under our door, then he later came forward and gave a sworn statement. He felt very bad about it and thought it was very wrong.”
Questioned further, the Army investigator said that Frederick and his colleagues had not been given any “training guidelines” that he was aware of. The M.P.s in the 372nd had been assigned to routine traffic and police duties upon their arrival in Iraq, in the spring of 2003. In October of 2003, the 372nd was ordered to prison-guard duty at Abu Ghraib. Frederick, at thirty-seven, was far older than his colleagues, and was a natural leader; he had also worked for six years as a guard for the Virginia Department of Corrections. Bobeck explained:
What I got is that SSG Frederick and CPL Graner were road M.P.s and were put in charge because they were civilian prison guards and had knowledge of how things were supposed to be run.
Bobeck also testified that witnesses had said that Frederick, on one occasion, “had punched a detainee in the chest so hard that the detainee almost went into cardiac arrest.”
At the Article 32 hearing, the Army informed Frederick and his attorneys, Captain Robert Shuck, an Army lawyer, and Gary Myers, a civilian, that two dozen witnesses they had sought, including General Karpinski and all of Frederick’s co-defendants, would not appear. Some had been excused after exercising their Fifth Amendment right; others were deemed to be too far away from the courtroom. “The purpose of an Article 32 hearing is for us to engage witnesses and discover facts,” Gary Myers told me. “We ended up with a c.i.d. agent and no alleged victims to examine.” After the hearing, the presiding investigative officer ruled that there was sufficient evidence to convene a court-martial against Frederick.
Myers, who was one of the military defense attorneys in the My Lai prosecutions of the nineteen-seventies, told me that his client’s defense will be that he was carrying out the orders of his superiors and, in particular, the directions of military intelligence. He said, “Do you really think a group of kids from rural Virginia decided to do this on their own? Decided that the best way to embarrass Arabs and make them talk was to have them walk around nude?”
In letters and e-mails to family members, Frederick repeatedly noted that the military-intelligence teams, which included C.I.A. officers and linguists and interrogation specialists from private defense contractors, were the dominant force inside Abu Ghraib. In a letter written in January, he said:
I questioned some of the things that I saw . . . such things as leaving inmates in their cell with no clothes or in female underpants, handcuffing them to the door of their cell—and the answer I got was, “This is how military intelligence (MI) wants it done.” . . . . MI has also instructed us to place a prisoner in an isolation cell with little or no clothes, no toilet or running water, no ventilation or window, for as much as three days.
The military-intelligence officers have “encouraged and told us, ‘Great job,’ they were now getting positive results and information,” Frederick wrote. “CID has been present when the military working dogs were used to intimidate prisoners at MI’s request.” At one point, Frederick told his family, he pulled aside his superior officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Phillabaum, the commander of the 320th M.P. Battalion, and asked about the mistreatment of prisoners. “His reply was ‘Don’t worry about it.’”
In November, Frederick wrote, an Iraqi prisoner under the control of what the Abu Ghraib guards called “O.G.A.,” or other government agencies—that is, the C.I.A. and its paramilitary employees—was brought to his unit for questioning. “They stressed him out so bad that the man passed away. They put his body in a body bag and packed him in ice for approximately twenty-four hours in the shower. . . . The next day the medics came and put his body on a stretcher, placed a fake IV in his arm and took him away.” The dead Iraqi was never entered into the prison’s inmate-control system, Frederick recounted, “and therefore never had a number.”
Frederick’s defense is, of course, highly self-serving. But the complaints in his letters and e-mails home were reinforced by two internal Army reports—Taguba’s and one by the Army’s chief law-enforcement officer, Provost Marshal Donald Ryder, a major general.
Last fall, General Sanchez ordered Ryder to review the prison system in Iraq and recommend ways to improve it. Ryder’s report, filed on November 5th, concluded that there were potential human-rights, training, and manpower issues, system-wide, that needed immediate attention. It also discussed serious concerns about the tension between the missions of the military police assigned to guard the prisoners and the intelligence teams who wanted to interrogate them. Army regulations limit intelligence activity by the M.P.s to passive collection. But something had gone wrong at Abu Ghraib.
There was evidence dating back to the Afghanistan war, the Ryder report said, that M.P.s had worked with intelligence operatives to “set favorable conditions for subsequent interviews”—a euphemism for breaking the will of prisoners. “Such actions generally run counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility, attempting to maintain its population in a compliant and docile state.” General Karpinski’s brigade, Ryder reported, “has not been directed to change its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI interrogations, nor participate in those interrogations.” Ryder called for the establishment of procedures to “define the role of military police soldiers . . .clearly separating the actions of the guards from those of the military intelligence personnel.” The officers running the war in Iraq were put on notice.
Ryder undercut his warning, however, by concluding that the situation had not yet reached a crisis point. Though some procedures were flawed, he said, he found “no military police units purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices.” His investigation was at best a failure and at worst a coverup.
Taguba, in his report, was polite but direct in refuting his fellow-general. “Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that surfaced during [Ryder’s] assessment are the very same issues that are the subject of this investigation,” he wrote. “In fact, many of the abuses suffered by detainees occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment.” The report continued, “Contrary to the findings of MG Ryder’s report, I find that personnel assigned to the 372nd MP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed to change facility procedures to ‘set the conditions’ for MI interrogations.” Army intelligence officers, C.I.A. agents, and private contractors “actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses.”
Taguba backed up his assertion by citing evidence from sworn statements to Army C.I.D. investigators. Specialist Sabrina Harman, one of the accused M.P.s, testified that it was her job to keep detainees awake, including one hooded prisoner who was placed on a box with wires attached to his fingers, toes, and penis. She stated, “MI wanted to get them to talk. It is Graner and Frederick’s job to do things for MI and OGA to get these people to talk.”
Another witness, Sergeant Javal Davis, who is also one of the accused, told C.I.D. investigators, “I witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section . . . being made to do various things that I would question morally. . . . We were told that they had different rules.” Taguba wrote, “Davis also stated that he had heard MI insinuate to the guards to abuse the inmates. When asked what MI said he stated: ‘Loosen this guy up for us.’‘Make sure he has a bad night.’‘Make sure he gets the treatment.’” Military intelligence made these comments to Graner and Frederick, Davis said. “The MI staffs to my understanding have been giving Graner compliments . . . statements like, ‘Good job, they’re breaking down real fast. They answer every question. They’re giving out good information.’”
When asked why he did not inform his chain of command about the abuse, Sergeant Davis answered, “Because I assumed that if they were doing things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone would have said something. Also the wing”—where the abuse took place—“belongs to MI and it appeared MI personnel approved of the abuse.”
Another witness, Specialist Jason Kennel, who was not accused of wrongdoing, said, “I saw them nude, but MI would tell us to take away their mattresses, sheets, and clothes.” (It was his view, he added, that if M.I. wanted him to do this “they needed to give me paperwork.”) Taguba also cited an interview with Adel L. Nakhla, a translator who was an employee of Titan, a civilian contractor. He told of one night when a “bunch of people from MI” watched as a group of handcuffed and shackled inmates were subjected to abuse by Graner and Frederick.
General Taguba saved his harshest words for the military-intelligence officers and private contractors. He recommended that Colonel Thomas Pappas, the commander of one of the M.I. brigades, be reprimanded and receive non-judicial punishment, and that Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jordan, the former director of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center, be relieved of duty and reprimanded. He further urged that a civilian contractor, Steven Stephanowicz, of CACI International, be fired from his Army job, reprimanded, and denied his security clearances for lying to the investigating team and allowing or ordering military policemen “who were not trained in interrogation techniques to facilitate interrogations by ‘setting conditions’ which were neither authorized” nor in accordance with Army regulations. “He clearly knew his instructions equated to physical abuse,” Taguba wrote. He also recommended disciplinary action against a second CACI employee, John Israel. (A spokeswoman for CACI said that the company had “received no formal communication” from the Army about the matter.)
“I suspect,” Taguba concluded, that Pappas, Jordan, Stephanowicz, and Israel “were either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuse at Abu Ghraib,” and strongly recommended immediate disciplinary action.
The problems inside the Army prison system in Iraq were not hidden from senior commanders. During Karpinski’s seven-month tour of duty, Taguba noted, there were at least a dozen officially reported incidents involving escapes, attempted escapes, and other serious security issues that were investigated by officers of the 800th M.P. Brigade. Some of the incidents had led to the killing or wounding of inmates and M.P.s, and resulted in a series of “lessons learned” inquiries within the brigade. Karpinski invariably approved the reports and signed orders calling for changes in day-to-day procedures. But Taguba found that she did not follow up, doing nothing to insure that the orders were carried out. Had she done so, he added, “cases of abuse may have been prevented.”
General Taguba further found that Abu Ghraib was filled beyond capacity, and that the M.P. guard force was significantly undermanned and short of resources. “This imbalance has contributed to the poor living conditions, escapes, and accountability lapses,” he wrote. There were gross differences, Taguba said, between the actual number of prisoners on hand and the number officially recorded. A lack of proper screening also meant that many innocent Iraqis were wrongly being detained—indefinitely, it seemed, in some cases. The Taguba study noted that more than sixty per cent of the civilian inmates at Abu Ghraib were deemed not to be a threat to society, which should have enabled them to be released. Karpinski’s defense, Taguba said, was that her superior officers “routinely” rejected her recommendations regarding the release of such prisoners.
Karpinski was rarely seen at the prisons she was supposed to be running, Taguba wrote. He also found a wide range of administrative problems, including some that he considered “without precedent in my military career.” The soldiers, he added, were “poorly prepared and untrained . . . prior to deployment, at the mobilization site, upon arrival in theater, and throughout the mission.”
General Taguba spent more than four hours interviewing Karpinski, whom he described as extremely emotional: “What I found particularly disturbing in her testimony was her complete unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her command to both establish and enforce basic standards and principles among its soldiers.”
Taguba recommended that Karpinski and seven brigade military-police officers and enlisted men be relieved of command and formally reprimanded. No criminal proceedings were suggested for Karpinski; apparently, the loss of promotion and the indignity of a public rebuke were seen as enough punishment.
After the story broke on CBS last week, the Pentagon announced that Major General Geoffrey Miller, the new head of the Iraqi prison system, had arrived in Baghdad and was on the job. He had been the commander of the Guantánamo Bay detention center. General Sanchez also authorized an investigation into possible wrongdoing by military and civilian interrogators.
As the international furor grew, senior military officers, and President Bush, insisted that the actions of a few did not reflect the conduct of the military as a whole. Taguba’s report, however, amounts to an unsparing study of collective wrongdoing and the failure of Army leadership at the highest levels. The picture he draws of Abu Ghraib is one in which Army regulations and the Geneva conventions were routinely violated, and in which much of the day-to-day management of the prisoners was abdicated to Army military-intelligence units and civilian contract employees. Interrogating prisoners and getting intelligence, including by intimidation and torture, was the priority.
The mistreatment at Abu Ghraib may have done little to further American intelligence, however. Willie J. Rowell, who served for thirty-six years as a C.I.D. agent, told me that the use of force or humiliation with prisoners is invariably counterproductive. “They’ll tell you what you want to hear, truth or no truth,” Rowell said. “‘You can flog me until I tell you what I know you want me to say.’ You don’t get righteous information.”
Under the fourth Geneva convention, an occupying power can jail civilians who pose an “imperative” security threat, but it must establish a regular procedure for insuring that only civilians who remain a genuine security threat be kept imprisoned. Prisoners have the right to appeal any internment decision and have their cases reviewed. Human Rights Watch complained to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that civilians in Iraq remained in custody month after month with no charges brought against them. Abu Ghraib had become, in effect, another Guantánamo.
As the photographs from Abu Ghraib make clear, these detentions have had enormous consequences: for the imprisoned civilian Iraqis, many of whom had nothing to do with the growing insurgency; for the integrity of the Army; and for the United States’ reputation in the world.
Captain Robert Shuck, Frederick’s military attorney, closed his defense at the Article 32 hearing last month by saying that the Army was “attempting to have these six soldiers atone for its sins.” Similarly, Gary Myers, Frederick’s civilian attorney, told me that he would argue at the court-martial that culpability in the case extended far beyond his client. “I’m going to drag every involved intelligence officer and civilian contractor I can find into court,” he said. “Do you really believe the Army relieved a general officer because of six soldiers? Not a chance.” | | | | Alpha | | Posted: Fri May 07, 2004 8:13 pm Post subject: Israeli (Torture) Lessons for the US in Iraq |
| Israeli lessons for the US in Iraq
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/C182D988-28E3-4D48-ADFC-F15D6509B0EC.htm
By Khalid Amayreh in the West Bank
Friday 07 May 2004, 2:48 Makka Time, 23:48 GMT
The torturing of Iraqi prisoners at the Abu Ghuraib prison by US occupying forces has shocked the world - but for most Palestinians they come as no surprise.
In fact, tens of thousands of Palestinians who have served time in Israeli prisons and detention centres see striking similarities between Israeli treatment of Palestinian prisoners and American treatment of Iraqi detainees.
In some cases, the torture technique or form of mistreatment is almost identical, some former Palestinian prisoners told Aljazeera.net.
Hisham Abd al-Razzaq is a Palestinian Authority minister in charge of overseeing and catering for more than 7000 Palestinian prisoners in Israel, many of them interned without charge or trial.
He believes that what the Americans are doing to the Iraqis amounts to a "carbon copy" of what the Israelis have been doing to the Palestinians.
"I am inclined to think that the Americans copied the Israeli techniques. I can’t prove it in an objective manner, but the striking similarities are overwhelming."
Abd al-Razzaq, who himself experienced many forms of torture during his lengthy imprisonment in an Israeli jail prior to the Oslo Accords in 1993, described physical and psychological torture as the "modus operandi" of Israeli treatment of Palestinian detainees.
Torture techniques
He said that the so-called hooding technique - whereby the detainee's head is covered with a rancid-smelling sack for weeks or months - was always "the first order of business" in Israeli interrogation centres.
"The hooding itself is not an interrogation method. Its purpose is not to extract confessions from the suspect, but rather to demoralise him and destroy his mental balance."
"The hooding itself is not an interrogation method. Its purpose is not to extract confessions from the suspect, but rather to demoralise him and destroy his mental balance"
Hisham Abd al-Razzaq,
Palestinian Authority minister
Abd al-Razzaq said that the filthy sack that he too was forced to wear was made up of three or four layers to make sure that the suspect "breathes the least possible amount of oxygen, enough to keep him or her alive".
In addition to the hooding, Israel, according to consistent reports by international human rights groups as well as testimonies by Palestinian detainees, continues to use harsh means of torture, both for extracting confessions and as a punishment for opposing the Israeli occupation.
These include, inter alia, brutal beating, (taltul) or violent shaking, forced-stripping, sleep deprivation (by playing extremely loud music inside a detainee’s cell), cold baths in winter, actual or threatened sexual abuse, as well as the notorious shabh technique whereby a suspect is tied tightly tied to a small chair, with his hands tied to his back, for weeks.
Similarity denied
Ofer Yisler, spokesman for the Israeli Prison Authority, vehemently denies any "similarity between our treatment of the Palestinians and what we have seen in Iraq".
"There is no comparison whatsoever, what the Americans did in Iraq is something entirely different."
Palestinians say the US learned
its torture tactics from Israel
But Yisler refused to comment on accusations that the hooding technique, the shabh, sleep deprivation and forced stripping were still being used by Israel. Yisler ended the interview and refused to answer further questions, insisting that written questions be submitted to his office.
Yisler’s reluctance to speak, however, seems to underscore Israel’s desire to stay away from the international outcry over what happened in Iraq.
But Israeli-Arab Knesset member Talab al-Sanai says Israel is indirectly but heavily involved in "the systematic mistreatment of Iraqi people at the hands of the American occupation troops".
Israeli experts
"It is not secret at all, there are many Israeli experts on torture in Iraq who are transferring to the Americans their accumulative experience of thirty seven years of torturing and mistreating Palestinians," al-Sanai told Aljazeera.net.
He said that American officers joined Israeli army units in Jenin several months ago for the purpose of learning Israeli methods and techniques of repressing civilians, which the Americans, he said, later applied in Iraq.
"It took Israel 37 years to develop and perfect these barbaric methods of repression and humiliation. Surprisingly, the Americans surpassed and outmatched the Israelis in their savagery in less than two years."
Al-Sanai condemned American behaviour in Iraq as "manifestly criminal", dismissing claims by the Bush administration that the torture incidents were isolated.
"Here in Israel, it is an ugly occupation, and Israel doesn’t make any pretensions about it. But in Iraq, the United States is murdering, humiliating, torturing and raping the Iraqis under the rubric of freedom and democracy…
"Perhaps this is what they really mean when they talk about freedom and democracy … namely, liberating the Iraqis from their dignity."
Israeli Connection with Abu Ghuraib Torture?
Many readers have written to suggest that there is an Israeli connection of some sort to the Abu Ghuraib prison scandal, because the techniques used seem so similar to what Palestinians report. One noted that Joe Ryan, the Abu Ghuraib blogger, had some training with Israeli specialists on such matters.
Khalid Amayrah summarizes the case for.
Talab al-Sana'i, an Arab member of the Israeli Knesset, is one of Amayrah's key sources, and it seems likely to me that he knows whereof he speaks:
' But Israeli-Arab Knesset member Talab al-Sanai says Israel is indirectly but heavily involved in "the systematic mistreatment of Iraqi people at the hands of the American occupation troops". "It is not secret at all, there are many Israeli experts on torture in Iraq who are transferring to the Americans their accumulative experience of thirty seven years of torturing and mistreating Palestinians," al-Sanai told Aljazeera.net. He said that American officers joined Israeli army units in Jenin several months ago for the purpose of learning Israeli methods and techniques of repressing civilians, which the Americans, he said, later applied in Iraq. '
On the other hand, one Muslim-American reader wrote in to suggest that for decades Israel helped spoil America's image in the Middle East by its determined colonization of Palestinian land since 1967 and by the brutality with which it often treated Palestinians under its Occupation. But now, in view of the events of the past year and especially the Abu Ghuraib photos. it may well be Israel's association with the United States that hurts Israel's image in the region.
http://www.juancole.com/ | | | | Alpha | | Posted: Fri May 07, 2004 9:17 pm Post subject: General Taguba's Report |
| http://www.antiwar.com/news/?articleid=2479
May 5, 2004
US Army Report on Iraqi Prisoner Abuse
HEARING
ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION
OF THE
800th MILITARY POLICE
BRIGADE
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
References .......................... 3
Background ......................... 6
Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism
Interrogation and Detention Operations
In Iraq (MG Miller's Assessment).................. 8
IO Comments on MG Miller's Assessment.............. 8
Report on Detention and Corrections
In Iraq (MG Ryder's Report).................. 9
IO Comments on MG Ryder's Report.................. 12
Preliminary Investigative Actions .................. 12
Findings and Recommendations
Part One (Detainee Abuse). .................. 15
Findings ...................... 15
Recommendations .................. 20
Part Two (Escapes and Accountability) ............... 22
Findings ...................... 22
Recommendations. ................... 31
Part Three (Command Climate, Etc.). ............... 34
Findings ...................... 36
Recommendations .................. 44
Other Findings/Observations ................... 49
Conclusion ........................ 50
Annexes ......................... 51
References
1. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949
2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, 12
August 1949
3. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea, 12 August 1949
4. Geneva Convention Protocol Relative to the Status of
Refugees, 1967
5. Geneva Convention Relative to the Status of Refugees,
1951
6. Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims, 12
August 1949
7. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949
8. DOD Directive 5100.69, "DOD Program for Prisoners of
War and other Detainees," 27 December 1972
9. DOD Directive 5100.77 "DOD Law of War Program," 10 July
1979
10. STANAG No. 2044, Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners
of War (PW) (Edition 5), 28 June 1994
11. STANAG No. 2033, Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW)
(Edition 6), 6 December 1994
12. AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel,
Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997
13. AR 190-47, The Army Corrections System, 15 August 1996
14. AR 190-14, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for
Law Enforcement and Security Duties, 12 March 1993
15. AR 195-5, Evidence Procedures, 28 August 1992
16. AR 190-11, Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition and
Explosives, 12 February 1998
17. AR 190-12, Military Police Working Dogs, 30 September
1993
18. AR 190-13, The Army Physical Security Program, 30
September 1993
19. AR 380-67, Personnel Security Program, 9 September 1988
20. AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security,
31 September 2000
21. AR 670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and
Insignia, 5 September 2003
22. AR 190-40, Serious Incident Report, 30 November 1993
23. AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and
Boards of Officers, 11 May 1988
24. AR 27-10, Military Justice, 6 September 2002
25. AR 635-200, Enlisted Personnel, 1 November 2000
26. AR 600-8-24, Officer Transfers and Discharges, 29 June
2002
27. AR 500-5, Army Mobilization, 6 July 1996
28. AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, 13 May 2002
29. AR 623-105, Officer Evaluation Reports, 1 April 1998
30. AR 175-9, Contractors Accompanying the Force, 29
October 1999
31. FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement
Operations, 1 August 2001
32. FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 22 March 2001
33. FM 3-19.4, Military Police Leaders' Handbook, 4 March
2002
34. FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations, 19 June 2000
35. FM 33-1-1, Psychological Operations Techniques and
Procedures, 5 May 1994
36. FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992
37. FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances, 25 November 1985
38. FM 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001
39. FM 101-5, Staff Organizations and Functions, 23 May
1984
40. FM 3-19.30, Physical Security, 8 January 2001
41. FM 3-21.5, Drill and Ceremonies, 7 July 2003
42. ARTEP 19-546-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military
Police Battalion (IR)
43. ARTEP 19-667-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military
Police Guard Company
44. ARTEP 19-647-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military
Police Escort Guard Company
45. STP 19-95B1-SM, Soldier's Manual, MOS 95B, Military
Police, Skill Level 1, 6 August 2002
46. STP 19-95C14-SM-TG, Soldier's Manual and Trainer's
Guide for MOS 95C Internment/Resettlement Specialist, Skill
Levels 1/2/3/4, 26 March 1999
47. STP 19-95C1-SM MOS 95C, Corrections Specialist, Skill
Level 1, Soldier's Manual, 30 September 2003
48. STP 19-95C24-SM-TG MOS 95C, Corrections Specialist,
Skill Levels 2/3/4, Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide, 30
September 2003
49. Assessment of DOD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and
Detention Operations in Iraq, (MG Geoffrey D. Miller,
Commander JTF-GTMO, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), 9 September 2003
50. Assessment of Detention and Corrections Operations in
Iraq, (MG Donald J. Ryder, Provost Marshal General), 6
November 2003
51. CJTF-7 FRAGO #1108, Subject: includes- para 3.C.8 &
3.C.8.A.1, Assignment of 205 MI BDE CDR Responsibilities for
the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF), 19 November
2003
52. CJTF-7 FRAGO #749, Subject: Intelligence and Evidence-
Led Detention Operations Relating to Detainees, 24 August
2003
53. 800th MP BDE FRAGO # 89, Subject: Rules of Engagement,
26 December 2003
54. CG CJTF-7 Memo: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-
Resistance Policy, 12 October 2003
55. CG CJTF-7 Memo: Dignity and Respect While Conducting
Operations, 13 December 2003
56. Uniform Code of Military Justice and Manual for Courts
Martial, 2002 Edition
ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE
800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
BACKGROUND
1. (U) On 19 January 2004, Lieutenant General (LTG) Ricardo
S. Sanchez, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Seven
(CJTF-7) requested that the Commander, US Central
Command, appoint an Investigating Officer (IO) in the
grade of Major General (MG) or above to investigate the
conduct of operations within the 800th Military Police
(MP) Brigade. LTG Sanchez requested an investigation of
detention and internment operations by the Brigade from 1
November 2003 to present. LTG Sanchez cited recent
reports of detainee abuse, escapes from confinement
facilities, and accountability lapses, which indicated
systemic problems within the brigade and suggested a lack
of clear standards, proficiency, and leadership. LTG
Sanchez requested a comprehensive and all-encompassing
inquiry to make findings and recommendations concerning
the fitness and performance of the 800th MP Brigade.
(ANNEX 2)
2. (U) On 24 January 2003, the Chief of Staff of US Central
Command (CENTCOM), MG R. Steven Whitcomb, on behalf of
the CENTCOM Commander, directed that the Commander,
Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), LTG
David D. McKiernan, conduct an investigation into the
800th MP Brigade's detention and internment operations
from 1 November 2003 to present. CENTCOM directed that
the investigation should inquire into all facts and
circumstances surrounding recent reports of suspected
detainee abuse in Iraq. It also directed that the
investigation inquire into detainee escapes and
accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, and to gain
a more comprehensive and all-encompassing inquiry into
the fitness and performance of the 800th MP Brigade.
(ANNEX 3)
3. (U) On 31 January 2004, the Commander, CFLCC, appointed
MG Antonio M. Taguba, Deputy Commanding General Support,
CFLCC, to conduct this investigation. MG Taguba was
directed to conduct an informal investigation under AR 15-
6 into the 800th MP Brigade's detention and internment
operations. Specifically, MG Taguba was tasked to:
a. (U) Inquire into all the facts and circumstances
surrounding recent allegations of detainee abuse,
specifically allegations of maltreatment at the Abu
Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility
(BCCF));
b. (U) Inquire into detainee escapes and accountability
lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically allegations
concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib Prison;
c. (U) Investigate the training, standards, employment,
command policies, internal procedures, and command
climate in the 800th MP Brigade, as appropriate;
d. (U) Make specific findings of fact concerning all
aspects of the investigation, and make any
recommendations for corrective action, as appropriate.
(ANNEX 4)
4. (U) LTG Sanchez's request to investigate the 800th MP
Brigade followed the initiation of a criminal
investigation by the US Army Criminal Investigation
Command (USACIDC) into specific allegations of detainee
abuse committed by members of the 372nd MP Company, 320th
MP Battalion in Iraq. These units are part of the 800th
MP Brigade. The Brigade is an Iraq Theater asset, TACON
to CJTF-7, but OPCON to CFLCC at the time this
investigation was initiated. In addition, CJTF-7 had
several reports of detainee escapes from US/Coalition
Confinement Facilities in Iraq over the past several
months. These include Camp Bucca, Camp Ashraf, Abu
Ghraib, and the High Value Detainee (HVD) Complex/Camp
Cropper. The 800th MP Brigade operated these facilities.
In addition, four Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion
had been formally charged under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) with detainee abuse in May 2003
at the Theater Internment Facility (TIF) at Camp Bucca,
Iraq. (ANNEXES 5-18, 34 and 35)
5. (U) I began assembling my investigation team prior to
the actual appointment by the CFLCC Commander. I
assembled subject matter experts from the CFLCC Provost
Marshal (PM) and the CFLCC Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). I
selected COL Kinard J. La Fate, CFLCC Provost Marshal to
be my Deputy for this investigation. I also contacted
the Provost Marshal General of the Army, MG Donald J.
Ryder, to enlist the support of MP subject matter experts
in the areas of detention and internment operations.
(ANNEXES 4 and 19)
6. (U) The Investigating Team also reviewed the Assessment
of DoD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention
Operations in Iraq conducted by MG Geoffrey D. Miller,
Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). From
31 August to 9 September 2003, MG Miller led a team of
personnel experienced in strategic interrogation to HQ,
CJTF-7 and the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) to review current
Iraqi Theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for
actionable intelligence. MG Miller's team focused on
three areas: intelligence integration, synchronization,
and fusion; interrogation operations; and detention
operations. MG Miller's team used JTF-GTMO procedures
and interrogation authorities as baselines. (ANNEX 20)
7. (U) The Investigating Team began its inquiry with an in-
depth analysis of the Report on Detention and Corrections
in Iraq, dated 5 November 2003, conducted by MG Ryder and
a team of military police, legal, medical, and automation
experts. The CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, had
previously requested a team of subject matter experts to
assess, and make specific recommendations concerning
detention and corrections operations. From 13 October to
6 November 2003, MG Ryder personally led this
assessment/assistance team in Iraq. (ANNEX 19)
ASSESSMENT OF DoD COUNTER-TERRORISM INTERROGATION AND
DETENTION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ (MG MILLER'S ASSESSMENT)
1. (S/NF) The principal focus of MG Miller's team was on
the strategic interrogation of detainees/internees in
Iraq. Among its conclusions in its Executive Summary
were that CJTF-7 did not have authorities and procedures
in place to affect a unified strategy to detain,
interrogate, and report information from
detainees/internees in Iraq. The Executive Summary also
stated that detention operations must act as an enabler
for interrogation. (ANNEX 20)
2. (S/NF) With respect to interrogation, MG Miller's Team
recommended that CJTF-7 dedicate and train a detention
guard force subordinate to the Joint Interrogation
Debriefing Center (JIDC) Commander that "sets the
conditions for the successful interrogation and
exploitation of internees/detainees." Regarding
Detention Operations, MG Miller's team stated that the
function of Detention Operations is to provide a safe,
secure, and humane environment that supports the
expeditious collection of intelligence. However, it also
stated "it is essential that the guard force be actively
engaged in setting the conditions for successful
exploitation of the internees." (ANNEX 20)
3. (S/NF) MG Miller's team also concluded that Joint
Strategic Interrogation Operations (within CJTF-7) are
hampered by lack of active control of the internees
within the detention environment. The Miller Team also
stated that establishment of the Theater Joint
Interrogation and Detention Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF) will consolidate both detention and strategic
interrogation operations and result in synergy between MP
and MI resources and an integrated, synchronized, and
focused strategic interrogation effort. (ANNEX 20)
4. (S/NF) MG Miller's team also observed that the
application of emerging strategic interrogation
strategies and techniques contain new approaches and
operational art. The Miller Team also concluded that a
legal review and recommendations on internee
interrogation operations by a dedicated Command Judge
Advocate is required to maximize interrogation
effectiveness. (ANNEX 20)
IO COMMENTS ON MG MILLER'S ASSESSMENT
1. (S/NF) MG Miller's team recognized that they were using
JTF-GTMO operational procedures and interrogation
authorities as baselines for its observations and
recommendations. There is a strong argument that the
intelligence value of detainees held at JTF-Guantanamo
(GTMO) is different than that of the detainees/internees
held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and other detention facilities
in Iraq. Currently, there are a large number of Iraqi
criminals held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). These are not
believed to be international terrorists or members of Al
Qaida, Anser Al Islam, Taliban, and other international
terrorist organizations. (ANNEX 20)
2. (S/NF) The recommendations of MG Miller's team that the
"guard force" be actively engaged in setting the
conditions for successful exploitation of the internees
would appear to be in conflict with the recommendations
of MG Ryder's Team and AR 190-8 that military police "do
not participate in military intelligence supervised
interrogation sessions." The Ryder Report concluded that
the OEF template whereby military police actively set the
favorable conditions for subsequent interviews runs
counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility.
(ANNEX 20)
REPORT ON DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS
IN IRAQ (MG RYDER'S REPORT)
1. (U) MG Ryder and his assessment team conducted a
comprehensive review of the entire detainee and
corrections system in Iraq and provided recommendations
addressing each of the following areas as requested by
the Commander CJTF-7:
a. (U) Detainee and corrections system management
b. (U) Detainee management, including detainee
movement, segregation, and accountability
c. (U) Means of command and control of the detention
and corrections system
d. (U) Integration of military detention and
corrections with the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) and adequacy of plans for transition to an Iraqi-
run corrections system
e. (U) Detainee medical care and health management
f. (U) Detention facilities that meet required
health, hygiene, and sanitation standards
g. (U) Court integration and docket management for
criminal detainees
h. (U) Detainee legal processing
i. (U) Detainee databases and records, including
integration with law enforcement and court databases
(ANNEX 19)
2. (U) Many of the findings and recommendations of MG
Ryder's team are beyond the scope of this investigation.
However, several important findings are clearly relevant
to this inquiry and are summarized below (emphasis is
added in certain areas):
A. (U) Detainee Management (including movement,
segregation, and accountability)
1. (U) There is a wide variance in standards and
approaches at the various detention facilities.
Several Division/Brigade collection points and US
monitored Iraqi prisons had flawed or insufficiently
detailed use of force and other standing operating
procedures or policies (e.g. weapons in the facility,
improper restraint techniques, detainee management,
etc.) Though, there were no military police units
purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices.
(ANNEX 19)
2. (U) Currently, due to lack of adequate Iraqi
facilities, Iraqi criminals (generally Iraqi-on-Iraqi
crimes) are detained with security internees (generally
Iraqi-on-Coalition offenses) and EPWs in the same
facilities, though segregated in different
cells/compounds. (ANNEX 19)
3. (U) The management of multiple disparate groups of
detained people in a single location by members of the
same unit invites confusion about handling, processing,
and treatment, and typically facilitates the transfer
of information between different categories of
detainees. (ANNEX 19)
4. (U) The 800th MP (I/R) units did not receive
Internment/Resettlement (I/R) and corrections specific
training during their mobilization period. Corrections
training is only on the METL of two MP (I/R)
Confinement Battalions throughout the Army, one
currently serving in Afghanistan, and elements of the
other are at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. MP units supporting
JTF-GTMO received ten days of training in detention
facility operations, to include two days of unarmed
self-defense, training in interpersonal communication
skills, forced cell moves, and correctional officer
safety. (ANNEX 19)
B. (U) Means of Command and Control of the Detention and
Corrections System
1. (U) The 800th MP Brigade was originally task
organized with eight MP(I/R) Battalions consisting of
both MP Guard and Combat Support companies. Due to
force rotation plans, the 800th redeployed two
Battalion HHCs in December 2003, the 115th MP Battalion
and the 324th MP Battalion. In December 2003, the
400th MP Battalion was relieved of its mission and
redeployed in January 2004. The 724th MP Battalion
redeployed on 11 February 2004 and the remainder is
scheduled to redeploy in March and April 2004. They
are the 310th MP Battalion, 320th MP Battalion, 530th
MP Battalion, and 744th MP Battalion. The units that
remain are generally understrength, as Reserve
Component units do not have an individual personnel
replacement system to mitigate medical losses or the
departure of individual Soldiers that have reached 24
months of Federal active duty in a five-year period.
(ANNEX 19)
2. (U) The 800th MP Brigade (I/R) is currently a CFLCC
asset, TACON to CJTF-7 to conduct
Internment/Resettlement (I/R) operations in Iraq. All
detention operations are conducted in the CJTF-7 AO;
Camps Ganci, Vigilant, Bucca, TSP Whitford, and a
separate High Value Detention (HVD) site. (ANNEX 19)
3. (U) The 800th MP Brigade has experienced challenges
adapting its task organizational structure, training,
and equipment resources from a unit designed to conduct
standard EPW operations in the COMMZ (Kuwait).
Further, the doctrinally trained MP Soldier-to-detainee
population ratio and facility layout templates are
predicated on a compliant, self-disciplining EPW
population, and not criminals or high-risk security
internees. (ANNEX 19)
4. (U) EPWs and Civilian Internees should receive the
full protections of the Geneva Conventions, unless the
denial of these protections is due to specifically
articulated military necessity (e.g., no visitation to
preclude the direction of insurgency operations).
(ANNEXES 19 and 24)
5. (U) AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained
Personnel, Civilian Internees, and other Detainees, FM
3-19.40, Military Police Internment and Resettlement
Operations, and FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogations,
require military police to provide an area for
intelligence collection efforts within EPW facilities.
Military Police, though adept at passive collection of
intelligence within a facility, do not participate in
Military Intelligence supervised interrogation
sessions. Recent intelligence collection in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom posited a template whereby
military police actively set favorable conditions for
subsequent interviews. Such actions generally run
counter to the smooth operation of a detention
facility, attempting to maintain its population in a
compliant and docile state. The 800th MP Brigade has
not been directed to change its facility procedures to
set the conditions for MI interrogations, nor
participate in those interrogations. (ANNEXES 19 and
21-23)
6. MG Ryder's Report also made the following, inter
alia, near-term and mid-term recommendations regarding
the command and control of detainees:
a. (U) Align the release process for security
internees with DoD Policy. The process of
screening security internees should include
intelligence findings, interrogation results, and
current threat assessment.
b. (U) Determine the scope of intelligence collection that
will occur at Camp Vigilant. Refurbish the Northeast
Compound to separate the screening operation from the Iraqi
run Baghdad Central Correctional Facility. Establish
procedures that define the role of military police Soldiers
securing the compound, clearly separating the actions of the
guards from those of the military intelligence personnel.
c. (U) Consolidate all Security Internee
Operations, except the MEK security mission, under
a single Military Police Brigade Headquarters for
OIF 2.
d. (U) Insist that all units identified to rotate
into the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO) to
conduct internment and confinement operations in
support of OIF 2 be organic to CJTF-7. (ANNEX 19)
IO COMMENTS REGARDING MG RYDER'S REPORT
1. (U) The objective of MG Ryder's Team was to observe
detention and prison operations, identify potential
systemic and human rights issues, and provide near-term,
mid-term, and long-term recommendations to improve CJTF-7
operations and transition of the Iraqi prison system from
US military control/oversight to the Coalition
Provisional Authority and eventually to the Iraqi
Government. The Findings and Recommendations of MG
Ryder's Team are thorough and precise and should be
implemented immediately. (ANNEX 19)
2. (U) Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that
surfaced during MG Ryder's Team's assessment are the very
same issues that are the subject of this investigation.
In fact, many of the abuses suffered by detainees
occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment.
As will be pointed out in detail in subsequent portions
of this report, I disagree with the conclusion of MG
Ryder's Team in one critical aspect, that being its
conclusion that the 800th MP Brigade had not been asked
to change its facility procedures to set the conditions
for MI interviews. While clearly the 800th MP Brigade
and its commanders were not tasked to set conditions for
detainees for subsequent MI interrogations, it is obvious
from a review of comprehensive CID interviews of suspects
and witnesses that this was done at lower levels. (ANNEX
19)
3. (U) I concur fully with MG Ryder's conclusion regarding
the effect of AR 190-8. Military Police, though adept at
passive collection of intelligence within a facility,
should not participate in Military Intelligence
supervised interrogation sessions. Moreover, Military
Police should not be involved with setting "favorable
conditions" for subsequent interviews. These actions, as
will be outlined in this investigation, clearly run
counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility.
(ANNEX 19)
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS
1. (U) Following our review of MG Ryder's Report and MG
Miller's Report, my investigation team immediately began
an in-depth review of all available documents regarding
the 800th MP Brigade. We reviewed in detail the
voluminous CID investigation regarding alleged detainee
abuses at detention facilities in Iraq, particularly the
Abu Ghraib (BCCF) Detention Facility. We analyzed
approximately fifty witness statements from military
police and military intelligence personnel, potential
suspects, and detainees. We reviewed numerous photos and
videos of actual detainee abuse taken by detention
facility personnel, which are now in the custody and
control of the US Army Criminal Investigation Command and
the CJTF-7 prosecution team. The photos and videos are
not contained in this investigation. We obtained copies
of the 800th MP Brigade roster, rating chain, and
assorted internal investigations and disciplinary actions
involving that command for the past several months. (All
ANNEXES Reviewed by Investigation Team)
2. (U) In addition to military police and legal officers
from the CFLCC PMO and SJA Offices we also obtained the
services of two individuals who are experts in military
police detention practices and training. These were LTC
Timothy Weathersbee, Commander, 705th MP Battalion,
United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth,
and SFC Edward Baldwin, Senior Corrections Advisor, US
Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood. I also
requested and received the services of Col (Dr) Henry
Nelson, a trained US Air Force psychiatrist assigned to
assist my investigation team. (ANNEX 4)
3. (U) In addition to MG Ryder's and MG Miller's Reports,
the team reviewed numerous reference materials including
the 12 October 2003 CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-
Resistance Policy, the AR 15-6 Investigation on Riot and
Shootings at Abu Ghraib on 24 November 2003, the 205th MI
Brigade's Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE),
facility staff logs/journals and numerous records of AR
15-6 investigations and Serious Incident Reports (SIRs)
on detainee escapes/shootings and disciplinary matters
from the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEXES 5-20, 37, 93, and
94)
4. (U) On 2 February 2004, I took my team to Baghdad for a
one-day inspection of the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF) and
the High Value Detainee (HVD) Complex in order to become
familiar with those facilities. We also met with COL
Jerry Mocello, Commander, 3rd MP Criminal Investigation
Group (CID), COL Dave Quantock, Commander, 16th MP
Brigade, COL Dave Phillips, Commander, 89th MP Brigade,
and COL Ed Sannwaldt, CJTF-7 Provost Marshal. On 7
February 2004, the team visited the Camp Bucca Detention
Facility to familiarize itself with the facility and
operating structure. In addition, on 6 and 7 February
2004, at Camp Doha, Kuwait, we conducted extensive
training sessions on approved detention practices. We
continued our preparation by reviewing the ongoing CID
investigation and were briefed by the Special Agent in
Charge, CW2 Paul Arthur. We refreshed ourselves on the
applicable reference materials within each team member's
area of expertise, and practiced investigative
techniques. I met with the team on numerous occasions to
finalize appropriate witness lists, review existing
witness statements, arrange logistics, and collect
potential evidence. We also coordinated with CJTF-7 to
arrange witness attendance, force protection measures,
and general logistics for the team's move to Baghdad on 8
February 2004. (ANNEXES 4 and 25)
5. (U) At the same time, due to the Transfer of Authority
on 1 February 2004 between III Corps and V Corps, and the
upcoming demobilization of the 800th MP Brigade Command,
I directed that several critical witnesses who were
preparing to leave the theater remain at Camp Arifjan,
Kuwait until they could be interviewed (ANNEX 29). My
team deployed to Baghdad on 8 February 2004 and conducted
a series of interviews with a variety of witnesses (ANNEX
30). We returned to Camp Doha, Kuwait on 13 February
2004. On 14 and 15 February we interviewed a number of
witnesses from the 800th MP Brigade. On 17 February we
returned to Camp Bucca, Iraq to complete interviews of
witnesses at that location. From 18 February thru 28
February we collected documents, compiled references, did
follow-up interviews, and completed a detailed analysis
of the volumes of materials accumulated throughout our
investigation. On 29 February we finalized our executive
summary and out-briefing slides. On 9 March we submitted
the AR 15-6 written report with findings and
recommendations to the CFLCC Deputy SJA, LTC Mark
Johnson, for a legal sufficiency review. The out-brief
to the appointing authority, LTG McKiernan, took place on
3 March 2004. (ANNEXES 26 and 45-91)
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART ONE)
(U) The investigation should inquire into all of the facts
and circumstances surrounding recent allegations of detainee
abuse, specifically, allegations of maltreatment at the Abu
Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility).
1. (U) The US Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID),
led by COL Jerry Mocello, and a team of highly trained
professional agents have done a superb job of
investigating several complex and extremely disturbing
incidents of detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Prison.
They conducted over 50 interviews of witnesses, potential
criminal suspects, and detainees. They also uncovered
numerous photos and videos portraying in graphic detail
detainee abuse by Military Police personnel on numerous
occasions from October to December 2003. Several
potential suspects rendered full and complete confessions
regarding their personal involvement and the involvement
of fellow Soldiers in this abuse. Several potential
suspects invoked their rights under Article 31 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the 5th
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (ANNEX 25)
2. (U) In addition to a comprehensive and exhaustive review
of all of these statements and documentary evidence, we
also interviewed numerous officers, NCOs, and junior
enlisted Soldiers in the 800th MP Brigade, as well as
members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade
working at the prison. We did not believe it was
necessary to re-interview all the numerous witnesses who
had previously provided comprehensive statements to CID,
and I have adopted those statements for the purposes of
this investigation. (ANNEXES 26, 34, 35, and 45-91)
REGARDING PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE
FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. (U) That Forward Operating Base (FOB) Abu Ghraib (BCCF)
provides security of both criminal and security detainees
at the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility, facilitates
the conducting of interrogations for CJTF-7, supports
other CPA operations at the prison, and enhances the
force protection/quality of life of Soldiers assigned in
order to ensure the success of ongoing operations to
secure a free Iraq. (ANNEX 31)
2. (U) That the Commander, 205th Military Intelligence
Brigade, was designated by CJTF-7 as the Commander of FOB
Abu Ghraib (BCCF) effective 19 November 2003. That the
205th MI Brigade conducts operational and strategic
interrogations for CJTF-7. That from 19 November 2003
until Transfer of Authority (TOA) on 6 February 2004, COL
Thomas M. Pappas was the Commander of the 205th MI
Brigade and the Commander of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
(ANNEX 31)
3. (U) That the 320th Military Police Battalion of the
800th MP Brigade is responsible for the Guard Force at
Camp Ganci, Camp Vigilant, & Cellblock 1 of FOB Abu
Ghraib (BCCF). That from February 2003 to until he was
suspended from his duties on 17 January 2004, LTC Jerry
Phillabaum served as the Battalion Commander of the 320th
MP Battalion. That from December 2002 until he was
suspended from his duties, on 17 January 2004, CPT Donald
Reese served as the Company Commander of the 372nd MP
Company, which was in charge of guarding detainees at FOB
Abu Ghraib. I further find that both the 320th MP
Battalion and the 372nd MP Company were located within
the confines of FOB Abu Ghraib. (ANNEXES 32 and 45)
4. (U) That from July of 2003 to the present, BG Janis L.
Karpinski was the Commander of the 800th MP Brigade.
(ANNEX 45)
5. (S) That between October and December 2003, at the Abu
Ghraib Confinement Facility (BCCF), numerous incidents of
sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses were
inflicted on several detainees. This systemic and
illegal abuse of detainees was intentionally perpetrated
by several members of the military police guard force
(372nd Military Police Company, 320th Military Police
Battalion, 800th MP Brigade), in Tier (section) 1-A of
the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF). The allegations of abuse
were substantiated by detailed witness statements (ANNEX
26) and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic
evidence. Due to the extremely sensitive nature of these
photographs and videos, the ongoing CID investigation,
and the potential for the criminal prosecution of several
suspects, the photographic evidence is not included in
the body of my investigation. The pictures and videos
are available from the Criminal Investigative Command and
the CTJF-7 prosecution team. In addition to the
aforementioned crimes, there were also abuses committed
by members of the 325th MI Battalion, 205th MI Brigade,
and Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC).
Specifically, on 24 November 2003, SPC Luciana Spencer,
205th MI Brigade, sought to degrade a detainee by having
him strip and returned to cell naked. (ANNEXES 26 and
53)
6. (S) I find that the intentional abuse of detainees by
military police personnel included the following acts:
a. (S) Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees;
jumping on their naked feet;
b. (S) Videotaping and photographing naked male and
female detainees;
c. (S) Forcibly arranging detainees in various
sexually explicit positions for photographing;
d. (S) Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and
keeping them naked for several days at a time;
e. (S) Forcing naked male detainees to wear women's
underwear;
f. (S) Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate
themselves while being photographed and videotaped;
g. (S) Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and
then jumping on them;
h. (S) Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box,
with a sandbag on his head, and attaching wires to his
fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture;
i. (S) Writing "I am a Rapest" (sic) on the leg of a
detainee alleged to have forcibly raped a 15-year old
fellow detainee, and then photographing him naked;
j. (S) Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked
detainee's neck and having a female Soldier pose for a
picture;
k. (S) A male MP guard having sex with a female
detainee;
l. (S) Using military working dogs (without muzzles)
to intimidate and frighten detainees, and in at least
one case biting and severely injuring a detainee;
m. (S) Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees.
(ANNEXES 25 and 26)
7. (U) These findings are amply supported by written
confessions provided by several of the suspects, written
statements provided by detainees, and witness statements.
In reaching my findings, I have carefully considered the
pre-existing statements of the following witnesses and
suspects (ANNEX 26):
a. (U) SPC Jeremy Sivits, 372nd MP Company - Suspect
b. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company - Suspect
c. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company - Suspect
c. (U) PFC Lynndie R. England, 372nd MP Company -
Suspect
d. (U) Adel Nakhla, Civilian Translator, Titan Corp.,
Assigned to the 205th MI Brigade- Suspect
e. (U) SPC Joseph M. Darby, 372nd MP Company
f. (U) SGT Neil A. Wallin, 109th Area Support Medical
Battalion
g (U) SGT Samuel Jefferson Provance, 302nd MI
Battalion
h (U) Torin S. Nelson, Contractor, Titan Corp.,
Assigned to the 205th MI Brigade
j. (U) CPL Matthew Scott Bolanger, 372nd MP
Company
k. (U) SPC Mathew C. Wisdom, 372nd MP Company
l. (U) SSG Reuben R. Layton, Medic, 109th Medical
Detachment
m. (U) SPC John V. Polak, 229th MP Company
8. (U) In addition, several detainees also described the
following acts of abuse, which under the circumstances, I
find credible based on the clarity of their statements
and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses
(ANNEX 26):
a. (U) Breaking chemical lights and pouring the
phosphoric liquid on detainees;
b. (U) Threatening detainees with a charged 9mm pistol;
c. (U) Pouring cold water on naked detainees;
d. (U) Beating detainees with a broom handle and a
chair;
e. (U) Threatening male detainees with rape;
f. (U) Allowing a military police guard to stitch the
wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed
against the wall in his cell;
g. (U) Sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and
perhaps a broom stick.
h. (U) Using military working dogs to frighten and
intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one
instance actually biting a detainee.
9. (U) I have carefully considered the statements provided
by the following detainees, which under the circumstances
I find credible based on the clarity of their statements
and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses:
a. (U) Amjed Isail Waleed, Detainee # 151365
b. (U) Hiadar Saber Abed Miktub-Aboodi, Detainee #
13077
c. (U) Huessin Mohssein Al-Zayiadi, Detainee # 19446
d. (U) Kasim Mehaddi Hilas, Detainee # 151108
e. (U) Mohanded Juma Juma (sic), Detainee # 152307
f. (U) Mustafa Jassim Mustafa, Detainee # 150542
g. (U) Shalan Said Alsharoni, Detainee, # 150422
h. (U) Abd Alwhab Youss, Detainee # 150425
i. (U) Asad Hamza Hanfosh, Detainee # 152529
j. (U) Nori Samir Gunbar Al-Yasseri, Detainee # 7787
k. (U) Thaar Salman Dawod, Detainee # 150427
l. (U) Ameen Sa'eed Al-Sheikh, Detainee # 151362
m. (U) Abdou Hussain Saad Faleh, Detainee # 18470
(ANNEX 26)
10. (U) I find that contrary to the provision of AR 190-8,
and the findings found in MG Ryder's Report, Military
Intelligence (MI) interrogators and Other US Government
Agency's (OGA) interrogators actively requested that MP
guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable
interrogation of witnesses. Contrary to the findings of
MG Ryder's Report, I find that personnel assigned to the
372nd MP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed to
change facility procedures to "set the conditions" for MI
interrogations. I find no direct evidence that MP
personnel actually participated in those MI
interrogations. (ANNEXES 19, 21, 25, and 26).
11. (U) I reach this finding based on the actual proven
abuse that I find was inflicted on detainees and by the
following witness statements. (ANNEXES 25 and 26):
a. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company, stated in
her sworn statement regarding the incident where a
detainee was placed on a box with wires attached to his
fingers, toes, and penis, "that her job was to keep
detainees awake." She stated that MI was talking to CPL
Grainer. She stated: "MI wanted to get them to talk.
It is Grainer and Frederick's job to do things for MI
and OGA to get these people to talk."
b. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company, stated in
his sworn statement as follows: "I witnessed prisoners
in the MI hold section, wing 1A being made to do various
things that I would question morally. In Wing 1A we
were told that they had different rules and different
SOP for treatment. I never saw a set of rules or SOP
for that section just word of mouth. The Soldier in
charge of 1A was Corporal Granier. He stated that the
Agents and MI Soldiers would ask him to do things, but
nothing was ever in writing he would complain (sic)."
When asked why the rules in 1A/1B were different than
the rest of the wings, SGT Davis stated: "The rest of
the wings are regular prisoners and 1A/B are Military
Intelligence (MI) holds." When asked why he did not
inform his chain of command about this abuse, SGT Davis
stated: " Because I assumed that if they were doing
things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines,
someone would have said something. Also the wing
belongs to MI and it appeared MI personnel approved of
the abuse." SGT Davis also stated that he had heard MI
insinuate to the guards to abuse the inmates. When
asked what MI said he stated: "Loosen this guy up for
us." Make sure he has a bad night." "Make sure he gets
the treatment." He claimed these comments were made to
CPL Granier and SSG Frederick. Finally, SGT Davis
stated that (sic): "the MI staffs to my understanding
have been giving Granier compliments on the way he has
been handling the MI holds. Example being statements
like, "Good job, they're breaking down real fast. They
answer every question. They're giving out good
information, Finally, and Keep up the good work . Stuff
like that."
c. (U) SPC Jason Kennel, 372nd MP Company, was asked
if he were present when any detainees were abused. He
stated: "I saw them nude, but MI would tell us to take
away their mattresses, sheets, and clothes." He could
not recall who in MI had instructed him to do this, but
commented that, "if they wanted me to do that they
needed to give me paperwork." He was later informed
that "we could not do anything to embarrass the
prisoners."
d. (U) Mr. Adel L. Nakhla, a US civilian contract
translator was questioned about several detainees
accused of rape. He observed (sic): "They (detainees)
were all naked, a bunch of people from MI, the MP were
there that night and the inmates were ordered by SGT
Granier and SGT Frederick ordered the guys while
questioning them to admit what they did. They made them
do strange exercises by sliding on their stomach, jump
up and down, throw water on them and made them some wet,
called them all kinds of names such as "gays" do they
like to make love to guys, then they handcuffed their
hands together and their legs with shackles and started
to stack them on top of each other by insuring that the
bottom guys penis will touch the guy on tops butt."
e. (U) SPC Neil A Wallin, 109th Area Support Medical
Battalion, a medic testified that: "Cell 1A was used to
house high priority detainees and cell 1B was used to
house the high risk or trouble making detainees. During
my tour at the prison I observed that when the male
detainees were first brought to the facility, some of
them were made to wear female underwear, which I think
was to somehow break them down."
12. (U) I find that prior to its deployment to Iraq for
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 320th MP Battalion and the
372nd MP Company had received no training in
detention/internee operations. I also find that very
little instruction or training was provided to MP
personnel on the applicable rules of the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
FM 27-10, AR 190-8, or FM 3-19.40. Moreover, I find that
few, if any, copies of the Geneva Conventions were ever
made available to MP personnel or detainees. (ANNEXES 21-
24, 33, and multiple witness statements)
13. (U) Another obvious example of the Brigade Leadership
not communicating with its Soldiers or ensuring their
tactical proficiency concerns the incident of detainee
abuse that occurred at Camp Bucca, Iraq, on May 12, 2003.
Soldiers from the 223rd MP Company reported to the 800th
MP Brigade Command at Camp Bucca, that four Military
Police Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had abused a
number of detainees during inprocessing at Camp Bucca.
An extensive CID investigation determined that four
soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had kicked and
beaten these detainees following a transport mission from
Talil Air Base. (ANNEXES 34 and 35)
14. (U) Formal charges under the UCMJ were preferred
against these Soldiers and an Article-32 Investigation
conducted by LTC Gentry. He recommended a general court
martial for the four accused, which BG Karpinski
supported. Despite this documented abuse, there is no
evidence that BG Karpinski ever attempted to remind 800th
MP Soldiers of the requirements of the Geneva Conventions
regarding detainee treatment or took any steps to ensure
that such abuse was not repeated. Nor is there any
evidence that LTC(P) Phillabaum, the commander of the
Soldiers involved in the Camp Bucca abuse incident, took
any initiative to ensure his Soldiers were properly
trained regarding detainee treatment. (ANNEXES 35 and
62)
RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION:
1. (U) Immediately deploy to the Iraq Theater an integrated
multi-discipline Mobile Training Team (MTT) comprised of
subject matter experts in internment/resettlement
operations, international and operational law,
information technology, facility management,
interrogation and intelligence gathering techniques,
chaplains, Arab cultural awareness, and medical practices
as it pertains to I/R activities. This team needs to
oversee and conduct comprehensive training in all aspects
of detainee and confinement operations.
2. (U) That all military police and military intelligence
personnel involved in any aspect of detainee operations
or interrogation operations in CJTF-7, and subordinate
units, be immediately provided with training by an
international/operational law attorney on the specific
provisions of The Law of Land Warfare FM 27-10,
specifically the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Enemy Prisoners of War,
Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other
Detainees, and AR 190-8.
3. (U) That a single commander in CJTF-7 be responsible for
overall detainee operations throughout the Iraq Theater
of Operations. I also recommend that the Provost Marshal
General of the Army assign a minimum of two (2) subject
matter experts, one officer and one NCO, to assist CJTF-7
in coordinating detainee operations.
4. (U) That detention facility commanders and interrogation
facility commanders ensure that appropriate copies of the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War and notice of protections be made available in
both English and the detainees' language and be
prominently displayed in all detention facilities.
Detainees with questions regarding their treatment should
be given the full opportunity to read the Convention.
5. (U) That each detention facility commander and
interrogation facility commander publish a complete and
comprehensive set of Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs)
regarding treatment of detainees, and that all personnel
be required to read the SOPs and sign a document
indicating that they have read and understand the SOPs.
6. (U) That in accordance with the recommendations of MG
Ryder's Assessment Report, and my findings and
recommendations in this investigation, all units in the
Iraq Theater of Operations conducting
internment/confinement/detainment operations in support
of Operation Iraqi Freedom be OPCON for all purposes, to
include action under the UCMJ, to CJTF-7.
7. (U) Appoint the C3, CJTF as the staff proponent for
detainee operations in the Iraq Joint Operations Area
(JOA). (MG Tom Miller, C3, CJTF-7, has been appointed by
COMCJTF-7).
8. (U) That an inquiry UP AR 381-10, Procedure 15 be
conducted to determine the extent of culpability of
Military Intelligence personnel, assigned to the 205th MI
Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center
(JIDC) regarding abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
9. (U) That it is critical that the proponent for detainee
operations is assigned a dedicated Senior Judge Advocate,
with specialized training and knowledge of international
and operational law, to assist and advise on matters of
detainee operations.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART TWO)
(U) The Investigation inquire into detainee escapes and
accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically
allegations concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib
Prison:
REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION,
I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. The 800th MP Brigade was responsible for theater-wide
Internment and Resettlement (I/R) operations. (ANNEXES 45
and 95)
2. (U) The 320th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked
with detainee operations at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex
during the time period covered in this investigation.
(ANNEXES 41, 45, and 59)
3. (U) The 310th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked
with detainee operations and Forward Operating Base (FOB)
Operations at the Camp Bucca Detention Facility until TOA on
26 February 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 52)
4. (U) The 744th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked
with detainee operations and FOB Operations at the HVD
Detention Facility until TOA on 4 March 2004. (ANNEXES 41
and 55)
5. (U) The 530th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked
with detainee operations and FOB Operations at the MEK
holding facility until TOA on 15 March 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and
97)
6. (U) Detainee operations include accountability, care,
and well being of Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Person,
Civilian Detainees, and Other Detainees, as well as Iraqi
criminal prisoners. (ANNEX 22)
7. (U) The accountability for detainees is doctrinally an
MP task IAW FM 3-19.40. (ANNEX 22)
8. (U) There is a general lack of knowledge,
implementation, and emphasis of basic legal, regulatory,
doctrinal, and command requirements within the 800th MP
Brigade and its subordinate units. (Multiple witness
statements in ANNEXES 45-91).
9.
(U) The handling of detainees and criminal prisoners after
in-processing was inconsistent from detention facility to
detention facility, compound to compound, encampment to
encampment, and even shift to shift throughout the 800th MP
Brigade AOR. (ANNEX 37)
10. (U) Camp Bucca, operated by the 310th MP Battalion, had
a "Criminal Detainee In-Processing SOP" and a "Training
Outline" for transferring and releasing detainees, which
appears to have been followed. (ANNEXES 38 and 52)
11. (U) Incoming and outgoing detainees are being
documented in the National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS)
and Biometric Automated Toolset System (BATS) as required by
regulation at all detention facilities. However, it is
underutilized and often does not give a "real time" accurate
picture of the detainee population due to untimely updating.
(ANNEX 56)
12. (U) There was a severe lapse in the accountability of
detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex. The 320th MP
Battalion used a self-created "change sheet" to document the
transfer of a detainee from one location to another. For
proper accountability, it is imperative that these change
sheets be processed and the detainee manifest be updated
within 24 hours of movement. At Abu Ghraib, this process
would often take as long as 4 days to complete. This lag-
time resulted in inaccurate detainee Internment Serial
Number (ISN) counts, gross differences in the detainee
manifest and the actual occupants of an individual compound,
and significant confusion of the MP Soldiers. The 320th MP
Battalion S-1, CPT Theresa Delbalso, and the S-3, MAJ David
DiNenna, explained that this breakdown was due to the lack
of manpower to process change sheets in a timely manner.
(ANNEXES 39 and 98)
13. (U) The 320th Battalion TACSOP requires detainee
accountability at least 4 times daily at Abu Ghraib.
However, a detailed review of their operational journals
revealed that these accounts were often not done or not
documented by the unit. Additionally, there is no indication
that accounting errors or the loss of a detainee in the
accounting process triggered any immediate corrective action
by the Battalion TOC. (ANNEX 44)
14. (U) There is a lack of standardization in the way the
320th MP Battalion conducted physical counts of their
detainees. Each compound within a given encampment did
their headcounts differently. Some compounds had detainees
line up in lines of 10, some had them sit in rows, and some
moved all the detainees to one end of the compound and
counted them as they passed to the other end of the
compound. (ANNEX 98)
15. (U) FM 3-19.40 outlines the need for 2 roll calls (100%
ISN band checks) per day. The 320th MP Battalion did this
check only 2 times per week. Due to the lack of real-time
updates to the system, these checks were regularly
inaccurate. (ANNEXES 22 and 98)
16. (U) The 800th MP Brigade and subordinate units adopted
non-doctrinal terms such as "band checks," "roll-ups," and
"call-ups," which contributed to the lapses in
accountability and confusion at the soldier level. (ANNEXES
63, 88, and 98)
17. (U) Operational journals at the various compounds and
the 320th Battalion TOC contained numerous unprofessional
entries and flippant comments, which highlighted the lack of
discipline within the unit. There was no indication that
the journals were ever reviewed by anyone in their chain of
command. (ANNEX 37)
18. (U) Accountability SOPs were not fully developed and
standing TACSOPs were widely ignored. Any SOPs that did
exist were not trained on, and were never distributed to the
lowest level. Most procedures were shelved at the unit TOC,
rather than at the subordinate units and guards mount sites.
(ANNEXES 44, 67, 71, and 85)
19. (U) Accountability and facility operations SOPs lacked
specificity, implementation measures, and a system of checks
and balances to ensure compliance. (ANNEXES 76 and 82)
20. (U) Basic Army Doctrine was not widely referenced or
utilized to develop the accountability practices throughout
the 800th MP Brigade's subordinate units. Daily processing,
accountability, and detainee care appears to have been made
up as the operations developed with reliance on, and
guidance from, junior members of the unit who had civilian
corrections experience. (ANNEX 21)
21. (U) Soldiers were poorly prepared and untrained to
conduct I/R operations prior to deployment, at the
mobilization site, upon arrival in theater, and throughout
their mission. (ANNEXES 62, 63, and 69)
22. (U) The documentation provided to this investigation
identified 27 escapes or attempted escapes from the
detention facilities throughout the 800th MP Brigade's AOR.
Based on my assessment and detailed analysis of the
substandard accountability process maintained by the 800th
MP Brigade, it is highly likely that there were several more
unreported cases of escape that were probably "written off"
as administrative errors or otherwise undocumented. 1LT
Lewis Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company, reported
knowing about at least two additional escapes (one from a
work detail and one from a window) from Abu Ghraib (BCCF)
that were not documented. LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander,
744th MP Battalion, detailed the escape of one detainee at
the High Value Detainee Facility who went to the latrine and
then outran the guards and escaped. Lastly, BG Janis
Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade, stated that there
were more than 32 escapes from her holding facilities, which
does not match the number derived from the investigation
materials. (ANNEXES 5-10, 45, 55, and 71)
23. (U) The Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca detention facilities
are significantly over their intended maximum capacity while
the guard force is undermanned and under resourced. This
imbalance has contributed to the poor living conditions,
escapes, and accountability lapses at the various
facilities. The overcrowding of the facilities also limits
the ability to identify and segregate leaders in the
detainee population who may be organizing escapes and riots
within the facility. (ANNEXES 6, 22, and 92)
24. (U) The screening, processing, and release of detainees
who should not be in custody takes too long and contributes
to the overcrowding and unrest in the detention facilities.
There are currently three separate release mechanisms in the
theater-wide internment operations. First, the apprehending
unit can release a detainee if there is a determination that
their continued detention is not warranted. Secondly, a
criminal detainee can be released after it has been
determined that the detainee has no intelligence value, and
that their release would not be detrimental to society. BG
Karpinski had signature authority to release detainees in
this second category. Lastly, detainees accused of
committing "Crimes Against the Coalition," who are held
throughout the separate facilities in the CJTF-7 AOR, can be
released upon a determination that they are of no
intelligence value and no longer pose a significant threat
to Coalition Forces. The release process for this category
of detainee is a screening by the local US Forces Magistrate
Cell and a review by a Detainee Release Board consisting of
BG Karpinski, COL Marc Warren, SJA, CJTF-7, and MG Barbara
Fast, C-2, CJTF-7. MG Fast is the "Detainee Release
Authority" for detainees being held for committing crimes
against the coalition. According to BG Karpinski, this
category of detainee makes up more than 60% of the total
detainee population, and is the fastest growing category.
However, MG Fast, according to BG Karpinski, routinely
denied the board's recommendations to release detainees in
this category who were no longer deemed a threat and clearly
met the requirements for release. According to BG
Karpinski, the extremely slow and ineffective release
process has significantly contributed to the overcrowding of
the facilities. (ANNEXES 40, 45, and 46)
25. (U) After Action Reviews (AARs) are not routinely being
conducted after an escape or other serious incident. No
lessons learned seem to have been disseminated to
subordinate units to enable corrective action at the lowest
level. The Investigation Team requested copies of AARs, and
none were provided. (Multiple Witness Statements)
26. (U) Lessons learned (i.e. Findings and Recommendations
from various 15-6 Investigations concerning escapes and
accountability lapses) were rubber stamped as approved and
ordered implemented by BG Karpinski. There is no evidence
that the majority of her orders directing the implementation
of substantive changes were ever acted upon. Additionally,
there was no follow-up by the command to verify the
corrective actions were taken. Had the findings and
recommendations contained within their own investigations
been analyzed and actually implemented by BG Karpinski, many
of the subsequent escapes, accountability lapses, and cases
of abuse may have been prevented. (ANNEXES 5-10)
27. (U) The perimeter lighting around Abu Ghraib and the
detention facility at Camp Bucca is inadequate and needs to
be improved to illuminate dark areas that have routinely
become avenues of escape. (ANNEX 6)
28. (U) Neither the camp rules nor the provisions of the
Geneva Conventions are posted in English or in the language
of the detainees at any of the detention facilities in the
800th MP Brigade's AOR, even after several investigations
had annotated the lack of this critical requirement.
(Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal Observations
of the Investigation Team)
29. (U) The Iraqi guards at Abu Ghraib BCCF) demonstrate
questionable work ethics and loyalties, and are a
potentially dangerous contingent within the Hard-Site.
These guards have furnished the Iraqi criminal inmates with
contraband, weapons, and information. Additionally, they
have facilitated the escape of at least one detainee.
(ANNEX 8 and 26-SPC Polak's Statement)
30. (U) In general, US civilian contract personnel (Titan
Corporation, CACI, etc.), third country nationals, and local
contractors do not appear to be properly supervised within
the detention facility at Abu Ghraib. During our on-site
inspection, they wandered about with too much unsupervised
free access in the detainee area. Having civilians in
various outfits (civilian and DCUs) in and about the
detainee area causes confusion and may have contributed to
the difficulties in the accountability process and with
detecting escapes. (ANNEX 51, Multiple Witness Statements,
and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)
31. (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP
Battalion, contended that the Detainee Rules of Engagement
(DROE) and the general principles of the Geneva Convention
were briefed at every guard mount and shift change on Abu
Ghraib. However, none of our witnesses, nor our personal
observations, support his contention. I find that SGM
Emerson was not a credible witness. (ANNEXES 45, 80, and
the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)
32. (U) Several interviewees insisted that the MP and MI
Soldiers at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) received regular training on
the basics of detainee operations; however, they have been
unable to produce any verifying documentation, sign-in
rosters, or soldiers who can recall the content of this
training. (ANNEXES 59, 80, and the Absence of any Training
Records)
33. (S/NF) The various detention facilities operated by
the 800th MP Brigade have routinely held persons brought to
th | | | | Alpha | | Posted: Sat May 08, 2004 8:48 am Post subject: "The Photos are Shocking, but Our Reports are Worse&quo |
| The Red Cross Accuses:
"The Photos are Shocking, but Our Reports are Worse"
By Afsane Bassir Pour
Le Monde Wednesday 05 May 2004
Geneva - The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) has known for a long time that "worse things than what are shown in the photos" have been taking place at the big Abou Ghraib prison, west of Baghdad. "We don't need the photos to know what's going on and that it's not acceptable," says the ICRC spokesperson, Antonella Notari. According to her, the ICRC had already made several reports and recommendations to the American and British authorities in Iraq "in the first instance" and to their superiors in Washington and London "in the second place". "The photos are certainly shocking, but our reports are worse," says Mrs. Notari, who nonetheless refuses to detail the contents of those reports, in conformity with ICRC standard practice. That's the price the group pays, she explains, for being able to make "impromptu and regular" visits to the Abou Ghraib prison every five or six weeks since Iraqi prisoners have been held there, starting in October 2003. "We knew and we had told the Americans that what was going on at Abou Ghraib is reprehensible." Mrs. Notari categorically denies the statements of General Janis Karpinski, commander of the units responsible for prisons in Iraq, according to which "military intelligence men" prevented the detainees in cell block 1A- where the tortures were practiced- from seeing ICRC delegates. "We are not simpletons," retorts Antonella Notari, "our representatives are extremely experienced and they speak to lots of people inside the prison, we always end up knowing the truth in all the world's prisons and the truth about Abou Ghraib is shocking." "Preventative Message"
The ICRC demands that the abuses committed against Iraqi prisoners be punished by the law. "When there is information about torture, sanctions must be quickly enforced; it's extremely important; it makes the people in charge of the prisoners responsible and sends a very clear preventive message to others." According to its representatives, if the ICRC has remained "very discreet" about the abuses, it's only because its reports "have been taken very seriously" by the Americans. Relations between the United States and the ICRC are more complicated on the Guantanamo naval base. The "persistent" refusal of the United States to respect the Geneva conventions on prisoners of war has actually led the ICRC, for the first time, to publicly condemn the "illegality" of the arbitrary detention of the 600 prisoners who are there. Since the fall of the Baathist regime in April 2003, the ICRC has recorded more than 11,000 Iraqi prisoners in Iraq, some of whom have been released in the mean time. According to the organization, there were two categories of prisoner in the Abou Ghraib prison: former fighters from Saddam Hussein's army, who have prisoner of war status; and civilians interned "for different reasons", but to whom the Geneva conventions- of which the ICRC has been the steward since 1949- equally well apply. The ICRC concentrates on "the prisoners who are most vulnerable, that is, those who are detained for security reasons." The fact that the coalition used the Abou Ghraib prison "shocked the Iraqi people very much," says Antonella Notari, "because this prison was famous for the atrocities the Saddam Hussein regime committed there." The NGOs Too...
The UN is also timidly mobilizing. Tuesday May 4, the High Commission for Human Rights named "an independent expert" to investigate the violations committed by belligerents in Iraq. The Icelandic judge Jakob Moller has been charged with conducting "an evaluation exercise." His mandate and his resources have yet to be defined. One of the strongest voices against abuses in Iraq could be that of Theo van Boven. A personage well-respected by human rights' advocates, this Dutch magistrate is the UN's special reporter on torture. In a communiqué on Tuesday, he demanded "an inquiry, prosecutions, and punishment" as well as reparations to the victims of these violations. Non-governmental organizations are also multiplying their denunciations. The International Federation for Human Rights has already called on the Swiss government, as the depositary and agent for the Geneva conventions, to assemble an international conference, to, as the Federation's General Secretary put it, "find solutions for the violations of international humanitarian law committed in Iraq." Human Rights Watch has demanded that the inquiry be extended to "the superior authorities" so that it may be known "whether they ordered or tolerated these abuses, which are possibly war crimes." Translation: Truthout French language correspondent Leslie Thatcher.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jailed Iraqis Hidden from Red Cross, Says U.S. Army
By Julian Borger
The Guardian U.K.
Wednesday 05 May 2004 US military policemen moved unregistered Iraqi prisoners, known as "ghost detainees", around an army-run jail at Abu Ghraib, in order to hide them from the Red Cross, according to a confidential military report. The report on abuses at Abu Ghraib prison - a copy of which was obtained by the Guardian - described the practice of hiding prisoners as "deceptive, contrary to army doctrine, and in violation of international law". The revelations surfaced at a time when the prison abuse scandal threatened to engulf the Pentagon and the military occupation of Iraq. The US army yesterday admitted to the Senate there was evidence of widespread abuse of prisoners in military-run jails in both Iraq and Afghanistan. There have been a total of 25 recorded deaths in US military custody in both countries. The army also said yesterday that one soldier had been court-martialed for using excessive force in shooting to death an Iraqi prisoner last September. The soldier was reduced in rank and dismissed from the army. It disclosed, too, that it had referred to the Justice Department a homicide case involving a CIA contract interrogator alleged to be responsible for the death of an Iraqi pris oner last November. That death was at Abu Ghraib prison. "I think the important point that I took from this hearing is that this does not appear to be an isolated incident and that there are additional reports in Iraq, and also Afghanistan," Senator Edward Kennedy said after an army briefing of the armed services committee. "And I think we also have to find out [about] the conduct of personnel down in Guantanamo as well." The defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, said that multiple investigations were under way into prison conditions and interrogation techniques, including at Guantanamo Bay and a naval detention centre at Charleston, South Carolina. But he denied the scandal represented a breakdown in control. "The system works," he insisted. However, Mr Rumsfeld was denounced in the Senate for failing to tell Congress about the Abu Ghraib scandal until the news broke in the press last week. The army report on Abu Ghraib, written by Major General Antonio Taguba, is a bluntly-worded indictment of the military detention system, with harsh words for the military policemen who physically and sexually abused prisoners, their superior officers, and the private contractors who carried out interrogations and gave some of the orders. The Taguba report described how "ghost detainees" were brought to the military police (MP) unit running several jails in Iraq by OGAs (military jargon for other government agencies, often a reference to the CIA). "The various detention facilities operated by the 800th MP Brigade have routinely held persons brought to them by OGAs without accounting for them, knowing their identities, or even the reason for their detention," the report stated. "The joint interrogation and debriefing centre (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib called these detainees 'ghost detainees'. On at least one occasion, the 320th MP Battalion at Abu Ghraib held a handful of 'ghost detainees' for OGAs that they moved around within the facility to hide them from a visiting International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) survey team." Amanda Williamson, an ICRC spokeswoman, said its prison inspectors were not aware that prisoners had been hidden from them.
The US plans to keep more than 130,000 troops in Iraq until the end of next year, Pentagon officials said yesterday. The decision marks a drastic departure from earlier plans to reduce troop levels sharply in the run-up to the US elections in November
Jailed Iraqis Hidden from Red Cross, Says U.S. Army
By Julian Borger
The Guardian U.K. Wednesday 05 May 2004 US military policemen moved unregistered Iraqi prisoners, known as "ghost detainees", around an army-run jail at Abu Ghraib, in order to hide them from the Red Cross, according to a confidential military report. The report on abuses at Abu Ghraib prison - a copy of which was obtained by the Guardian - described the practice of hiding prisoners as "deceptive, contrary to army doctrine, and in violation of international law". The revelations surfaced at a time when the prison abuse scandal threatened to engulf the Pentagon and the military occupation of Iraq. The US army yesterday admitted to the Senate there was evidence of widespread abuse of prisoners in military-run jails in both Iraq and Afghanistan. There have been a total of 25 recorded deaths in US military custody in both countries. The army also said yesterday that one soldier had been court-martialed for using excessive force in shooting to death an Iraqi prisoner last September. The soldier was reduced in rank and dismissed from the army. It disclosed, too, that it had referred to the Justice Department a homicide case involving a CIA contract interrogator alleged to be responsible for the death of an Iraqi pris oner last November. That death was at Abu Ghraib prison. "I think the important point that I took from this hearing is that this does not appear to be an isolated incident and that there are additional reports in Iraq, and also Afghanistan," Senator Edward Kennedy said after an army briefing of the armed services committee. "And I think we also have to find out [about] the conduct of personnel down in Guantanamo as well." The defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, said that multiple investigations were under way into prison conditions and interrogation techniques, including at Guantanamo Bay and a naval detention centre at Charleston, South Carolina. But he denied the scandal represented a breakdown in control. "The system works," he insisted. However, Mr Rumsfeld was denounced in the Senate for failing to tell Congress about the Abu Ghraib scandal until the news broke in the press last week. The army report on Abu Ghraib, written by Major General Antonio Taguba, is a bluntly-worded indictment of the military detention system, with harsh words for the military policemen who physically and sexually abused prisoners, their superior officers, and the private contractors who carried out interrogations and gave some of the orders. The Taguba report described how "ghost detainees" were brought to the military police (MP) unit running several jails in Iraq by OGAs (military jargon for other government agencies, often a reference to the CIA). "The various detention facilities operated by the 800th MP Brigade have routinely held persons brought to them by OGAs without accounting for them, knowing their identities, or even the reason for their detention," the report stated. "The joint interrogation and debriefing centre (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib called these detainees 'ghost detainees'. On at least one occasion, the 320th MP Battalion at Abu Ghraib held a handful of 'ghost detainees' for OGAs that they moved around within the facility to hide them from a visiting International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) survey team." Amanda Williamson, an ICRC spokeswoman, said its prison inspectors were not aware that prisoners had been hidden from them.
The US plans to keep more than 130,000 troops in Iraq until the end of next year, Pentagon officials said yesterday. The decision marks a drastic departure from earlier plans to reduce troop levels sharply in the run-up to the US elections in November ------- | | | | | ©2002-2009 WarWithoutEnd.co.uk |
