War Without End

Guest

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4096-2002Dec17.html

washingtonpost.com
Projection on Fall Of Hussein Disputed
Ground Forces Chiefs, Pentagon at Odds

By Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, December 18, 2002; Page A01

With war possible soon in Iraq, the chiefs of the two U.S. ground forces are challenging the belief of some senior Pentagon civilians that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein will fall almost immediately upon being attacked and are calling for more attention to planning for worst-case scenarios, Defense Department officials said.

The U.S. war plan for a possible attack on Iraq, which has been almost a year in the making, calls for a fast-moving ground attack without an overwhelming number of reinforcements on hand. Instead, some follow-on troops would be flown into Iraq from outside the region. Among other things, this "rolling start" would seek to achieve tactical surprise by launching an attack before the U.S. military appears ready to do so.

In addition, the plan calls for some armored units, instead of traveling a predetermined distance and pausing to allow slow-moving supply trucks to catch up, to charge across Iraq until they run into armed opposition and then engage in combat, officials said.

Those aspects of the plan, which appear riskier than usual U.S. military practice, worry the chief of the Army, Gen. Eric Shinseki, and the commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. James L. Jones, defense officials said.

Shinseki and Jones, who as service chiefs are members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have questioned the contention of Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz and other top officials that Hussein's government is likely to collapse almost as soon as a U.S. attack is launched, the officials said.

The two generals are concerned that the Wolfowitz school may underestimate the risks involved, the officials said. They have argued that planning should prepare thoroughly for worst-case scenarios, most notably one that planners have labeled "Fortress Baghdad," in which Hussein withdraws his most loyal forces into the Iraqi capital and challenges the United States to enter into protracted street fighting, perhaps involving chemical or biological weapons.

In an interview last night, Wolfowitz rejected the view that he has been overoptimistic in his views. He said he also believes that, "You've got to be prepared for the worst case." He added: "It would be a terrible mistake for anyone to think they can predict with confidence what the course of a war is going to be." In discussions of the war plan, he said, he has repeatedly emphasized the risk of Hussein "using his most terrible weapons."

The dispute, which is taking place mainly in secret reviews of the war plan, promises to be the last major issue in the Pentagon's consideration of that plan, as more signs point toward forces being ready to launch a wide-ranging, highly synchronized ground and air attack in six to eight weeks. Psychological operations, such as leafleting and broadcasting into Iraq, have been stepped up lately, and there is talk at the Pentagon of large-scale troop movements or mobilizations being announced soon after the holidays.

The debate became more open last week when Jones alluded to it in comments made at a dinner held in his honor by former defense secretary William S. Cohen. Jones is scheduled next month to leave the Marine post to become the commander of U.S. military forces in Europe. At that dinner, Jones indicated that he and other senior officers did not share the "optimism" of others about the ease of fighting in Iraq.

In an interview, Jones said that he did not name who he thought was being overly optimistic. "I did not say, 'folks at the Pentagon,' " he said. "I said I didn't align myself with folks around town who seem to think that this is preordained to be a very easy military operation."

If a victory were swiftly won, he continued: "It is to be celebrated. But military planners should always plan for the worst case." He insisted that in his remarks he had not expressed a conclusion about how quickly Hussein might fall.

He said he believed that he and Shinseki, the Army chief, "are of the same view on this."

If anything, the Army's leadership is even more worried than Jones, said a senior officer who sides with the Wolfowitz view. "The Army really is conservative on this," he said dismissively.

The Army also has qualms about the likely burden of postwar peacekeeping in Iraq -- a mission that is likely to be executed mainly by the Army. "They're concerned they're going to be left holding the bag after everyone else has gone home," said Andrew Krepinevich, a retired Army officer who is now director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a small but influential defense think tank.

The chief of the Air Force, Gen. John P. Jumper, is said to side with the Wolfowitz view, believing that the opening round of bombing, combined with an intense propaganda campaign and Special Operations attacks, is likely to topple the government quickly. The fourth service chief, the Navy's Adm. VernClark, sides with Jumper, but not as emphatically, officials said.

The influence of the Joint Chiefs on military policy appears to have diminished under Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, so it is not clear what effect the recent round of questioning will have on the war plan.

Former House speaker Newt Gingrich, a Rumsfeld confidant, predicted that it would have little. "If the chiefs wanted to be extremely cautious, extremely conservative and design a risk-avoiding strategy, that would be nothing new," he said in an interview.

Gingrich, who also is a member of the Defense Policy Board, a Pentagon advisory panel, said he was confident that Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks, the commander of U.S. forces in the Mideast, would not be swayed by suggestions that he include more reinforcements and plan a more cautious attack. Franks, he said, "will probably have a more integrated, more aggressive and more risk-taking plan."

© 2002 The Washington Post Company

Guest · Posted: Wed Dec 18, 2002 8:54 pm Post subject:

It will take a while.

Maybe all day.

Guest

[quote="Anonymous"]http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4096-2002Dec17.html

washingtonpost.com
Projection on Fall Of Hussein Disputed
Ground Forces Chiefs, Pentagon at Odds

By Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, December 18, 2002; Page A01

With war possible soon in Iraq, the chiefs of the two U.S. ground forces are challenging the belief of some senior Pentagon civilians that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein will fall almost immediately upon being attacked and are calling for more attention to planning for worst-case scenarios, Defense Department officials said.

The U.S. war plan for a possible attack on Iraq, which has been almost a year in the making, calls for a fast-moving ground attack without an overwhelming number of reinforcements on hand. Instead, some follow-on troops would be flown into Iraq from outside the region. Among other things, this "rolling start" would seek to achieve tactical surprise by launching an attack before the U.S. military appears ready to do so.

In addition, the plan calls for some armored units, instead of traveling a predetermined distance and pausing to allow slow-moving supply trucks to catch up, to charge across Iraq until they run into armed opposition and then engage in combat, officials said.

Those aspects of the plan, which appear riskier than usual U.S. military practice, worry the chief of the Army, Gen. Eric Shinseki, and the commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. James L. Jones, defense officials said.

Shinseki and Jones, who as service chiefs are members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have questioned the contention of Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz and other top officials that Hussein's government is likely to collapse almost as soon as a U.S. attack is launched, the officials said.

The two generals are concerned that the Wolfowitz school may underestimate the risks involved, the officials said. They have argued that planning should prepare thoroughly for worst-case scenarios, most notably one that planners have labeled "Fortress Baghdad," in which Hussein withdraws his most loyal forces into the Iraqi capital and challenges the United States to enter into protracted street fighting, perhaps involving chemical or biological weapons.

In an interview last night, Wolfowitz rejected the view that he has been overoptimistic in his views. He said he also believes that, "You've got to be prepared for the worst case." He added: "It would be a terrible mistake for anyone to think they can predict with confidence what the course of a war is going to be." In discussions of the war plan, he said, he has repeatedly emphasized the risk of Hussein "using his most terrible weapons."

The dispute, which is taking place mainly in secret reviews of the war plan, promises to be the last major issue in the Pentagon's consideration of that plan, as more signs point toward forces being ready to launch a wide-ranging, highly synchronized ground and air attack in six to eight weeks. Psychological operations, such as leafleting and broadcasting into Iraq, have been stepped up lately, and there is talk at the Pentagon of large-scale troop movements or mobilizations being announced soon after the holidays.

The debate became more open last week when Jones alluded to it in comments made at a dinner held in his honor by former defense secretary William S. Cohen. Jones is scheduled next month to leave the Marine post to become the commander of U.S. military forces in Europe. At that dinner, Jones indicated that he and other senior officers did not share the "optimism" of others about the ease of fighting in Iraq.

In an interview, Jones said that he did not name who he thought was being overly optimistic. "I did not say, 'folks at the Pentagon,' " he said. "I said I didn't align myself with folks around town who seem to think that this is preordained to be a very easy military operation."

If a victory were swiftly won, he continued: "It is to be celebrated. But military planners should always plan for the worst case." He insisted that in his remarks he had not expressed a conclusion about how quickly Hussein might fall.

He said he believed that he and Shinseki, the Army chief, "are of the same view on this."

If anything, the Army's leadership is even more worried than Jones, said a senior officer who sides with the Wolfowitz view. "The Army really is conservative on this," he said dismissively.

The Army also has qualms about the likely burden of postwar peacekeeping in Iraq -- a mission that is likely to be executed mainly by the Army. "They're concerned they're going to be left holding the bag after everyone else has gone home," said Andrew Krepinevich, a retired Army officer who is now director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a small but influential defense think tank.

The chief of the Air Force, Gen. John P. Jumper, is said to side with the Wolfowitz view, believing that the opening round of bombing, combined with an intense propaganda campaign and Special Operations attacks, is likely to topple the government quickly. The fourth service chief, the Navy's Adm. VernClark, sides with Jumper, but not as emphatically, officials said.

The influence of the Joint Chiefs on military policy appears to have diminished under Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, so it is not clear what effect the recent round of questioning will have on the war plan.

Former House speaker Newt Gingrich, a Rumsfeld confidant, predicted that it would have little. "If the chiefs wanted to be extremely cautious, extremely conservative and design a risk-avoiding strategy, that would be nothing new," he said in an interview.

Gingrich, who also is a member of the Defense Policy Board, a Pentagon advisory panel, said he was confident that Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks, the commander of U.S. forces in the Mideast, would not be swayed by suggestions that he include more reinforcements and plan a more cautious attack. Franks, he said, "will probably have a more integrated, more aggressive and more risk-taking plan."

Looks like the JINSA Zionist chickenhawks of Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle are at odds with the military officials who actually know what war is like:

Zionist Paul Wolfowitz in Bush Regime is the Enemy Within

http://www.warwithoutend.co.uk/middle-east-and-asia/2002/12/17/zionist-paul-wolfowitz-in-bush-regime-is-the-enemy-within.php

Guest · Posted: Thu Dec 19, 2002 12:44 am Post subject:

First, Iraqi power goes out. Then, electronic circuitry gets fried, making fiber optic cables and battery power both irrelevant. Radar is out, making target tracking impossible. Troops are stranded without communication, and moral quickly deteriorates. Fear sets in. Iraqi troops know that without communication, they can surrender without their bosses even knowing. Any airforce that can get off the ground is gone the firest day. Outlying troops are gone within 2 days.

Here's the best part. Troops in Baghdad that can't travel and can't communicate are impotent after strategic sites are taken out with smart weapons. Most surrender, and the resistance, who have friends in town and know the terrain, takes out the rest.

Gone. Adios. Buh-bye.

Guest

Guest · Posted: Sun Dec 22, 2002 10:45 pm Post subject: Israel readies for Iraq conflict

Israel readies for Iraq conflict:

http://www.warwithoutend.co.uk/middle-east-and-asia/2002/12/22/israel-readies-for-iraq-conflict.php

Guest

Pentagon to Dispatch Thousands to Gulf

http://www.warwithoutend.co.uk/middle-east-and-asia/2002/12/20/pentagon-to-dispatch-thousands-to-gulf.php

Guest · Posted: Mon Dec 23, 2002 2:20 am Post subject:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of the Spokesman
December 19, 2002
Fact Sheet
Illustrative Examples of Omissions from the
Iraqi Declaration to the United Nations Security Council

Anthrax and Other Undeclared Biological Agents

The UN Special Commission concluded that Iraq did not verifiably account for, at a minimum, 2160kg of growth media.
This is enough to produce 26,000 liters of anthrax -- 3 times the amount Iraq declared; 1200 liters of botulinum toxin; and, 5500 liters of clostridium perfrigens -- 16 times the amount Iraq declared.
Why does the Iraqi declaration ignore these dangerous agents in its tally?
Ballistic Missiles

Iraq has disclosed manufacturing new energetic fuels suited only to a class of missile to which it does not admit.
Iraq claims that flight-testing of a larger diameter missile falls within the 150km limit. This claim is not credible.
Why is the Iraqi regime manufacturing fuels for missiles it says it does not have?
Nuclear Weapons

The Declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger.
Why is the Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement?
VX

In 1999, UN Special Commission and international experts concluded that Iraq needed to provide additional, credible information about VX production.
The declaration provides no information to address these concerns.
What is the Iraqi regime trying to hide by not providing this information?
Chemical and Biological Weapons Munitions

In January 1999, the UN Special Commission reported that Iraq failed to provide credible evidence that 550 mustard gas-filled artillery shells and 400 biological weapon-capable aerial bombs had been lost or destroyed.
The Iraqi regime has never adequately accounted for hundreds, possibly thousands, of tons of chemical precursors.
Again, what is the Iraqi regime trying to hide by not providing this information?
Empty Chemical Munitions

There is no adequate accounting for nearly 30,000 empty munitions that could be filled with chemical agents.
Where are these munitions?
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) Programs

Iraq denies any connection between UAV programs and chemical or biological agent dispersal. Yet, Iraq admitted in 1995 that a MIG-21 remote-piloted vehicle tested in 1991 was to carry a biological weapon spray system.
Iraq already knows how to put these biological agents into bombs and how to disperse biological agent using aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles.
Why do they deny what they have already admitted? Why has the Iraqi regime acquired the range and auto-flight capabilities to spray biological weapons?
Mobile Biological Weapon Agent Facilities

The Iraqi declaration provides no information about its mobile biological weapon agent facilities. Instead it insists that these are “refrigeration vehicles and food testing laboratories.”
What is the Iraqi regime trying to hide about their mobile biological weapon facilities?
Summary
None of these holes and gaps in Iraq's declaration are mere accidents, editing oversights or technical mistakes: they are material omissions.

Guest · Posted: Sun Dec 29, 2002 12:38 am Post subject: Sharon's war?:

Sharon's war?:

http://www.warwithoutend.co.uk/middle-east-and-asia/2002/12/28/sharon-s-war.php

War Without End

The global war against terror, news about the illegal invasion of Iraq, the corporate puppet presidents, the war criminal Tony Blair, September 11th 2001, the USS Liberty and New World Order crimes against humanity.

Projection on Fall Of Hussein Disputed