| Author | Message | | Alpha | | Posted: Sun Oct 24, 2004 8:13 am Post subject: Iraq Report steers clear of interrogators' boss |
| http://www.sptimes.com/2004/05/08/Worldandnation/Report_steers_clear_o.shtml
Iraq Report steers clear of interrogators' boss
By SUSAN TAYLOR MARTIN, Times Senior Correspondent
Published May 8, 2004
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A scathing report on prisoner abuse in Iraq found that U.S. military intelligence interrogators set "physical and mental conditions" for questioning inmates that contributed to the shocking acts of abuse.
But except for one brief mention, the 55-page report contains nothing about the role of the top military intelligence officer in Iraq, Maj. Gen. Barbara Fast. As head of intelligence for the U.S. command in Baghdad, Fast was in charge of interrogators at Abu Ghraib, where prisoners were beaten, sodomized and photographed in sexually degrading positions.
Experts contacted by the St. Petersburg Times say strict adherence to military protocol - and a possible reluctance to delve too far into intelligence operations - have kept Fast out of the spotlight even as her boss, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, faces blistering criticism and calls to resign.
That the investigation into prisoner abuse was conducted by a major general may be one reason why Fast, an officer of equal rank, apparently has undergone little scrutiny, one expert says.
"The military is very conscious of rank - if you want to investigate a major general you need a lieutenant general," said Larry Korb, a former Navy captain and assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration.
"I think when they appointed a major general they never assumed it was going to go much higher - they figured it was basically a bunch of out-of-control young reservists and didn't realize the extent to which they had a problem, not the least of which was who was in charge."
Korb said he was amazed at the murky lines of authority at Abu Ghraib, which technically was run by military police, but where certain cell bocks were controlled by military intelligence officers, CIA officials and civilian contractors.
"I worked in the Pentagon, I spent four years in active duty and 20 in the reserves but I've never seen such a command-relations structure where it's so unclear who's reporting to whom," said Korb, now a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress in Washington.
The investigation focused on abuse of prisoners by members of the 800th Military Police Brigade, led by Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski from last July until she was reassigned in January. The report, by Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, severely faulted Karpinski's leadership and found that the reservists under her command were poorly trained and supervised.
However, the report also says military intelligence officers set the conditions for "favorable" interrogation of prisoners, including instructions on how to "loosen up" inmates so they would talk.
In a sworn statement, one reservist said prisoners "were made to do various things that I would question morally." Another said "MI" - military intelligence - "would tell us to take away their mattresses, sheets and clothes."
Over Karpinski's apparent opposition, military police units at Abu Ghraib were under the command of Col. Thomas Pappas, whose 205th Military Intelligence Brigade came under Fast's oversight.
"This effectively made a military intelligence officer, rather than a military police officer, responsible for the MP units conducting detainee operations at that facility," the report says. "This is doctrinally unsound due to the different missions and agendas assigned to each of these respective specialties."
The report recommended Pappas be reprimanded for failing, among other things, to ensure his soldiers followed the Geneva Convention on humane treatment of prisoners of war.
Pappas was among those "either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuse at Abu Ghraib," the report said.
But Korb, the former assistant secretary of defense, said "it's a legitimate question" why the investigation stopped at Pappas' level and didn't examine the role of his superiors, including Maj. Gen. Fast, head of intelligence in Iraq.
"Whenever Rumsfeld and Myers (chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) get around to reading this report, they should say, "Okay, we need to get this major general involved because obviously someone was telling Pappas what to do,"' Korb said.
An investigation into intelligence practices in Afghanistan and Iraq, including at Abu Ghraib prison, was begun April 23 by Maj. Gen. George Fay, the Army's deputy chief of staff for intelligence.
In Taguba's report, the only mention of Fast refers to her position as "detainee release authority," in charge of deciding which inmates accused of crimes against the coalition could be released.
According to Karpinski, who was formally in charge of Iraq's prison system, those detainees made up 60 percent of the prison population and were the fastest-growing segment. However, Karpinski told investigators, Fast "routinely" denied recommendations to release inmates who were no longer deemed a threat and clearly met the requirements for release.
Karpinski further complained that "the extremely slow and ineffective release process has significantly contributed to the overcrowding of the facilities," Taguba's report said.
As head of intelligence in Iraq, Fast would have been responsible for intelligence officers working inside Abu Ghraib. She also "would have been very interested in the interrogation reports coming out of that prison," says Charles Heyman, senior defense analyst for Jane's Consultancy.
"Information from the prisoners is very valuable to the intelligence community so the intelligence community is going to have someone in that the prison system," he said.
Under standard procedures, "very high-ranking" officers like Fast and Karpinski would have agreed between themselves who would be responsible for what in the prisons.
"Where it could have gone wrong," Heyman said, "is that the CIA could have wandered in and said, "Hey, we're going to park ourselves with the intelligence people' and the intelligence people didn't tell the prison system."
The scant mention of Fast in the report is likely because Taguba was told to focus on the role of the military police, not military intelligence.
"His report at the end of the day will be straight down the parameter he was given," Heyman said, "but the report is probably 20 percent of what he knows."
Neither Taguba nor Karpinski, who was the only female commander in Iraq, could be reached for comment. Fast declined to respond to an e-mailed list of questions because "an interrogation investigation is in process. It would not be appropriate at this time to answer the questions," according to a colonel who replied on her behalf.
Unlike Karpinski, whose military career probably will end because of the scandal, Fast still appears to be highly regarded and remains on active duty in Baghdad.
Fast, 50, graduated from the University of Missouri with a degree in education and has a master's degree in business administration from Boston University. Before her current assignment, she was director of intelligence for U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, Germany, and deputy commander of Fort Huachuca in Arizona.
Last month, the Pentagon announced Fast will return to Fort Huachuca - to head the Army Intelligence Center.
The fort's Web site described the center as "focused on leading, training, equipping and supporting the world's premier corps of military intelligence professionals - imbued with a warrior spirit, self-discipline and mutual respect."
- Susan Taylor Martin can be contacted at susan@sptimes.com
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Sudanese minister denies 'ethnic cleansing' | |  | | Alpha | | Posted: Sun Oct 24, 2004 5:34 pm Post subject: Memo Lets CIA Take Detainees Out of Iraq |
| Memo Lets CIA Take Detainees Out of Iraq
Sun Oct 24, 8:21 AM ET
By Dana Priest, Washington Post Staff Writer
At the request of the CIA (news - web sites), the Justice Department (news - web sites) drafted a confidential memo that authorizes the agency to transfer detainees out of Iraq (news - web sites) for interrogation -- a practice that international legal specialists say contravenes the Geneva Conventions.
One intelligence official familiar with the operation said the CIA has used the March draft memo as legal support for secretly transporting as many as a dozen detainees out of Iraq in the last six months. The agency has concealed the detainees from the International Committee of the Red Cross and other authorities, the official said.
The draft opinion, written by the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel and dated March 19, 2004, refers to both Iraqi citizens and foreigners in Iraq, who the memo says are protected by the treaty. It permits the CIA to take Iraqis out of the country to be interrogated for a "brief but not indefinite period." It also says the CIA can permanently remove persons deemed to be "illegal aliens" under "local immigration law."
Some specialists in international law say the opinion amounts to a reinterpretation of one of the most basic rights of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which protects civilians during wartime and occupation, including insurgents who were not part of Iraq's military.
The treaty prohibits the "[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory . . . regardless of their motive."
The 1949 treaty notes that a violation of this particular provision constitutes a "grave breach" of the accord, and thus a "war crime" under U.S. federal law, according to a footnote in the Justice Department draft. "For these reasons," the footnote reads, "we recommend that any contemplated relocations of 'protected persons' from Iraq to facilitate interrogation be carefully evaluated for compliance with Article 49 on a case by case basis." It says that even persons removed from Iraq retain the treaty's protections, which would include humane treatment and access to international monitors.
During the war in Afghanistan (news - web sites), the administration ruled that al Qaeda fighters were not considered "protected persons" under the convention. Many of them were transferred out of the country to the naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and elsewhere for interrogations. By contrast, the U.S. government deems former members of Saddam Hussein (news - web sites)'s Baath Party and military, as well as insurgents and other civilians in Iraq, to be protected by the Geneva Conventions.
International law experts contacted for this article described the legal reasoning contained in the Justice Department memo as unconventional and disturbing.
"The overall thrust of the Convention is to keep from moving people out of the country and out of the protection of the Convention," said former senior military attorney Scott Silliman, executive director of Duke University's Center on Law, Ethics and National Security. "The memorandum seeks to create a legal regime justifying conduct that the international community clearly considers in violation of international law and the Convention." Silliman reviewed the document at The Post's request.
The CIA, Justice Department and the author of the draft opinion, Jack L. Goldsmith, former director of the Office of Legal Counsel, declined to comment for this article.
CIA officials have not disclosed the identities or locations of its Iraq detainees to congressional oversight committees, the Defense Department or CIA investigators who are reviewing detention policy, according to two informed U.S. government officials and a confidential e-mail on the subject shown to The Washington Post.
White House officials disputed the notion that Goldsmith's interpretation of the treaty was unusual, although they did not explain why. "The Geneva Conventions are applicable to the conflict in Iraq, and our policy is to comply with the Geneva Conventions," White House spokesman Sean McCormick said.
The Office of Legal Counsel also wrote the Aug. 1, 2002, memo on torture that advised the CIA and White House that torturing al Qaeda terrorists in captivity abroad "may be justified," and that international laws against torture "may be unconstitutional if applied to interrogations" conducted in the war on terrorism. President Bush (news - web sites)'s aides repudiated that memo once it became public this June.
The Office of Legal Counsel writes legal opinions considered binding on federal agencies and departments. The March 19 document obtained by The Post is stamped "draft" and was not finalized, said one U.S. official involved in the legal deliberations. However, the memo was sent to the general counsels at the National Security Council, the CIA and the departments of State and Defense.
"The memo was a green light," an intelligence official said. "The CIA used the memo to remove other people from Iraq."
Since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the CIA has used broad authority granted in a series of legal opinions and guidance from the Office of Legal Counsel and its own general counsel's office to transfer, interrogate and detain individuals suspected of terrorist activities at a series of undisclosed locations around the world.
According to current and former agency officials, the CIA has a rendition policy that has permitted the agency to transfer an unknown number of suspected terrorists captured in one country into the hands of security services in other countries whose record of human rights abuse is well documented. These individuals, as well as those at CIA detention facilities, have no access to any recognized legal process or rights.
The scandal at Abu Ghraib, and the investigations and congressional hearings that followed, forced the disclosure of the Pentagon (news - web sites)'s behind-closed-doors debate and classified rules for detentions and interrogations at Guantanamo Bay and in Afghanistan and Iraq. Senior defense leaders have repeatedly been called to explain and defend their policies before Congress. But the CIA's policies and practices remain shrouded in secrecy.
The only public account of CIA detainee treatment comes from soldier testimony and Defense Department investigations of military conduct. For instance, Army Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba's report on Abu Ghraib criticized the CIA practice of maintaining "ghost detainees" -- prisoners who were not officially registered and were moved around inside the prison to hide them from Red Cross teams. Taguba called the practice "deceptive, contrary to Army doctrine and in violation of international law."
Gen. Paul J. Kern, who oversaw another Army inquiry, told Congress that the number of CIA ghost detainees "is in the dozens, to perhaps up to 100."
The March 19, 2004, Justice Department memo by Goldsmith deals with a previously unknown class of people -- those removed from Iraq.
It is not clear why the CIA would feel the need to remove detainees from Iraq for interrogation. A U.S. government official who has been briefed on the CIA's detention practices said some detainees are probably taken to other countries because "that's where the agency has the people, expertise and interrogation facilities, where their people and programs are in place."
The origin of the Justice Department memo is directly related to the only publicly acknowledged ghost detainee, Hiwa Abdul Rahman Rashul, nicknamed "Triple X" by CIA and military officials.
Rashul, a suspected member of the Iraqi Al-Ansar terrorist group, was captured by Kurdish soldiers in June or July of 2003 and turned over to the CIA, which whisked him to Afghanistan for interrogation.
In October, White House counsel Alberto R. Gonzales asked the Office of Legal Counsel to write an opinion on "protected persons" in Iraq and rule on the status of Rashul, according to another U.S. government official involved in the deliberations.
Goldsmith, then head of the office, ruled that Rashul was a "protected person" under the Fourth Geneva Convention and therefore had to be brought back to Iraq, several intelligence and defense officials said.
The CIA was not happy with the decision, according to two intelligence officials. It promptly brought Rashul back and suspended any other transfers out of the country.
At the same time, when transferring Rashul back to Iraq, then-CIA Director George J. Tenet asked Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld not to give Rashul a prisoner number and to hide him from International Red Cross officials, according to an account provided by Rumsfeld during a June 17 Pentagon news conference. Rumsfeld complied.
As a "ghost detainee," Rashul became lost in the prison system for seven months.
Rumsfeld did not fully explain the reason he had complied with Tenet's request or under what legal authority he could have kept Rashul hidden for so long. "We know from our knowledge that [Tenet] has the authority to do this," he said.
Rashul, defense and intelligence officials noted, had not once been interrogated since he was returned to Iraq. His current status is unknown.
In the one-page October 2003 interim ruling that directed Rashul's return, Goldsmith also created a new category of persons in Iraq whom he said did not qualify for protection under the Geneva Conventions. They are non-Iraqis who are not members of the former Baath Party and who went to Iraq after the invasion.
After Goldsmith's ruling, the CIA and Gonzales asked the Office of Legal Counsel for a more complete legal opinion on "protected persons" in Iraq and on the legality of transferring people out of Iraq for interrogation. "That case started the CIA yammering to Justice to get a better memo," said one intelligence officer familiar with the interagency discussion.
Michael Byers, a professor and international law expert at the University of British Columbia, said that creating a legal justification for removing protected persons from Iraq "is extraordinarily disturbing."
"What they are doing is interpreting an exception into an all-encompassing right, in one of the most fundamental treaties in history," Byers said. The Geneva Convention "is as close as you get to protecting human rights in times of chaos. There's no ambiguity here." | | | | Alpha | | Posted: Tue Oct 26, 2004 5:52 am Post subject: Abu Ghraib Guards Kept a Log Of Prison Conditions, Practices |
| The Israelis got into Abu Ghraib and elsewhere via the 'OGA' and private contractors:
washingtonpost.com
Abu Ghraib Guards Kept a Log Of Prison Conditions, Practices
By Josh White
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, October 25, 2004; Page A14
The military police soldiers who ran the high-security wing of the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq kept an unofficial log of their daily activities, a diary of sorts that documents the conditions that gripped the prison during the months that detainees were abused in what would later erupt into an international scandal.
From Oct. 19, 2003, to Jan. 18, 2004 -- just days after digital photographs of soldiers mistreating prisoners were turned in to Army criminal investigators -- the members of the 372nd Military Police Company who ran tiers 1A and 1B at Abu Ghraib jotted their experiences in a light green ledger kept in a prison office. On the log's cover is printed in large, handwritten letters: "MI Wing." A copy of the log was obtained by The Washington Post.
Day after day, the log's more than 50 pages of handwritten notes and observations describe a spartan prison where some inmates inexplicably vomited after meals, a detainee regularly covered himself in his own feces, and others sharpened toothbrushes into makeshift weapons. There were fights, attacks on soldiers and riots.
"Note: No power. No water. Prison in state of lockdown," a soldier wrote on Nov. 17, 2003.
The Army soldiers, some of whom have been charged by the military with crimes for the abuses, logged a stream of mysterious and unregistered inmates held by unnamed U.S. government agents, a group of "ghost detainees" who were locked behind a row of 10 solid iron doors.
References to "OGA," for Other Government Agency, appear throughout the logbook, meaning agencies such as the CIA and FBI, which had operatives in Iraq looking for the highest-value targets. "We didn't know anything about them," said one MP from the 372nd, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of ongoing investigations. "We called them X-Men. They were there, but they weren't there."
The soldiers also wrote about unclear orders being passed down orally from military intelligence officials to "put pressure" on detainees of high intelligence value -- though none of the entries referred directly to the abuses made internationally infamous in digital photographs and in reports arising from multiple military investigations.
"MI handlers will be turning on heat to this one," reads an entry at 2:30 a.m. on Nov. 12, referring to inmate No. 152529, identified in investigative documents as Asad Hamza Hanfosh. In a statement, Hanfosh alleged that soldiers stripped him, beat him and left him shackled naked to his bed overnight. "Sleep management program was requested but paperwork has not been approved yet," the entry reads.
The Post obtained a digital copy of the logbook by e-mail and took several steps to verify its authenticity. Pentagon officials said the Criminal Investigations Division evidence tag on the log's back cover, dated Jan. 19, matches the tag placed on the original logbook. Army officials who reviewed a copy of the logbook said its contents appeared to be consistent with what investigators have learned about the prison.
Sgt. Hydrue S. Joyner, who testified in a preliminary court hearing that he started the logbook on Oct. 19, 2003, reviewed The Post's copy and said it appeared to be complete and accurate. Joyner declined to discuss the entries but pointed out his own handwriting and said he last saw the book when he gave it to a military Criminal Investigations Division agent Jan. 19.
The book shows that soldiers repeatedly counted the detainees, worked to get prisoners better food and clothing, and made sure those who were ill got to see the facility's medics. The MPs noted that some detainees had problems urinating, suffered from constipation or lacked proper medication.
"Inmate #20092 continues to refuse to eat anything," Joyner wrote. "He will have to receive another I.V. from medical."
These guard duties were performed by a unit untrained in detention operations, at a facility that came under frequent enemy attack. The soldiers were forced to improvise. Detainees who were hard to control or had mental problems were handcuffed to their beds or fully restrained.
One detainee kept trying to kiss the guards. One ate chicken bones. Some would secret away weapons, such as sharpened toothbrushes, razors, medical needles and guns.
"Conducted bed check and prisoner count," begins a Dec. 18 entry. "Note: Inmate #116451 was placed into isolation quiet room because night shift passed on that he attempted to burn the wood blocking his window. Once I came on shift I spoke to the inmate about the incident and he admitted to trying to commit suicide. . . . Note: After last night's incident, NO MATCHES are to be given to inmates."
None of the entries clearly states that military intelligence officials were asking the MPs to do anything abusive, as attorneys for some of the MPs have alleged. Numerous entries refer to military intelligence asking MPs to help keep detainees awake for long periods to break them down for questioning.
"The logbook certainly validates what Army investigators subsequently found about the environmental conditions inside the prison, the combat conditions outside the facility and the challenges the soldiers faced," said Col. Joseph G. Curtin, an Army spokesman. "It also validates that the behavior of these soldiers was unacceptable."
The logbook for the first time shows Cpl. Charles A. Graner Jr. noting in his own words that he was unhappy receiving oral instructions from military intelligence personnel. Graner and six other MPs have been charged in the abuse. Two MPs have pleaded guilty, and the most senior of the soldiers, Staff Sgt. Ivan L. "Chip" Frederick, was sentenced to eight years in prison last week.
"Per MI . . . unless told to put pressure on an MI inmate do not do so," reads an entry that bears Graner's name on Oct. 25, 2003, at a time when some of the most serious abuses were occurring. "I will now request everything to be in writting [sic] since it seems one MI handler does not know what the other one is requesting with verbal orders."
In an entry from Graner on Oct. 26, writing about three mysterious inmates brought in by U.S. agents: "It has been over three days since OGA inmates were placed in cells 8 and 13. When subjects were first placed on block verbal instructions were that both would be placed on a sleep plan of 20 hours up and 4 hours down. No paperwork has been issued to verify this. Until this is put down on paper, the sleep plan is stopping at this point."
Some Army officials said Graner's entries could very well be the work of someone covering their inappropriate behavior. There are omissions of events, such as the sexual humiliation that was captured on the soldiers' cameras. Graner did not return e-mail requests for comment, and Graner's civilian attorney did not return several calls to his office in Texas and to his cell phone.
Members of the 372nd have said privately that they were asked to put detainees through physical training to keep them awake during these sleep management programs, but that they were not told specifically what they could and could not do.
"Those who knew the rules and knew how to act, we just had them do things we would have done in basic training, like running and push-ups," said the soldier from the 372nd. "I could see how someone could misinterpret that into thinking they could do whatever they wanted."
Whatever the sleep programs encompassed, they were abruptly altered in January after the photographs surfaced, according to the logbook. A series of entries shows that standards for sleep programs "will be revised" and that such programs for three inmates would be suspended immediately. On Jan. 16, the log shows that all of the ghost detainees would be "taken out of their cells, processed, and given numbers."
Some of the ghost detainees were put on disruptive sleep programs and interrogated in a shower room and in a stairwell -- locations where some of the photographs of abuse also were taken.
Pentagon officials, including Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, initially said there were only one or two such secret holds. Subsequent investigations revealed numerous such detainees, and the logbook shows that there were consistently three to 10 ghost detainees at Abu Ghraib from mid-October into January.
The inspectors general of the Pentagon and CIA "are working together to look into that specific issue," said Bryan Whitman, a Pentagon spokesman.
The final entry in the logbook, by Joyner on Jan. 18, shows that the prison leadership wanted things to change, and fast. Joyner, praised by inmates in investigative reports for helping them, has not been charged with a crime.
"The new directive for the Tier 1 Wing is as follows: We count the inmates and feed them," he wrote. "No more sleep management, etc." | | | | Alpha | | Posted: Tue Nov 02, 2004 6:22 pm Post subject: Navy Seal: CIA Roughed Up Iraqi Prisoner |
| The following stinks of Israeli involvement as General Janis Karpinski had mentioned that she met the Israeli interrogator working with US special forces at a detention facility near the Baghdad airport in Iraq:
http://www.nowarforisrael.com
http://www.nogw.com/warforisrael.html
It was in the NY times today.
Navy Seal: CIA Roughed Up Iraqi Prisoner
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Published: November 1, 2004
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SAN DIEGO (AP) -- The CIA interrogated and roughed up Iraqi prisoners in a ``romper room'' where a handcuffed and hooded terror suspect was kicked, slapped and punched shortly before he died last year at the Abu Ghraib prison, a Navy SEAL testified Monday.
Blood was visible on the hood worn by the prisoner, Manadel al-Jamadi, as he was led into the interrogation room at Baghdad International Airport in November 2003, the Navy commando said at a military pretrial hearing for another SEAL accused of abusing Iraqi prisoners.
Testifying under a grant of immunity, the witness, identified only by his rank as a hospital corpsman, said he kicked al-Jamadi several times, slapped him in the back of the head and punched him. Five or six other CIA personnel in the room laid their hands on the prisoner, he said, but he did not provide details.
Sometime later, al-Jamadi was found dead in a shower room at Abu Ghraib less than an hour after two CIA personnel brought him into Abu Ghraib as a so-called ``ghost detainee,'' according to Army Maj. Gen. George R. Fay's report on the notorious prison. Such detainees were not listed in the normal roster of military prisoners.
The testimony about the CIA's role came during a hearing for an aviation boatswain's mate who is accused of punching al-Jamadi and posing in humiliating photos with the prisoner. The boatswain's mate allegedly twisted other prisoners' testicles and struck a prisoner in the buttocks with a wooden board.
An Article 32 hearing, the military equivalent of a civilian grand jury, was held to determine whether the boatswain's mate should be court-martialed.
The hearing concluded Monday. An investigating officer will recommend what charges, if any, the boatswain's mate should face.
The accused SEAL, who received the Purple Heart for wounds suffered in Iraq, could get up to 11 years in prison if convicted. | | | | | ©2002-2009 WarWithoutEnd.co.uk |
