| Author | Message | | Alpha | | Posted: Sun Apr 18, 2004 8:42 pm Post subject: INSIDE THE NEOCON PENTAGON |
| http://www.nowarforisrael.com http://www.nogw.com/warforisrael.html http://www.whatreallyhappened.com http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/spyring.html ----- Original Message ----- From: Jeff Blankfort Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2004 12:09 PM Subject: TheToronto Star.com - Inside the neo-con Pentagon Much of this Karen Kwiatowski has told before but it is significant that it is now being published in a mainstream Canadian paper. I should point something that has received little notice in the alternative press and just passing mention in the mainstream media and that is that Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith, a committed supporter of Likud and co-author of the Clean Break paper for Netanyahu in 1996. calling for the overthrow of Saddam, has spent the last two months traveling around the world arranging for the placement of US military bases and, no doubt, letting foreign governments know that dealing with the US includes dealing with Israel which accounts for the relatively low key reactions around the world to Israel's more recent transgressions. Inside the neo-con Pentagon Ex-Officer reveals how Bush appointees suppressed facts and twisted truth to drive America to war with Iraq KAREN KWIATKOWSKI SPECIAL TO THE STAR In July of last year, after just over 20 years of service, I retired as a lieutenant-colonel in the U.S. Air Force. My career started in 1978 with the smooth seduction of a full four-year ROTC scholarship. It ended with 10 months of duty in a strange new country, observing up close and personal a process of decision-making for war not sanctioned by the Constitution. In the spring of 2002, I was a cynical but willing staff officer, almost two years into my three-year tour in the defence department's office of the undersecretary for policy, sub-Saharan Africa. In April, a call for volunteers went out for NESA — the Near East South Asia directorate and I was "volunteered" to enter what would be a well-appointed den of iniquity. The education I would receive there was intense, fascinating and frightening. While the people were very much alive, I saw a dead philosophy — Cold War anti-communism and neo-imperialism — walking the corridors of the Pentagon. It wore the clothing of counterterrorism and spoke the language of a holy war between good and evil. The evil was recognized by the leadership to be resident mainly in the Middle East and articulated by Islamic clerics and radicals. But there were other enemies within: anyone who dared voice any skepticism about their grand plans, including Secretary of State Colin Powell. From May, 2002, until February, 2003, I observed firsthand the formation of the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans (OSP) and watched the latter stages of the neo-conservative capture of the policy/intelligence nexus in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq. This seizure of the reins of U.S. Middle East policy was directly visible to many of us working in the NESA policy office, yet there seemed little any of us could do. I saw a narrow and deeply flawed policy used to manipulate and pressurize the traditional relationship between Pentagon policy-makers and U.S. intelligence agencies. I witnessed neo-conservative agenda bearers within the OSP usurp carefully considered assessments and, through suppression and distortion of intelligence analysis, promulgate falsehoods to both Congress and the executive office of the president. While this commandeering of intelligence production and U.S. foreign policy matched closely the well-published desires of the neo-conservative wing of the Republican party, many of us in the Pentagon — conservatives and liberals alike — felt the agenda had never been openly presented to the American people. Instead, the public storyline was a fear-peddling and confusing set of messages, designed to take Congress and the country into a war of executive choice — a war based on false pretences and one that Americans do not really understand. That is why I have gone public. To begin, I was welcomed to the fold by Bill Luti, assistant secretary of defence for NESA. Tall, thin and nervously intelligent, he was a recently retired naval captain and now a high-level Bush appointee. I would later find out that when Dick Cheney was secretary of defence a decade earlier, Luti had been his aide. He had also been a military aide to Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich during the Clinton years and was not shy about name-dropping. I was present at a staff meeting when Luti called Gen. Anthony Zinni a "traitor" for publicly expressing reservations about the rush to war. Something deliberate and manipulative was happening to NESA. Key long-time civilian professionals were replaced early on. Removing such a critical continuity factor was not only unusual but also seemed like wilful handicapping. It was the first signal of radical change. At the time, I didn't realize that the expertise on Middle East policy was not only being removed but also being exchanged for input from politicized think-tanks, including the Middle East Media Research Institute, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs. Interestingly, the office of the director stayed vacant the whole time I was there. That vacancy and the long-term absence of real regional understanding to inform defence policy-makers in the Pentagon explains a great deal about the neo-conservative approach to the Middle East and the disastrous mistakes made in Washington and Iraq in the past two years. I learned there was indeed a preferred ideology for NESA. On my first day in the office, a career civil servant rather unhappily advised me that if I wanted to be successful here, I'd better remember not to say anything positive about the Palestinians. This belied official U.S. policy. Throughout the summer, as war planning increased, all kinds of new people were brought in. The Iraq desk officer was Bill Bruner, a politically savvy officer who preferred civilian clothes to his lieutenant-colonel's uniform. I discovered that Bruner, like Luti, had served as a military aide to Gingrich, who himself was now conveniently an active member of the president's Defense Policy Board, which had space immediately below ours. I asked why Bruner wore civilian attire and was told: "He's Chalabi's handler." Ahmad Chalabi was president of the Iraqi National Congress, the favoured exile of the neo-conservatives and the source of much of their "intelligence." I had friendly debates with John Trigilio, an analyst assigned to Iraq intelligence. The one I remember most clearly came after the president gave his famous "mushroom cloud" speech in October, 2002, asserting that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction as well as ties to "international terrorists" and was working feverishly to develop weapons with "nuclear holy warriors." I asked Trigilio who was feeding the president all the bull about Saddam and the threat he posed us in terms of WMD. He would only say: "Karen, we have sources that you don't have access to." It was widely felt by those of us not in the neo-con inner circle that these "sources" related to Ahmad Chalabi. The newly named director of the OSP, Abram Shulsky, was one of the most senior people sharing our space that summer. But it seemed that his boss was somebody like Douglas Feith or higher. Doug Feith, undersecretary of defence for policy, was a case study in how not to run a large organization. His inattention to most policy details, except those relating to Israel or Iraq, earned him a reputation most foul, with rampant stories of lost documents and routine signatures that took months to achieve. His poor reputation as a manager was not helped by his arrogance. I spent time that summer exploring the neo-conservative worldview and wondering what could explain this rush to war and disregard for real intelligence. Neo-conservatives are fairly easy to study, mainly because they are few in number and they show up at all the same parties. Examining them as individuals, it became clear that almost all have worked together, in and out of government, for several decades to push a defence strategy that favoured military intervention. Some former officials, such as Richard Perle (an assistant secretary of defence under Reagan) and James Woolsey (CIA director under Clinton), were granted a new lease on life with positions on Bush's Defense Policy Board. Others, like Elliott Abrams and Paul Wolfowitz, apparently overcame previous negative associations from an Iran-Contra conviction for lying to Congress and for utterly miscalculating the strength of the Soviet Union in a politically driven report to the CIA. After August, 2002, the OSP established talking points on Iraq, WMD and terrorism. The points were propagandistic in style and all desk officers were ordered to use them verbatim in the preparation of any material prepared for higher-ups and people outside the Pentagon. The points included statements about Saddam Hussein's proclivity for using chemical weapons against his own citizens and neighbours, his existing relations with terrorists based on a member of Al Qaeda reportedly receiving medical care in Baghdad, his widely publicized aid to the Palestinians and general indications of an aggressive viability in Saddam's nuclear weapons program and his ongoing efforts to use them against his neighbours or give them to Al Qaeda style groups The talking points said he was a serious threat to the U.S., too. Instead of developing defence policy alternatives and advice, the OSP was used to manufacture propaganda for internal and external use, and for pseudo war planning. The message to staff officers and the defence intelligence community was that senior appointed civilians were willing to exclude or marginalize intelligence that did not fit the agenda. The talking points were a series of bulleted statements, written persuasively and in a convincing way, and superficially they seemed reasonable and rational. <IMG src="http://www.thestar.com/images/sb_star10.gif"></IMG>Saddam had gassed his neighbours, abused his people and was continuing in that mode, becoming an imminently dangerous threat to his neighbours and to us (except that none of his neighbours or Israel felt that was the case). <IMG src="http://www.thestar.com/images/sb_star10.gif"></IMG>Saddam had harboured Al Qaeda operatives and offered and probably provided them with training facilities (except the suspected facilities were in the U.S./Kurdish-controlled part of Iraq). <IMG src="http://www.thestar.com/images/sb_star10.gif"></IMG>Saddam was pursuing and had WMD of the type that could be used by him, in conjunction with Al Qaeda and other terrorists, to attack and damage Americans and U.S. interests (except the intelligence didn't really say that). <IMG src="http://www.thestar.com/images/sb_star10.gif"></IMG>Saddam had not been seriously weakened by war, sanctions and weekly bombings over the past 12 years, and in fact was plotting to hurt America and support anti-American activities, in part through his carrying on with terrorists (except here the intelligence said the opposite). <IMG src="http://www.thestar.com/images/sb_star10.gif"></IMG>Saddam's support for the Palestinians and Arafat proved his terrorist connections. And basically, the time to act was now. The gist of the talking points remained on message, though they evolved as subtle changes revealed what the OSP was contributing to national security Two key types of modifications were directed or approved. The one I remember most specifically was the dropping of the assertion that one of Saddam's intelligence operatives had met with 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta in Prague, supposedly salient proof that Saddam was in part responsible for the terrorist attacks. That claim had lasted through a number of revisions, but after the media reported that the Czech government denied it and the FBI confirmed Atta's location to have been elsewhere, it was dropped from our "advice on things to say." The other change made to the talking points was along the line of fine-tuning and generalizing. Much of what was there was already so general as to be less than accurate. Some bullets were softened, particularly statements of Saddam's readiness and capability in the chemical, biological or nuclear arena. Others were altered to match more exactly something Bush and Cheney had said in recent speeches One item I never saw in our talking points was a reference to Saddam's purported attempt to buy yellowcake uranium in Niger. I was surprised to hear the president's mention of the uranium in Niger in his 2003 State of the Union address because that in theory might have represented new intelligence, something that seemed remarkably absent in any of the products provided us by the OSP. I checked with my old office of Sub-Saharan African Affairs. It was news there, too. And it turned out to be false. Starting in fall, 2002, I found a way to vent my frustrations with the neo-con hijacking of our defence policy when retired Col. David Hackworth agreed to publish my stories anonymously on his Web site, under the moniker: Deep Throat: Insider Notes From The Pentagon. I was happy to have a sense that there were folks out there, mostly military, who would be interested in the insanity I was witnessing on almost a daily basis in Donald Rumsfeld's defence department. In December, 2002, I requested an acceleration of my retirement to the following July. By now, the military was anxiously waiting under the bed for the other shoe to drop amid concerns over troop availability, readiness for an ill-defined mission and lack of day-after clarity. The other shoe fell with a thump, as did the regard many of us had held for Colin Powell, on Feb. 5, 2003, when the secretary of state capitulated in his speech at the United Nations — a speech not only filled with falsehoods pushed by the neo-cons but also containing many statements already debunked by intelligence. War is generally crafted and pursued for political reasons, but the reasons given to Congress and the American people for this one were inaccurate and so misleading as to be false. Moreover, they were false by design. Certainly, the neo-conservatives never bothered to sell the country on the real reasons for occupation of Iraq — more bases from which to flex U.S. muscle with Syria and Iran, and better positioning for the inevitable fall of the regional ruling sheikdoms. Maintaining OPEC on a dollar track rather than a euro standard and fulfilling a half-baked imperial vision also played a role. These more accurate reasons for invading and occupying Iraq could have been argued on their merits. But Americans didn't get the chance for an honest debate. SALON.COM Karen Kwiatkowski lives in Virginia with her family, teaches a U.S. foreign policy class at James Madison University and writes regularly for militaryweek.com ALL FOR ISRAEL: http://www.warwithoutend.co.uk/middle-east-and-asia/2004/04/17/hamas-rantisi-assassinated.php Israel's Standing as U.S. Ally Questioned (Excellent Interview with former CIA Analyst Ray McGovern can be listened to via the link at this URL): http://www.warwithoutend.co.uk/middle-east-and-asia/2004/04/17/israel-s-standing-as-u-s-ally-questioned.php Biggest bombshell yet! Woodward exposes Bush's LIE! (Woodward on '60 Minutes' Tonight): http://www.warwithoutend.co.uk/middle-east-and-asia/2004/04/17/biggest-bombshell-yet-woodward-exposes-bush-s-lie.php Fisk: Bush Legitimizes Terrorism: http://www.warwithoutend.co.uk/middle-east-and-asia/2004/04/17/fisk-bush-legitimizes-terrorism.php Hamas' Rantissi Assassinated: http://www.warwithoutend.co.uk/middle-east-and-asia/2004/04/17/hamas-rantisi-assassinated.php Subj: Neocon Call for Tougher US Policy in Iraq Date: 4/18/04 7:02:24 AM Pacific Daylight Time From: hectorpv@comcast.net To: hectorpv@comcast.net Friends, Neocon Call for Tougher US Policy in Iraq A common theme among the neocons and even more so among the rightist talk radio folk is that the US has to get tougher in Iraq. This appeals to the super-patriot and Muslim-hating pro-war masses who don’t have much of an understanding of foreign relations. Sometimes I have heard people who call in to the radio talk shows advocating using nuclear weapons. Mona Charen makes the more educated and respectable neocon call for toughness. The US is not out to kill Iraqis. Heavens no! But the only way to democratize them is to establish order—and this entails a much tougher policy. "But Iraq cannot be truly liberated until it has been transformed. And it cannot be transformed if the bad elements are not afraid of American soldiers. Those gleeful faces in Fallujah make the point: They think we are patsies." "Toughness" includes the prohibition of telling "lies" about the US—i.e., criticism of US policy must be prohibited. There is no reason to allow civil liberties in present-day Iraq. "Baghdad is not Boston. You can't teach democracy until you first have order. And you cannot have order if people like Al-Sadr think they can bully you." To achieve freedom and democracy you first need censorship and suppression. One thinks again of the words of Dostoyevsky’s character Shigalov in "The Possessed": "I have started out with the idea of unrestricted freedom and I have arrived at unrestricted despotism." Note the transformation and presumably military occupation is not just for Iraq but for the entire region. "The work of transforming the Middle East is going to be messy and difficult. But there is no alternative. To permit the region to simmer in ignorance, tyranny and fantasies of revenge is to incubate terrorism." In short, America has to transform the entire Middle East, which will require harsh military measures, in order to achieve security. This is the neocon World War IV scenario. The original author of the World War IV concept is Elliot Cohen, but it was popularized by Norman Podhoretz, whose article entitled "How to Win World War IV" appeared in Commentary shortly after 9/1.http://www.antiwar.com/justin/j040403.html Richard Perle and his co-author David Frum emphasize this same theme in their new book _An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror_" Right now the American people would not accept the World War IV approach. However, an increasing toughness in Iraq could have a snowball effect. The more killing of Iraqis can so inflame the Islamic world as to bring about more attacks on the Americans throughout the world and in the US itself. Numerous Americans (listen to Talk Radio or read the News groups) are already calling for brutal policies against the Arabs/Muslims, including nuclear weapons and outright genocide. If the Iraqis somehow manage to slaughter large numbers of American troops or if terrorists manage to pull off a significant attack in the US, the neocons might be able to gain a majority of Americans behind their World War IV final solution. Obviously, this could not transform the Arabs/Muslims into American/Israel loving democrats but it could lead to a lot of killing and make the Arabs/Muslims hate the US forever—a situation that Likudnik Israel could exploit for its own aggrandizement. ______________________ http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/charen.html Jewish World Review April 9, 2004 / 19 Nissan, 5764 Mona Charen Are we tough enough? http://www.NewsAndOpinion.com | As American and coalition soldiers are fired upon in Iraq, we may be seeing the radiating ripples of the Spanish election. If terror can succeed in Madrid, why not in Fallujah and Basra and Ramadi? Iraq is obviously not among the more civilized nations on earth. Saddam's barbarism was extreme, but it and he arose from a culture of terror and fear. One can imagine Saddam watching TV in his jail cell and chortling over the mutilated bodies of our aid workers in Fallujah. "Now maybe you Americans see why I ruled with an iron fist?" Of course, in truth, Saddam's rule only further brutalized a people already accustomed to tyranny. President Bush has been forceful in his commitment to democratizing the Middle East. What remains up for debate is how long it will take before Iraq is ready for free elections. A simple respect for the rule of law must precede self-government. Among the fractious, suspicious, violent and emotional Iraqi people, such respect has not been much in evidence yet. Rumors, for example, are Iraq's principle communications media. Among the legends that have circulated widely in the past year, reports Tom Squitieri of USA Today, include: 1) that toys distributed by U.S. soldiers to Iraqi children cause deadly diseases; 2) that Saddam is in a Colorado ski resort; 3) that the United States is holding back electricity to punish the Iraqi people; 4) that Israel is behind the U.S. invasion; and 5) that night vision goggles permit U.S. soldiers to see through the clothing of Iraqi women. The U.S.-led coalition has already accomplished an enormous amount, including introducing a new currency, reopening schools (with revised textbooks), re-establishing power grids, arranging for adequate water supplies, presiding over the opening of more than 100 newspapers and numerous radio and television stations, helping to establish democratically elected local councils, training new police and a professional and non-terrorist army, and more. The task we have set ourselves is Herculean. And most Americans do not speak the language. But the question of the moment is not whether we've done enough good, but whether we've been tough enough. We Americans hate being occupiers. We are liberators. But Iraq cannot be truly liberated until it has been transformed. And it cannot be transformed if the bad elements are not afraid of American soldiers. Those gleeful faces in Fallujah make the point: They think we are patsies. Are we? Moqtada al-Sadr, the 30-ish cleric who only now has been issued an arrest warrant for a murder committed (supposedly on his order) a year ago, has been handled with kid gloves until now. His newspaper has printed the vilest incitement, accusing the United States for example, of using an Apache helicopter to bomb 50 police recruits on Feb. 10 in front of an Iraqi police station. In truth, the attack was actually the work of terrorists. Why would the U.S. bomb Iraqis attempting to cooperate with the coalition in building a new police force? It doesn't matter that it defies common sense. The rumor mill churns on. Al-Sadr has used his newspaper, Al Hawza, to urge "terrorism" against American forces. And what has been the result? Several stern warnings. Only when Sadr's "Mahdi Army," a mob of criminals, former Baathists (ironic since Saddam executed Sadr's father) and Islamists, began firing at Americans did the civil administrator shut Al Hawza down. Perhaps they stayed their hand because they knew closing a newspaper would provoke criticism stateside. And it did. Editorials across the nation, from The New York Times to the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, to the Detroit News to The San Francisco Chronicle scolded the administration for hypocrisy. "Shutting down a newspaper," explained the Hartford Courant's editorial, "even an anti-American publication, doesn't teach democracy." Well, hold on a minute. Baghdad is not Boston. You can't teach democracy until you first have order. And you cannot have order if people like Al-Sadr think they can bully you. Why did we let ourselves in for all of this? As James Burnham used to say, "Where there's no alternative, there's no problem." The work of transforming the Middle East is going to be messy and difficult. But there is no alternative. To permit the region to simmer in ignorance, tyranny and fantasies of revenge is to incubate terrorism. http://www.nowarforisrael.com http://www.nogw.com/warforisrael.html Bin Laden warned us in 1998 that continued US support for Israel would result in attacks on US soil (but the 'protect Israel first' US press/media did not convey this warning to Americans to the extent that it should have back in 1998): http://www.investigate911.com/binladensez.htm | |  | | Alpha | | Posted: Sun Apr 18, 2004 8:58 pm Post subject: Woodward: Neocons' Separate Government |
| Subj: Woodward: Neocons' Separate Government Date: 4/18/04 12:19:30 PM Pacific Daylight Time From: hectorpv@comcast.net To: hectorpv@comcast.net Sent from the Internet (Details) Friends, Woodward: Neocons' Separate Government Bob Woodward’s new book _Plan of Attack_, which will be out next week, has many revelations, or rather confirmations, of the neocon dominance of the Bush administration. Woodward emphasizes Powell’s opposition to the neocon war juggernaut. He presents Powell as having continually cautioned Bush and other administration figures about the likely dangers of invading Iraq. Woodward describes Cheney as a "powerful, steamrolling force" for war. Powell saw Cheney as being preoccupied with reports of links between Saddam Hussein and the al Qaeda. Moreover, Powell believed that Cheney exaggerated intelligence about the Iraqi WMD threat and the alleged terrorist ties. "Powell thought Cheney and his allies — his chief aide, Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby; Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz; Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith; and what Powell called Feith's ‘Gestapo’ office — had established what amounted to a separate government." The term "separate government" is not actually accurate. The fact of the matter is that Cheney and the neocons were the actual government. Their ideas and plans became the official plans for the Bush government. Of course, as far as I can tell, Woodward does not point out that Feith and his group (Abraham Shulsky, etc), Libby, and Wolfowitz are neocons with close ties to Israel. In short, Woodward has illustrated the neocon control of the Bush administration, without actually mentioning neocons, Israel, and especially not the taboo "J" word. But one would not expect the mainstream Woodward to do anything like this. Nevertheless, his work appears very useful. It is assumed that Woodward got much of the hot information from Powell. Now, of course, the question is what is Powell’s angle here. Powell refers to all his private reservations regarding Bush policy, but he never made any public protest. It would seem that Powell is an opportunist. He went along with the Bush administration when it was riding high. But his fall back position was to point out his differences, if things deteriorated in Iraq. It can be seen as a brilliant move. For in the Woodward book Powell can be seen as a wise figure who had nothing to do with the debacle that Cheney and his people created. At the same time, he did not anger the Republican party by breaking with the Bush administration. Powell can now return to being regarded as a wise sage in the mainstream media. The Powell quasi-defection, I think, underscores how the mainstream, respectable elite has turned against Bush and the neocons. WOODWARD WILL TALK ON "60 MINUTES" TODAY, SUNDAY AT 8PM! ____________________ http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/17/international/middleeast/17BOOK.html?ei=1&en=64efaf198735ab04&ex=1083168125&pagewanted=print&position= April 17, 2004 Powell Said to Have Warned Bush Before the War, a New Book Says By DOUGLAS JEHL WASHINGTON, April 16 — Two months before the invasion of Iraq, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell warned President Bush about the potential negative consequences of a war, citing what Mr. Powell privately called the "you break it, you own it" rule of military action, according to a new book. "You're sure?" Mr. Powell is quoted as asking Mr. Bush in the Oval Office on Jan. 13, 2003, as the president told him he had made the decision to go forward. "You understand the consequences," he is said to have stated in a half-question. "You know you're going to be owning this place?" The book, "Plan of Attack," by Bob Woodward of The Washington Post, reconstructs that and other private conversations between senior Bush administration officials during the 16-month period of planning and preparation that ended with the attack on Iraq last March. It has been well known that Mr. Powell was the most skeptical among Mr. Bush's senior advisers about the wisdom of invading Iraq. But the new details described in the book, at a time when the American occupation has met with new perils, add considerably to a portrait of a secretary of state who expressed private reservations about the administration's policy but never issued a public protest about the administration's course. "Force should always be a last resort; I have preached this for most of my professional life as a soldier and as a diplomat; but it must be a resort," Mr. Powell told the United Nations Security Council on Feb. 14, 2003. "We cannot allow this process to be endlessly strung out, as Iraq is trying to do now." Mr. Powell is described as having clashed in particular with Vice President Dick Cheney, whom Mr. Woodward describes as a "powerful, steamrolling force" advocating the war who was preoccupied with reports of links between Saddam Hussein and the Qaeda terrorist network. Mr. Powell regarded Mr. Cheney's intense focus on Mr. Hussein and Al Qaeda as a "fever," the book says, and he believed that the vice president misread and exaggerated intelligence about the Iraq threat and supposed terrorist ties. Mr. Woodward's account quickly provoked speculation in Washington that Mr. Powell might have cooperated with Mr. Woodward as the book was being prepared in an effort to distance himself from the Iraq war. A spokesman for Mr. Powell said Friday night that he could not determine whether the secretary had spoken with Mr. Woodward. Mr. Powell has made no secret in the past that he has helped Mr. Woodward with other books. Only Mr. Bush and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld are identified by the author as having given on-the-record interviews for the book. But conversations between Mr. Powell and Mr. Bush are quoted verbatim in the book, and in the account of the January 2003 conversation, Mr. Bush is identified only as a corroborating source. Richard A. Boucher, Mr. Powell's spokesman, declined to comment on the book, saying he had not read it and adding: `We won't do book reviews. I promise." Asked if it were true that Mr. Powell and Mr. Cheney were barely on speaking terms, Mr. Boucher said, "I think that's not true." An official in Mr. Cheney's office said Friday that the vice president and his spokesman were flying back to the United States from a weeklong trip to Asia and would not be available for comment on Friday evening. The 443-page book, published by Simon & Schuster and to be available in bookstores next week, provides the most detailed account to date of debate and tension within the administration before the war, but it does not add any broad new story lines. The Associated Press published an account of the book's contents on Friday morning; The New York Times also obtained a copy. In a note to readers, Mr. Woodward writes that he based the book on information "from more than 75 key people directly involved in the events," a model he has used in other books. Following that model, the book does not include footnotes or otherwise identify the source of specific information. When he attributed thoughts, judgments or feelings to participants, Mr. Woodward writes, he obtained them from the person, a colleague with firsthand knowledge, or the written record. In Mr. Woodward's account of the meeting between Mr. Bush and Mr. Powell in January 2003, the president is described as having simply informed the secretary of state of his decision to go to war in Iraq, as part of a 12-minute meeting in which Mr. Bush made a conscious decision not to ask Mr. Powell for advice. But, according to the book, Mr. Bush did ask Mr. Powell "Are you with me on this?" and told him, "I want you with me." Mr. Powell is quoted as having replied: "I'll do the best I can. Yes sir, I will support you. I'm with you, Mr. President." The book discloses that Mr. Bush privately asked Mr. Rumsfeld in November 2001, just 72 days after the Sept. 11 attacks, to direct his commanders to begin planning for a possible war against Iraq. But it says that Mr. Bush did not make his final decision to start the war until January 2003. (In a televised news conference on March 6, Mr. Bush said, "I've not made up our mind about military action.") Asked about the account on Friday at a joint appearance with Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain, Mr. Bush said it was difficult for him to recall specific dates that far back. But he called attention to a meeting at Camp David, the presidential retreat in Maryland, on Sept. 15, 2001, the Saturday after the attacks. "I sat down with my national security team to discuss the response, and the subject of Iraq came up," Mr. Bush told reporters. "And I said as plainly as I possibly could: `We'll focus on Afghanistan. That's where we'll focus."' The White House spokesman, Scott McClellan, confirmed on Friday that Mr. Bush had raised the issue of Iraq with Mr. Rumsfeld in November 2001, at a time when American forces were still heavily engaged in the war in Afghanistan. But Mr. McClellan sought to minimize the significance of those discussions, saying that "there is a difference between planning and making a decision." The exact timing of Mr. Bush's request to Mr. Rumsfeld to begin war planning had not been publicly known, and it had not been known that, as the book reports, Mr. Bush kept that request secret from other top advisers, including Mr. Powell, Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, and George J. Tenet, the director of central intelligence. But the general time line for war planning that is presented in the book is broadly consistent with other recent accounts, including public statements by Gen. Tommy R. Franks, the retired commander of the Iraq war. It generally upholds the insistence by Mr. Bush and his top advisers that they did not begin their war planning for Iraq until well after the Sept. 11 attacks, even if their attention was fixed on Iraq from early in the administration, as former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill has written in a recent book. In an interview with Mr. Woodward in December 2003, Mr. Bush said he had kept the early war-planning directive secret because if news of it had leaked out, it would have caused "enormous international angst and domestic speculation," the book says. The book also provides new details about the hurriedly arranged airstrike on March 19, 2003, in which the White House jump-started the war with a bomb and missile strike on the Dora Farms compound near Baghdad in a failed attempt to kill Mr. Hussein. The air raid, advocated by Mr. Tenet, had initially been opposed by General Franks, the book says, but was approved by President Bush and Vice President Cheney after they asked other advisers to leave the Oval Office. The strike was launched, the book says, on the basis of first-hand reports from Iraqi sources at Dora Farms enlisted by a network of 87 Iraqi spies, designated with the code name DB/ROCKSTARS, who had been recruited by a C.I.A. team that had infiltrated northern Iraq in the months before the war. In calls by satellite phone to the C.I.A. team, the Iraqi sources reported that Mr. Hussein's sons Uday and Qusay were at the compound, and that Mr. Hussein himself would return there. After the strike, the book says, one Iraqi source reported Mr. Hussein's body had been removed from the wreckage, prompting Mr. Tenet to celebrate what he thought had been a success. Even now, it is still not clear whether Mr. Hussein was at the site at all, though a C.I.A. official said on Friday that the agency maintained that Mr. Hussein was "probably" there and survived the American raid. Mr. Woodward's book reports that the Iraqi security guard who was the main source of the intelligence was killed in the American attack, but a C.I.A. official said that the Iraqi agents recruited by the agency had proved "extraordinarily productive." Over a period that began in early 2002, Mr. Powell is depicted as having cautioned Mr. Bush and other advisers repeatedly about the potential drawbacks of military action in Iraq. The "you break it, you own it" principle he cited in delivering those warnings was privately known to Mr. Powell and his deputy, Richard L. Armitage, as "the Pottery Barn rule," the book says. "You are going to be the proud owner of 25 million people," Mr. Powell is said to have told Mr. Bush in the summer of 2002. "You will own all their hopes, aspirations and problems. You'll own it all." Conservatives have long accused Mr. Powell of pursuing his own agenda, and of being more interested in depicting himself as right on the issues than as loyal to his president. Among the previously unknown episodes presented in the book was a White House meeting in December 2002 in which Mr. Tenet and his deputy, John McLaughlin, met with Mr. Bush and his top advisers for what was intended as a dress rehearsal for a public presentation of the administration's claim that Iraq possessed illicit weapons. Mr. Bush was not impressed by the presentation, the book reports, and urged that it be refined to make a stronger case to "Joe Public." He is said to have turned to Mr. Tenet and said, "I've been told all this intelligence about having W.M.D. and this is the best we've got?" In response, Mr. Tenet is described in the book as having twice assured Mr. Bush that the intelligence information supporting the American claims meant that the case was a "slam dunk." A C.I.A. official said that Mr. Tenet was reflecting an assessment spelled out in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that declared unambiguously that Iraq possessed both chemical and biological weapons. ___________________________________________ http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article6047.htm "Lunacy!" Said Powell On Wolfowitz Iraq Plan 17 April 2004 "PKJ" Bob Woodward’s new book, "Plan of Attack", to be released next week, could be the most damaging haymaker thrown yet at an administration reeling from a series of blows from former top insiders. Woodward, famous for uncovering the Watergate Scandal, had written previously on President Bush following the events of 911, but this new book is set to shatter the last panes in the hall of mirrors at the Bush White House. Quotes from Associated Press and the Washington Post: Secretary of State Colin Powell believed Vice President Dick Cheney developed an "unhealthy fixation" on trying to find a connection between Iraq and the Sept. 11 attacks. Bush in mid-2002 secretly approved the diversion of hundreds of millions of dollars meant for Afghanistan to projects that would set the stage for a massive deployment of U.S. troops to the Persian Gulf region. Woodward describes a relationship between Cheney and Powell that became so strained that they barely are on speaking terms. Powell believed Cheney was obsessed with trying to establish a connection between Iraq and al-Qaida and treated ambiguous intelligence as fact. Powell thought Cheney and his allies — his chief aide, Lewis "Scooter" Libby; Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz; Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith; and what Powell called Feith's "Gestapo" office — had established what amounted to a separate government. After being briefed by the CIA on Iraq’s WMDs: "Nice try," Bush said. "I don't think this quite — it's not something that Joe Public would understand or would gain a lot of confidence from." "Going into this period, I was praying for strength to do the Lord's will. ... I'm surely not going to justify war based upon God. Understand that. Nevertheless, in my case, I pray that I be as good a messenger of His will as possible. And then, of course, I pray for personal strength and for forgiveness." Wolfowitz proposed seizing Iraq's southern oil fields to build a foothold from which opposition groups could overthrow Saddam. Powell dismissed the plan as "lunacy." WOODWARD WILL TALK ON "60 MINUTES" THIS SUNDAY AT 8PM! | |  | | Nancy | | Posted: Sun Apr 18, 2004 9:12 pm Post subject: |
| | Do you have a link for Feith's Clean Break paper? | |  | | Alpha | | Posted: Sun Apr 18, 2004 9:26 pm Post subject: Re: Woodward: Neocons' Separate Government |
| This Washington Times article seems to indicate that at least some in the US press/media are still pushing the JINSA/CSP/PNAC agenda of doing further regime change in the Middle East (Syria and beyond) for Israel: http://www.washtimes.com/national/20040416-112543-3428r.htm | Alpha wrote: | Subj: Woodward: Neocons' Separate Government Date: 4/18/04 12:19:30 PM Pacific Daylight Time From: hectorpv@comcast.net To: hectorpv@comcast.net Sent from the Internet (Details) Friends, Woodward: Neocons' Separate Government Bob Woodward’s new book _Plan of Attack_, which will be out next week, has many revelations, or rather confirmations, of the neocon dominance of the Bush administration. Woodward emphasizes Powell’s opposition to the neocon war juggernaut. He presents Powell as having continually cautioned Bush and other administration figures about the likely dangers of invading Iraq. Woodward describes Cheney as a "powerful, steamrolling force" for war. Powell saw Cheney as being preoccupied with reports of links between Saddam Hussein and the al Qaeda. Moreover, Powell believed that Cheney exaggerated intelligence about the Iraqi WMD threat and the alleged terrorist ties. "Powell thought Cheney and his allies — his chief aide, Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby; Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz; Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith; and what Powell called Feith's ‘Gestapo’ office — had established what amounted to a separate government." The term "separate government" is not actually accurate. The fact of the matter is that Cheney and the neocons were the actual government. Their ideas and plans became the official plans for the Bush government. Of course, as far as I can tell, Woodward does not point out that Feith and his group (Abraham Shulsky, etc), Libby, and Wolfowitz are neocons with close ties to Israel. In short, Woodward has illustrated the neocon control of the Bush administration, without actually mentioning neocons, Israel, and especially not the taboo "J" word. But one would not expect the mainstream Woodward to do anything like this. Nevertheless, his work appears very useful. It is assumed that Woodward got much of the hot information from Powell. Now, of course, the question is what is Powell’s angle here. Powell refers to all his private reservations regarding Bush policy, but he never made any public protest. It would seem that Powell is an opportunist. He went along with the Bush administration when it was riding high. But his fall back position was to point out his differences, if things deteriorated in Iraq. It can be seen as a brilliant move. For in the Woodward book Powell can be seen as a wise figure who had nothing to do with the debacle that Cheney and his people created. At the same time, he did not anger the Republican party by breaking with the Bush administration. Powell can now return to being regarded as a wise sage in the mainstream media. The Powell quasi-defection, I think, underscores how the mainstream, respectable elite has turned against Bush and the neocons. WOODWARD WILL TALK ON "60 MINUTES" TODAY, SUNDAY AT 8PM! ____________________ http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/17/international/middleeast/17BOOK.html?ei=1&en=64efaf198735ab04&ex=1083168125&pagewanted=print&position= April 17, 2004 Powell Said to Have Warned Bush Before the War, a New Book Says By DOUGLAS JEHL WASHINGTON, April 16 — Two months before the invasion of Iraq, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell warned President Bush about the potential negative consequences of a war, citing what Mr. Powell privately called the "you break it, you own it" rule of military action, according to a new book. "You're sure?" Mr. Powell is quoted as asking Mr. Bush in the Oval Office on Jan. 13, 2003, as the president told him he had made the decision to go forward. "You understand the consequences," he is said to have stated in a half-question. "You know you're going to be owning this place?" The book, "Plan of Attack," by Bob Woodward of The Washington Post, reconstructs that and other private conversations between senior Bush administration officials during the 16-month period of planning and preparation that ended with the attack on Iraq last March. It has been well known that Mr. Powell was the most skeptical among Mr. Bush's senior advisers about the wisdom of invading Iraq. But the new details described in the book, at a time when the American occupation has met with new perils, add considerably to a portrait of a secretary of state who expressed private reservations about the administration's policy but never issued a public protest about the administration's course. "Force should always be a last resort; I have preached this for most of my professional life as a soldier and as a diplomat; but it must be a resort," Mr. Powell told the United Nations Security Council on Feb. 14, 2003. "We cannot allow this process to be endlessly strung out, as Iraq is trying to do now." Mr. Powell is described as having clashed in particular with Vice President Dick Cheney, whom Mr. Woodward describes as a "powerful, steamrolling force" advocating the war who was preoccupied with reports of links between Saddam Hussein and the Qaeda terrorist network. Mr. Powell regarded Mr. Cheney's intense focus on Mr. Hussein and Al Qaeda as a "fever," the book says, and he believed that the vice president misread and exaggerated intelligence about the Iraq threat and supposed terrorist ties. Mr. Woodward's account quickly provoked speculation in Washington that Mr. Powell might have cooperated with Mr. Woodward as the book was being prepared in an effort to distance himself from the Iraq war. A spokesman for Mr. Powell said Friday night that he could not determine whether the secretary had spoken with Mr. Woodward. Mr. Powell has made no secret in the past that he has helped Mr. Woodward with other books. Only Mr. Bush and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld are identified by the author as having given on-the-record interviews for the book. But conversations between Mr. Powell and Mr. Bush are quoted verbatim in the book, and in the account of the January 2003 conversation, Mr. Bush is identified only as a corroborating source. Richard A. Boucher, Mr. Powell's spokesman, declined to comment on the book, saying he had not read it and adding: `We won't do book reviews. I promise." Asked if it were true that Mr. Powell and Mr. Cheney were barely on speaking terms, Mr. Boucher said, "I think that's not true." An official in Mr. Cheney's office said Friday that the vice president and his spokesman were flying back to the United States from a weeklong trip to Asia and would not be available for comment on Friday evening. The 443-page book, published by Simon & Schuster and to be available in bookstores next week, provides the most detailed account to date of debate and tension within the administration before the war, but it does not add any broad new story lines. The Associated Press published an account of the book's contents on Friday morning; The New York Times also obtained a copy. In a note to readers, Mr. Woodward writes that he based the book on information "from more than 75 key people directly involved in the events," a model he has used in other books. Following that model, the book does not include footnotes or otherwise identify the source of specific information. When he attributed thoughts, judgments or feelings to participants, Mr. Woodward writes, he obtained them from the person, a colleague with firsthand knowledge, or the written record. In Mr. Woodward's account of the meeting between Mr. Bush and Mr. Powell in January 2003, the president is described as having simply informed the secretary of state of his decision to go to war in Iraq, as part of a 12-minute meeting in which Mr. Bush made a conscious decision not to ask Mr. Powell for advice. But, according to the book, Mr. Bush did ask Mr. Powell "Are you with me on this?" and told him, "I want you with me." Mr. Powell is quoted as having replied: "I'll do the best I can. Yes sir, I will support you. I'm with you, Mr. President." The book discloses that Mr. Bush privately asked Mr. Rumsfeld in November 2001, just 72 days after the Sept. 11 attacks, to direct his commanders to begin planning for a possible war against Iraq. But it says that Mr. Bush did not make his final decision to start the war until January 2003. (In a televised news conference on March 6, Mr. Bush said, "I've not made up our mind about military action.") Asked about the account on Friday at a joint appearance with Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain, Mr. Bush said it was difficult for him to recall specific dates that far back. But he called attention to a meeting at Camp David, the presidential retreat in Maryland, on Sept. 15, 2001, the Saturday after the attacks. "I sat down with my national security team to discuss the response, and the subject of Iraq came up," Mr. Bush told reporters. "And I said as plainly as I possibly could: `We'll focus on Afghanistan. That's where we'll focus."' The White House spokesman, Scott McClellan, confirmed on Friday that Mr. Bush had raised the issue of Iraq with Mr. Rumsfeld in November 2001, at a time when American forces were still heavily engaged in the war in Afghanistan. But Mr. McClellan sought to minimize the significance of those discussions, saying that "there is a difference between planning and making a decision." The exact timing of Mr. Bush's request to Mr. Rumsfeld to begin war planning had not been publicly known, and it had not been known that, as the book reports, Mr. Bush kept that request secret from other top advisers, including Mr. Powell, Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, and George J. Tenet, the director of central intelligence. But the general time line for war planning that is presented in the book is broadly consistent with other recent accounts, including public statements by Gen. Tommy R. Franks, the retired commander of the Iraq war. It generally upholds the insistence by Mr. Bush and his top advisers that they did not begin their war planning for Iraq until well after the Sept. 11 attacks, even if their attention was fixed on Iraq from early in the administration, as former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill has written in a recent book. In an interview with Mr. Woodward in December 2003, Mr. Bush said he had kept the early war-planning directive secret because if news of it had leaked out, it would have caused "enormous international angst and domestic speculation," the book says. The book also provides new details about the hurriedly arranged airstrike on March 19, 2003, in which the White House jump-started the war with a bomb and missile strike on the Dora Farms compound near Baghdad in a failed attempt to kill Mr. Hussein. The air raid, advocated by Mr. Tenet, had initially been opposed by General Franks, the book says, but was approved by President Bush and Vice President Cheney after they asked other advisers to leave the Oval Office. The strike was launched, the book says, on the basis of first-hand reports from Iraqi sources at Dora Farms enlisted by a network of 87 Iraqi spies, designated with the code name DB/ROCKSTARS, who had been recruited by a C.I.A. team that had infiltrated northern Iraq in the months before the war. In calls by satellite phone to the C.I.A. team, the Iraqi sources reported that Mr. Hussein's sons Uday and Qusay were at the compound, and that Mr. Hussein himself would return there. After the strike, the book says, one Iraqi source reported Mr. Hussein's body had been removed from the wreckage, prompting Mr. Tenet to celebrate what he thought had been a success. Even now, it is still not clear whether Mr. Hussein was at the site at all, though a C.I.A. official said on Friday that the agency maintained that Mr. Hussein was "probably" there and survived the American raid. Mr. Woodward's book reports that the Iraqi security guard who was the main source of the intelligence was killed in the American attack, but a C.I.A. official said that the Iraqi agents recruited by the agency had proved "extraordinarily productive." Over a period that began in early 2002, Mr. Powell is depicted as having cautioned Mr. Bush and other advisers repeatedly about the potential drawbacks of military action in Iraq. The "you break it, you own it" principle he cited in delivering those warnings was privately known to Mr. Powell and his deputy, Richard L. Armitage, as "the Pottery Barn rule," the book says. "You are going to be the proud owner of 25 million people," Mr. Powell is said to have told Mr. Bush in the summer of 2002. "You will own all their hopes, aspirations and problems. You'll own it all." Conservatives have long accused Mr. Powell of pursuing his own agenda, and of being more interested in depicting himself as right on the issues than as loyal to his president. Among the previously unknown episodes presented in the book was a White House meeting in December 2002 in which Mr. Tenet and his deputy, John McLaughlin, met with Mr. Bush and his top advisers for what was intended as a dress rehearsal for a public presentation of the administration's claim that Iraq possessed illicit weapons. Mr. Bush was not impressed by the presentation, the book reports, and urged that it be refined to make a stronger case to "Joe Public." He is said to have turned to Mr. Tenet and said, "I've been told all this intelligence about having W.M.D. and this is the best we've got?" In response, Mr. Tenet is described in the book as having twice assured Mr. Bush that the intelligence information supporting the American claims meant that the case was a "slam dunk." A C.I.A. official said that Mr. Tenet was reflecting an assessment spelled out in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that declared unambiguously that Iraq possessed both chemical and biological weapons. ___________________________________________ http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article6047.htm "Lunacy!" Said Powell On Wolfowitz Iraq Plan 17 April 2004 "PKJ" Bob Woodward’s new book, "Plan of Attack", to be released next week, could be the most damaging haymaker thrown yet at an administration reeling from a series of blows from former top insiders. Woodward, famous for uncovering the Watergate Scandal, had written previously on President Bush following the events of 911, but this new book is set to shatter the last panes in the hall of mirrors at the Bush White House. Quotes from Associated Press and the Washington Post: Secretary of State Colin Powell believed Vice President Dick Cheney developed an "unhealthy fixation" on trying to find a connection between Iraq and the Sept. 11 attacks. Bush in mid-2002 secretly approved the diversion of hundreds of millions of dollars meant for Afghanistan to projects that would set the stage for a massive deployment of U.S. troops to the Persian Gulf region. Woodward describes a relationship between Cheney and Powell that became so strained that they barely are on speaking terms. Powell believed Cheney was obsessed with trying to establish a connection between Iraq and al-Qaida and treated ambiguous intelligence as fact. Powell thought Cheney and his allies — his chief aide, Lewis "Scooter" Libby; Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz; Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith; and what Powell called Feith's "Gestapo" office — had established what amounted to a separate government. After being briefed by the CIA on Iraq’s WMDs: "Nice try," Bush said. "I don't think this quite — it's not something that Joe Public would understand or would gain a lot of confidence from." "Going into this period, I was praying for strength to do the Lord's will. ... I'm surely not going to justify war based upon God. Understand that. Nevertheless, in my case, I pray that I be as good a messenger of His will as possible. And then, of course, I pray for personal strength and for forgiveness." Wolfowitz proposed seizing Iraq's southern oil fields to build a foothold from which opposition groups could overthrow Saddam. Powell dismissed the plan as "lunacy." WOODWARD WILL TALK ON "60 MINUTES" THIS SUNDAY AT 8PM! | | |  | | Alpha | | Posted: Mon Apr 19, 2004 12:44 am Post subject: Bush's dangerous arrogance |
| Subj: Bush's dangerous arrogance Date: 4/18/04 4:02:05 PM Pacific Daylight Time From: jblankfort@earthlink.net Sent from the Internet (Details) What is significant about this article, apart from its contents, is that its author is a veteran correspondent who has been unabashedly pro-American. http://observer.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,6903,1194276,00.html Bush's dangerous arrogance HenryPorter Sunday April 18, 2004 The Observer Somewhere in the mesmerising performance by RobertS.McNamara, the former US Defence Secretary, in the film The Fog of War, he says: 'America has no friends, only allies.' It's a phrase that should be chiselled into the Cabinet table because each new Prime Minister believes that the special relationship, a phrase that is unrecognised in the States, entails special favours, access and status. Any such illusion must have disintegrated for Blair last week after Sharon and Bush, operating in the exclusive club of their victimhood, made an announcement about the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Naturally, the Palestinians were not consulted; it is merely their land. More surprising in a way was that Blair remained outside the loop from last Sunday onwards when Sharon's people met two members of the National Security Council and a senior American diplomat in Washington's Hay Adams Hotel to thrash out an agreement before Sharon arrived 48 hours later. Blair gave no hint of bitterness in the RoseGarden press conference on Friday, but considering the risks he has taken to support America since 9/11, it was astonishingly ungracious of Bush to keep him out of these negotiations. The 'Road Map' and the promise of multilateral action in Palestine and the West Bank were, after all, the only real concession that Blair won in exchange for British help in Iraq. Yet before he had even touched down in America, the deal was done. Bush's undertaking to his 'friend' had been chucked away like a motto in Christmas cracker. I am one of those who believe that Blair should be relieved of his duties because of the failure to find WMD but, even so, I would not wish the humiliation he has suffered on him or any British Prime Minister. He has been one of America's staunchest allies, biting his lip at the serial crassness of US commanders and arguing the American case tirelessly, as he did last weekend in these pages. Yet, despite the enthusiastic tone at the White House, the reality is that he was cast aside as soon as Bush didn't need him. American foreign policy consists entirely of self-interest, never more so than in an election year when a first-term President is pursuing an extra couple of per cent of Jewish votes in Florida and Ohio. For this, the President attempts to put the world's most serious problem into storage, leaving the destiny of people hanging in the air and the world open-mouthed at the nakedness of his motives. The Prime Minister has argued that the Sharon plan is, in effect, stage one of the 'Road Map' and that it may contain an opportunity for progress, but the signs are not hopeful for the simple reason that it dismisses Security Council resolution 242 which demands an Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 borders. Drafted by the British, 242 is the central pillar of the Palestinian case and to have it dismissed by the Americans and Israelis will add to their rage and sense of injustice. In his Observer article last week about Iraq, the Prime Minister wrote that a 'significant part of Western opinion is sitting back, if not half-hoping we fail, certainly replete with Schadenfreude at the difficulty we find'. There's a reason for this which he may have appreciated better at the end of last week than he did at the beginning. A vast proportion of intelligent Western opinion is sick of the world's most delicate problems being subsumed to the ambitions of a few American politicians. We hurried to war last year so that it wouldn't overlap with Bush's election campaign. We are about to hand over to a sovereign authority in Iraq, the nature of which is still unclear, so that he can distance himself from events there during the run-up to 4 November. Now, Bush dispatches the Palestinian problem to the distant rim of the agenda with this shoddy fix in a hotel room. TonyBlair was wrong to suggest that some wish for failure. The world is too perilous for that; they just pray that the American and British governments understand the reasons for the failures so far. Opponents of the war may have given up worrying about the WMD, mostly because Blair and Bush no longer feel the need to answer for their mistake. But this doesn't allay their fears about the disastrous mishandling of the peace. The mistakes are ongoing and cumulative, chiefly because America is perceived as having a distinct bias against Arabs and Islam. Britain, though more balanced in its attitude, is dragged along in the slipstream and no one inIraq is in the mood to make fine distinctions. A valuable lesson, which RobertMcNamara has lived long enough to learn and which he expresses with a certain gritty sadness in The Fog of War, is the need to empathise with your foe. America and Britain have failed to do that at practically every turn. Western troops are not regarded as bearers of the gift of democracy but an invading force that has ripped pride and sovereignty from the Iraqi people. This is not to say that Iraqis don't appreciate the beginnings of a free press and increased civil liberties, but other religious and cultural emotions have come into play. We must recognise them in order to isolate the real troublemakers. The most worrying trend has been the way so many stories have merged into a single current: Palestine, Iraq, the warnings to US citizens in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden's tape and the 9/11 hearings have all come together to create a sense of general intractability. The clash of civilisations predicted by American neoconservative thinkers seems to be happening before our eyes. There are solutions to many of these problems, chiefly an increased role for the United Nations, now being wooed by the Prime Minister and Bush. Kofi Annan should use this to his advantage, for the only way to establish peace in Iraq, or Palestine, is with the international community's reinvigorated will. The UN is the only organisation that can get Britain and America out of the mess they are in. Rather than being polite and diplomatic, the Secretary General should ram that message home, reminding them how America swept aside the reservations of the international community last year. The UN has suffered greatly from Bush's arrogance. He must now concede that US military might is not everything. Iraq was a mistake of a very large order and that should be entered into the public record so that the American public may consider it on 4 November. All is not lost. The solutions are there and we can reach for them if only we have the will to push back the American influence and rein in our Prime Minister's ludicrous attempt to strut the world stage. There were smiles of conviction and staunchness in the RoseGarden on Friday, indicating to some that the special relationship was not dead. But the only foreign leader who has any claim to be America's friend had just left town with the deeds to the West Bank in his back pocket. | |  | | Alpha | | Posted: Mon Apr 19, 2004 1:25 am Post subject: A NOT-SO-NEUTRAL CORNER |
| A NOT-SO-NEUTRAL CORNER By Ciro Scotti * Senior Editor, Business Week April 14, 2004 (From) Blame Bush for What Came After 9/11 "THE REAL THREAT"? Philip Zelikow, now the executive director of the September 11 commission, served on the National Security Council, was on the Bush transition team, and was a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 2001 to 2003. According to the Inter Press Service, he said during a war-on-terror forum at the University of Virginia Law School on Sept. 10, 2002: "I'll tell you what the real threat [is] and actually has been since 1990 -- it's the threat against Israel. And this is the threat that dares not speak its name because...the American government doesn't want to lean too hard on it rhetorically because it's not a popular sell." So to boil all this down, we went to war, sacrificed thousands of human lives, racked up billions in bills, and flouted the rules of international law for three basic reasons: Israel, oil, and the vengeance of a son whose father didn't finish off Saddam and then was targeted for assassination by the Iraqi Horror Show in 1993? * Ciro Scotti, senior editor for government and sports business, offers his views in A Not-So-Neutral Corner, only for BusinessWeek Online Edited by Douglas Harbrecht | |  | | Alpha | | Posted: Mon Apr 19, 2004 8:27 am Post subject: Uprising in Iraq, Attack Iran. |
| Subj: Uprising in Iraq, Attack Iran. Date: 4/18/04 7:47:16 PM Pacific Daylight Time From: hectorpv@comcast.net To: hectorpv@comcast.net Sent from the Internet (Details) Friends, Uprising in Iraq, Attack Iran. I just saw arch-neocon (JINSA Zionist extremist Jew) Michael Ledeen on Fox News stressing that Iran was behind the uprising in Iraq. The only way the US could have peace in Iraq would be to overthrow the governments in Iran and Syria (and even Saudi Arabia). America was facing a regional problem, he claimed, and it would have to deal with it regionally. In short, the worse things get in Iraq, the greater the need for the US to attack Iraq’s neighbors--in short the neocons’ World War IV scenario. It is an obvious case of worse is better—better for the implementation of neocons’ ultimate plan, that is. In the following article, Jim Lobe points out that a number of neocons are now claiming Iran is directing the revolt in Iraq and are arguing for various types of US military measures directed at Iraq. Lobe writes: "The Iran hand was first raised in connection with Sadr's revolt by Michael Rubin, who just returned as a ‘governance team advisor’ for the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq to his previous position as a resident fellow at AEI." _The Wall Street Journal_ states: "If warnings to Tehran from Washington don't impress them [the Iranian government], perhaps some cruise missiles aimed at the Bushehr nuclear site will concentrate their minds." _New York Times_ columnist William Safire advocates using special forces against Iran. _______________________ http://www.antiwar.com/lobe/?articleid=2282 April 10, 2004 Neocons See Iran Behind Shi'ite Uprising by Jim Lobe Neo-conservatives close to the administration of President George W Bush are pushing for retribution against Iran for, they say, sponsoring this week's Shiite uprising in Iraq led by radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. Despite the growing number of reports that depict the fighting as a spontaneous and indigenous revolt against the U.S.-led occupation, the influential neo-cons are calling on Bush to warn Tehran to cease its alleged backing for al-Sadr and other Shia militias or face retaliation, ranging from an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities to covert action designed to overthrow the government. But independent experts say that while Iran has no doubt provided various forms of assistance to Shia factions in Iraq since the ouster of former President Saddam Hussein one year ago, its relations with Sadr have long been rocky, and that it has opposed radical actions that could destabilize the situation. "Those elements closest to Iran among the Shiite clerics (in Iraq) have been the most moderate through all of this," according to Shaul Bakhash, an Iran expert at George Mason University here. Many regional specialists agree that Iran has a strategic interest in avoiding any train of events that risks plunging Iraq into chaos or civil war and partition. Neo-conservatives centered in Vice President Dick Cheney's office and among the civilian leadership in the Pentagon have strongly opposed any détente with Iran, and have frequently blamed it for problems the United States has encountered in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Neo-conservatives outside the administration, such as former Defense Policy Board chairman Richard Perle and his colleagues at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Michael Ledeen and Reuel Marc Gerecht, called even before the Iraq war for Washington to support indigenous efforts to oust the "mullahcracy" in Tehran, which is seen as an archenemy of both the United States and Israel. Some neo-conservatives have seized on Sadr's uprising as a new opportunity both to raise tensions against Iran and to divert attention from Washington's bungling of relations with the Shia community in Iraq. Top U.S. officials both here and in Iraq have not yet named Iran as the hidden hand behind Sadr, although a senior reporter at the right-wing Washington Times, Rowan Scarborough, quoted unnamed "military sources" Wednesday as telling him that Sadr "is being aided directly by Iran's Revolutionary Guard and by Hezbollah, an Iranian-created terrorist group based in Lebanon." Unnamed "Pentagon officials" gave a similar account to the New York Times, although Times reporter James Risen stressed that CIA officials disagreed with that analysis, adding, "some intelligence officials believe that the Pentagon has been eager to link Hezbollah to the violence in Iraq to link the Iranian regime more closely to anti-American terrorism." The Iran hand was first raised in connection with Sadr's revolt by Michael Rubin, who just returned as a "governance team advisor" for the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq to his previous position as a resident fellow at AEI. In a column published in the Los Angeles Times on Sunday, he complained that Washington and the CPA had failed to provide liberal and democratic Iraqi leaders with anything like the kind of support that Iran was supplying to radical Shia leaders and their "gangs." Rubin said that on a visit to the Shia-dominated south he found that Iranians were pouring money and arms to key Islamist parties, including the Da'wa, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and Sadr himself, whose rise over the past year, according to Rubin, is explained by the "ample funding he receives through Iran-based cleric Ayatollah Kazem al Haeri, a close associate of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini." Another senior CPA adviser, Larry Diamond, a neo-conservative who specializes in democratization at the California-based Hoover Institution, told IPS this week that Sadr's Mahdi Army, and other Shia militias, are being armed and financed by Iran with the aim of imposing "another Iranian-style theocracy." "Iran is embarked on a concerned, clever, lavishly-resourced campaign to defeat any effort for any genuine pluralist democracy in Iraq," said Diamond. "The longer we wait to confront the thug, the more troops he'll have in his army, the more arms he'll have and financial support – virtually all coming from Iran – the more he will intimidate and kill sincere democratic actors in the country, and the more impossible our task at building democracy will become." "I think we should tell the Iranian regime that if they don't cease and desist, we will play the same game, that we will destabilize them," he added. On Tuesday, the Wall Street Journal's editorial page took up the same theme, arguing that Sadr has talked "openly of creating an Iranian-style Islamic Republic in Iraq (and) has visited Tehran since the fall of Saddam. "His Mahdi militia is almost certainly financed and trained by Iranians," the editorial continued, adding, "Revolutionary Guards may be instigating some of the current unrest." "As for Tehran, we would hope the Sadr uprising puts to rest the illusion that the mullahs (in Tehran) can be appeased. As Bernard Lewis teaches, Middle Eastern leaders interpret American restraint as weakness. Iran's mullahs fear a Muslim democracy in Iraq because is it a direct threat to their own rule." "If warnings to Tehran from Washington don't impress them, perhaps some cruise missiles aimed at the Bushehr nuclear site will concentrate their minds," the Journal suggested. On Wednesday, New York Times columnist William Safire asserted the existence of an axis involving Sadr, Iran, Hezbollah and Syria. "We should break the Iranian-Hezbollah-Sadr connection in ways that our special forces know how to do," he wrote. But this line of reasoning appears particularly curious to Bakhash, who notes that the Sadr family, including Moqtada himself, is precisely the kind of Iraqi Shiite who would be deeply suspicious of Tehran. "Sadr's father was a strong Iraqi nationalist, like Moqtada himself," he told IPS. "He often used to question why there were in Iraq ayatollahs who spoke Arabic with a Persian accent." Like other experts, Bakhash believes that Iran has indeed been heavily involved with the Iraqi Shia community, but sees the leadership providing far more support to SCIRI and its Badr brigades than to Sadr, who, from Tehran's point of view, is seen as untrustworthy. Bakhash also questions the neo-conservative assumption that Iran wants to destabilize Iraq now. "Obviously the Iranians are not unhappy to see the Americans discomfited in Iraq, but I don't think it's the policy of the Iranian government to destabilize Iraq right along its own border," he said. Middle East historian Juan Cole of the University of Michigan also questions the notion of a link between Iran and Sadr in the current uprising. While Sadr's views on theocratic government are consistent with those of Iranian hardliners, according to Cole, his outspoken Iraqi nationalism poses a major challenge to Khameini's claim to authority over all Shiite religious communities, including those outside Iran. Contrary to the Journal's assumptions, adds Cole, Sadr did not receive much encouragement from the Iranian leaders he met in Tehran. "The message he got was that he should stop being so divisive and should cooperate more with the other Shiite leaders." Geoffrey Kemp, an Iran specialist at the Nixon Center and Middle East adviser on former president Ronald Reagan's National Security Council staff, says he has little doubt the Iranians have influence with several different Shiite groups, and that there might even be "rogue elements" inside Iraq who back Sadr. But he agrees that Tehran's strongest ties are with SCIRI and the Badr Brigades, who were trained by the Revolutionary Guard inside Iran during Hussein's rule. "The situation is far too complex to make simplistic statements about what Iran is or is not doing," Kemp told IPS. "But to suggest that this is an Iranian-inspired insurrection is a stretch." "The neo-conservatives are all so heavily invested in the success of Iraq that instead of blaming the Pentagon for some extraordinary blunders, they want to blame everyone else – the State Department, the Iranians, the Syrians for the mess that was partly of their own making. Find this article at: http://www.antiwar.com/lobe/?articleid=2282 | |  | | Alpha | |  | | Alpha | |  | | Alpha | |  | | | ©2002-2009 WarWithoutEnd.co.uk |